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A Gendered Perspective on Draft EIA Notification

This is to place MAKAAM's (Mahila Kisan Adhikaar Manch) strong reservations with and objections against the recently introduced draft Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) notification 2020. MAKAAM endorses and reiterates some of the major concerns that have been highlighted by several environmental experts and civil society organisations, which are as follows: excluding certain categories of projects from the scope of public consultations irrespective of the socio-ecological damage they might cause; reducing the time frames for public consultations in other categories of projects; legalising post-facto environmental clearances thereby weakening the already shrinking spaces for rural women to participate in and influence decision-making processes; increasing the validity period of environmental clearances, thereby facilitating resource grabbing; minimising the role of the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) due to reduced frequency of submission of EIA compliance reports, although the comptroller and auditor general audit in 2016 had pointed out a low rate of submission of reports by the projects sampled under the audit, across 10 regional offices.

Most significantly, the provision for the post-facto clearance through the "provisional clearance" clause (p 31, pt 15) will encourage a culture of non-compliance, contrary to the interests of environmental protection, as well as encourage a mere payoff for violations, rather than an earlier provision of imprisonment as deterrence against violations (p 30, pt 8).

Draft EIA notification 2020 is a further step in diluting the role of communities that depend on the environment for their survival. As has been highlighted by environmental experts, MAKAAM believes that it is time that we reframe and restructure the EIA based on sound science combined with a more grounded, gendered understanding of the environment, rather than tweak it with reductive amendments.

Women are the worst affected by the destruction of forests, waterbodies, lands, commons and other natural resources that they depend on for their survival. Often, the agrarian crisis pushes the men out in search of work, leaving the women behind to manage the degraded lands and impoverished households.

The acquisition of lands and forest areas, waterbodies and other commons for "development," irrespective of people's pending claims and in contravention of other legislations that provide for due process to be followed in such instances, have only led to increasing the burden of unpaid care work of women, an issue that unfortunately receives less attention in the critique of development projects.

The acquisition of forestlands, grasslands, waterbodies not only affect the flora and fauna of those systems, but have a deep-seated impact on agriculture as well. Women and other small and marginal farmers practising agroecological agriculture depend on these symbiotic relations. Their long-standing knowledge and understanding, which has evolved over generations, is critical in the care and conservation of the environment. Women from rural and tribal areas have shown that such ecological ways of knowing are necessarily participatory and symbiotic.

There are ongoing efforts across the country by women and youth groups to save the environment. Some of these have largely been motivated by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that India is a signatory to, and also in response to the call given by our Prime Minister to move towards chemical-free agriculture. Women have battled hard to claim a space for their concerns of environment livelihoods and well-being in the legal frameworks that currently recognise their role and space in the context of forest and water environmental rights enshrined in the Constitution of India. Given this brief background, MAKAAM has the following recommendations for the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change: (i) Revoke the draft EIA 2020 notification with immediate effect;

Note to Readers

Dear Readers,

Owing to certain logistical reasons, this is a combined issue for 8 August and 15 August 2020.

(ii) Without rushing into further tweaking the draft notification, hold widespread consultations towards reframing the EIA based on sound science and a grounded and gendered understanding of the environment, including agroecosystems;

However, in the immediate term, ensure that:

(i) No projects are given the green signal before the necessary EIA and SIA are completed;

(ii) No categories of projects are excluded from the EIA and thereby public consultations;

(iii) EIA reports are not commissioned by the proponents of the projects but by third-party independent entities, whether government or private, through the selection of credible institutions/persons with expertise, including gender and equity expertise;

(iv) Time frames for public consultations are adequate and not for a short period of 20 days as proposed.

We are certain that the minister for environment, forest and climate change would heed the voice of women farmers and revoke the draft EIA notification 2020 and call for wider consultations for a more holistic framing of environmental impacts.

Akole Tsuhah, Anita Paul, Archana Singh, Ashalatha, Bhanuja, Fathima Burnad, Gargie Mangulkar and 15 others

PUNE

PM-GKRA: A Case Study of Beed

Beed, like the other Marathwada districts in Maharashtra, is characterised by a constant water crisis-making agriculture, unfeasible especially for those who do not own large farmlands. Almost a third of the population migrates to the "sugar-belt" districts in Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh during the sugar cane harvest period, to work as cane cutters. A "contractor," called a *mukkadam,* hired by the sugar factory, works as a middleman in sourcing labour for cane cutting. This contractor hires one couple as one unit, paying them ₹250 per ton on average. This seasonal employment from October to March is often the only annual income for these cane cutters. Poverty, water scarcity, exploitation at the hands of the contractors and an alarming rate of farmer suicides has been the reality in Beed for a while now. The COVID-19 pandemic has only made things worse.

This district has seen the return of over 2.5 lakh migrant workers in the last few months, the highest in Maharashtra and significantly higher than the criteria set for the Pradhan Mantri Gareeb Kalyan Rojgar Abhiyan (PM-GKRA). The lockdown started in the end of March, which already marks the end of the seasonal employment that people from Beed receive in sugar cane cutting. In addition to the return of these seasonal migrants are the ones who left, in the past few years, for cities like Mumbai, Pune, Aurangabad in search of higher wages and a more permanent job. Both kinds of returning migrants now face a crippling lack of employment opportunities in their home district. Consequently, the demand for Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) works is the highest it has been in the last decade.

The government ought to tread cautiously here, for this rise in demand in turn can have a dual effect. First, on the rural agrarian and female labourers, including the sugar cane workers, for whom MGNREGA was launched in the first place. In the summer months, agricultural jobs dry up, and this form of employment proves essential for them. If the rise in demand is not met with an adequate rise in funds and MGNREGA opportunities, they might lose out to the younger and physically stronger workers who have returned from the city. The second effect is on these migrants returning due to the lockdown, who are semi-skilled or skilled workers, and for whom the works offered by MGNREGA are inferior both in terms of skill set and pay grade. Therefore, shifting the burden of the increased demand for employment onto MGNREGA could become a lose-lose situation for both the residents and the returning migrant workers of Beed.

This is why the PM-GKRA is more likely to be a better fit for them, as the new scheme incorporates the skills of these workers while assigning them to a specific job. An excess in demand for employment faced with an incredibly low supply of work makes the authors wonder why a district like Beed was left out of the Prime Minister's new employment scheme. Although the six states selected for the launch of PM-GKRA are empowered-action-group states that have traditionally been low-performing; if the qualifying criteria was simply the quantum of returnee migrants, a district like Beed deserves equal attention. But, would including Beed and other such districts under the PM-GKRA solve the problems at hand? Some questions remain unanswered. For instance, the wage paid to these workers is unclear. Second, if they wait for success in 116 districts and then launch the scheme in districts like Beed, that would be after 125 days (4 months) or essentially seven months into the COVID-19 crisis. That is certainly too long a wait for this district, wherein people are in dire need of employment opportunities.

Finally, we must also keep in mind the fact that the scheme is being implemented through common service centres (CSCs). The visible levels of implementation obstacles, lack of accountability and transparency in payments in CSCs are well known. Therefore, while launching a scheme close to the MGNREGA formula might seem like a sigh of relief for returning migrants, in reality, the case study of Beed highlights that the scheme is poorly thought out, with little consideration of the fact that there are several districts apart from the included "aspirational districts" that witness a high number of returnees demanding employment. We suggest that the inclusion/exclusion criteria be set solely on the basis of existing employment opportunities and the number of returning migrants, and each district be evaluated independently so that districts like Beed do not lose out on benefits under the garb of being in "high-performing" states.

Mugdha Kinjawadekar, Anoushka Roy

BENGALURU

EPW Engage

The following article has been published in the past week in the *EPW* Engage section (www.epw.in/engage).

((1) Wet Markets and Food Laws in India: What is Needed to Ensure Safety and Hygiene? —*Parikshit Goyal*

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In the Wilderness

The new National Education Policy creates problems at all levels of education.

Education in India functions like two systemic discs placed one on top of another. The larger, lower disc is historically older and functions mainly with state-level resources and serves a provincial population. The higher, smaller disc—popularly perceived as "central"—is a later creation, its birth dating roughly to the same period when denser relations among provinces were evolving, both in politics and markets in the early 20th century. Exam boards act as greasy buffers between the two discs. State boards maintain regional order through their higher rates of failure, while a central board (in addition to a private one) allows regional elites to transcend their social surroundings and compete in a restricted national arena. A supra-administrative device to coordinate the two systemic discs was invented in 1919. It still exists, and the newly formulated National Education Policy (NEP) says that it will be strengthened. Known as the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE), this coordinating device has had no statutory powers, nor does the NEP 2020 present such a prospect. Instead, it proposes a slew of structures to help the centre perform a widening array of regulatory roles. While some of these structures are reincarnations of older ones, others will be added to control the wilderness, which will expand to enable offshore outfits of foreign universities to flourish.

The NEP was in the works for over five years. That it got ready to be announced in the middle of a pandemic could hardly be a choice. The text carries only a few passing references to this, and at one place (p 38), a "scenario of epidemics and pandemics" is mentioned as if the present one is about to end and we are prepared for others. Clearly, the NEP does not anticipate COVID-19 to pose any major challenge to the resources that even a partial implementation might require. Nor does it respond to the advisories issued by United Nations (UN) bodies concerned with the young. The NEP lists no pandemic-related challenges. Hence, the promise that the combined centre–state public expenditure on education will reach the 6% level etched by late D S Kothari 54 years ago must be read, at the present moment, in the context of a likely shrinkage of the gross domestic product itself.

The most difficult issues we can anticipate in India have to do with children, and their right to the eight-year-long elementary education legislated merely a decade ago. By clubbing three years of preschool with the first two grades of the primary, the NEP creates formidable problems for the further progress of an already embattled the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE). Urban private crèches and nurseries have already blurred the distinction between preschool and school education. Now, if anganwadis are also given a formal role, the havoc of three long years of so-called learning before Grade 1 will do incalculable damage to an already embattled childhood. The NEP proposes a National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT)-made curricular glue to attach the three nursery years to the first two years of primary schooling. Policymakers are surely aware of the effort that the NCERT and many others have put in over the decades to convince the middle class that learning prematurely is no learning.

The primary school represents the weakest stage in our education system; it will become weaker now. Its vulnerability to gender and caste-based prejudices had just started to be recognised. Progress on these difficult fronts demands more than obeisance to equity. The upper primary stage, says the NEP, will be imbued with vocational experience. The reason why earlier policymakers delayed vocational learning was to ensure that a highly stratified social set-up is prevented from segmenting children's life at school. The NEP's post-RTE discourse revives the parlance of non-formal education of the 1970s' vintage, featuring community volunteers to facilitate a minimalist curricular agenda. Their involvement contradicts the promise to professionalise teachers. The RTE will also be hollowed out by reversal to exams and frequent testing to chase down skeletal outcomes in literacy and numeracy. A hard-won right to comprehensive elementary education will shrink into a shadow.

In higher education, the NEP overlooks the historical evolution of a system that allowed provincial aspirations to be accommodated in an elite-dominated system. Affiliated colleges represented this arrangement. Many worshippers of excellence have hated them, and now, the policy expects them to vanish into a novel futuristic landscape. Institutional mergers and greater dependence on disseminative technology will set the new direction. The push to introduce United States (US)-type organisational practices has been on for some time. The NEP promises to continue this push, despite the persistence of adverse evidence. The four-year bachelor's degree—that shook the University of Delhi, and then failed—will be tried again. The prospect of a forceful shift from the old British-style archetype to the flexible US model has a distinct postcolonial echo conveying fascination with new masters. The NEP lauds indigenous resources, but welcomes foreign universities. It carries ample evidence of an ongoing struggle between the old impulse to control and the new impulse to let go. Both impulses enjoy political correctness today. While this struggle is on, the public institutional apparatus continues to decay. Its major role is to deliver social justice, while private institutions serve those who can pay.

The 1986 policy was followed by a programme of action (PoA) in 1992 when implications of economic reforms had started to surface. When the economic effects of COVID-19 become palpable, the NEP 2020 may get its PoA. At that time, the lower, provincial disc that covers the vast majority of the young will indicate the speed at which it can be pushed. The CABE will, once again, prove its historical worth by allowing India's educational complexity to be revealed for those who insist on missing it.

Recurring Flood Disasters

Integrated and long-term solutions are needed to mitigate the adverse impacts of floods.

With the early onset of the monsoon, heavy rainfall and concomitant flooding have caused widespread destruction and loss of lives, livestock and crops in many parts of the country. Although floods occur annually, this time around, the floods occurring at the time of the rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country had slowed down the mitigation and relief efforts, which has, in effect, exacerbated the scale and intensity of the crises. This has caused undue hardship, especially for the poor who have been disproportionately affected, and bear the brunt of both calamities, with the natural disaster and the pandemic occurring at the same time. Of the 10 states that have been the worst affected, the devastation has been most severe in Bihar and Assam.

The major rivers in Bihar, such as Koshi, Gandak, Bagmati, Burhi Gandak and Adhwara, had been flowing above the danger levels after Bihar received excess rainfall during June and July. After heavy rains in north Bihar and catchment areas, rivers breached their embankments at several places in the state, as the pressure on them had increased after the water levels rose in rivers after heavy rains. The release of excess water from the Koshi and Gandak barrages also led to flooding in several areas downstream, forcing people to flee to higher ground to safety. Breaching of embankments has also been caused due to the poor quality of flood-control measures undertaken, including that of the repair and maintenance of embankments. This was also because the prolonged pandemic-induced lockdown had delayed the routine flood-control measures undertaken before the onset of the monsoon each year.

After the commencement of the nationwide lockdown, the repair and maintenance of embankments were put on hold till mid-May. The work resumed only after the government eased the lockdown. Moreover, such work was completed hurriedly by June-end, compromising the quality of the work undertaken by contractors. However, the monsoon had arrived in the state on 13 June 2020. The embankments were under severe pressure due to the rise in the riverbed levels due to heavy silt brought down by the rivers from Nepal. The embankment of Gandak river was breached in East Champaran, while others, such as the Baruli embankment in Gopalganj district and the embankment of Bagmati river in Darbhanga district, were also breached. The series of breaching of embankments caused floodwaters to rush into hundreds of villages, causing widespread damage and destruction.

According to the situation report published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), as on 12 August 2020, a total of 77,18,000 people in 16 districts in Bihar had been affected by floods. Districts such as Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, East Champaran, Supaul, Sitmarhi and Madhubani have been among the worst affected. While 24 people died in the floods, 12,479 persons are housed in relief camps in the state. The floods also damaged kharif crops of thousands of farmers, as fields were submerged under floodwaters.

The flood situation in Assam has also been very severe with two waves of floods, which has been further exacerbated by the spread of the pandemic. About 136 people lost their lives in floods and flood-related incidents, such as landslides, and a total of 56,89,584 people had been affected across 30 districts of Assam, while 1,56,874 persons are housed in relief camps in the state, according to the situation report of the MHA. The Brahmaputra river was in spate in Jorhat, Sonitpur, Goalpara and Dhubri. Floodwaters also damaged two embankments in Jorhat district as well as many roads in Chirang, Barpeta, Majuli and Goalpara districts, while the Buroi river caused severe erosion in various parts of Biswanath district. Most parts of Kaziranga and Orang National Parks and the Pobitora Wildlife Sanctuary were submerged in the floods, putting the lives of endangered animals in peril.

In both Bihar and Assam, the approach of the government policies to mitigate the impact of floods has been mainly focused on building embankments. However, the increasing intensity of floods had made these embankments largely ineffective. Moreover, no cost–benefit analysis has been done so far to determine the effectiveness of embankments. The devastation caused by the floods have also increased over the years due to human interventions, such as encroachment of the floodplains and riverbeds as well as sand mining, deforestation in the catchment areas, encroachment on wetlands and changed cropping patterns.

Environmentalists have argued that an approach that integrates water management with land use planning, agriculture, and ecology is needed to manage floods. For a long-term sustainable solution, a "basin-wide approach" that would bring together all the basin-sharing countries and states has been advocated to address the problem at the source. Additionally, it needs to be recognised that the political and economic systems that prioritise overconsumption and growth have also led to the destruction of nature. This being the root cause of recurring natural disasters, there is an urgent need to pursue alternative models of development that also accord importance to nature and its conservation.

Can Concepts Cross Disciplinary Boundaries?

Many people have chosen to see novelty in the new National Education Policy (NEP) that has been recently announced by the central government, while others, understandably, have expressed their scepticism, about the lofty claims the policymakers have made about it. One point that should draw our attention in this debate is the retention of some concepts within and across disciplinary boundaries. One, however, is still left guessing about which concepts from the proposed syllabus have been retained and which have been dropped. The NEP 2020 does not seem to be categorical in stating the origin of language of these concepts. Where are these concepts coming from? Does their origin lie in English, Sanskrit or the regional languages? Moreover, the NEP 2020 does not state which concepts have the cognitive capacity to cross individual disciplinary boundaries and conceptually enrich the much broader interdisciplinary field that has been one of the stated concerns of the NEP 2020.

In this regard, it is important to take note of the fact that some core concepts do originate in the public speeches that are made by activists–intellectuals in and through the sociopolitical struggle of the masses. Put differently, a network of communication that facilitates the transmission of concepts does exist beyond the textbooks and the closed-door transactions in the classrooms. The moot point would be to see whether these struggle concepts with a mass social base do travel from the regional language and enter the classroom transactions.

Educational institutions with communication networks generally do not try to establish an interface between the classroom concepts and concepts that emerge from the mass struggle. Concepts entering upon the classroom or the sophisticated laboratory within which the disciplinary experts are likely to subject these concepts are put to rigorous refinement. Refinement may reach the degree where the concepts from the masses would lose their critical political edge. These concepts face exclusion at the hands of the policymakers.

The political life of the concepts gets enlarged when they are produced and explained by the activist–public intellectual. While there are many who do enlarge the meaning of concepts, there is one noteworthy organic intellectual whose creative and subversive use of concept formation has been deep, but has remained unnoticed. He is Annabhau Sathe, an organic intellectual whose birth centenary is currently being celebrated in Maharashtra. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasise that Annabhau's vocabulary is not conceptually arcane to be shared only by a privileged few; it, in fact, is for the common masses. It seeks to guard the masses against the influence of "mystery mongers."

He has produced several concepts and communicated them powerfully to the toiling masses. One of these fundamental concepts that he generated is the concept of labour. Annabhau possessed a unique communicative capacity to establish revolutionary significance of the concepts of labour. He imaginatively used the process of inversion of the mythical nature of the concepts of labour. In the mythological projection of labour, it has been the belief according to which the earth is rested on the hood of a mythical serpent. In this mythical belief, the labourer who with his human labour power not only shaped the earth but gave it an aesthetic orientation, however, gets subsumed in the mythical hood. Annabhau seeks to invert this understanding when he says that earth is not rested on the hood, but has been sustained by the creative and active labouring hands of the toiling masses. Annabhau's radical inversion of the metaphor seeks to ground objective meaning in the labour and acknowledges the agency in labouring human beings. Annabhau is discovering the rational kernel not in the mythical hood of a serpent but in the hands of labourers, who, for Annabhau, are the creators of this world. In his reading, the mythical creation of the world is translated and transposed in the hands of the working classes. The concept of labour for Annabhau provides support to his radical argument that acknowledges the moral significance of labour.

The concept of labour that was formed and articulated by Annabhau in popular Marathi language resonates with the universal understanding it. After all, those thinkers who worked on the concept have necessarily abstracted the concept from the actual labouring processes. Annabhau and Karl Marx use different languages in order to abstract the concept from the same labouring processes. The NEP 2020, which has made lofty claims to achieve for India an universal calibre and credibility, will have to bring the conceptual in the regional "vernacular," which has universal potential to enrich the interdisciplinary understanding of the concept of labour.

In the recent context of NEP 2020, the important question that needs to be raised is the following: whether the presence of the private in the educational system would allow such a concept of labour to become part of the curriculum at different levels of educational institutions. Any discussion on labour is bound to put both the corporate as well as the government in a tight spot.

Gopal Guru

FROM 50 YEARS AGO

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Two Into Three Won't Go

Along sequence of intertwined moves has at last led to the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. Towards the end of last year, Israel began a series of airraids penetrating deep into Egypt and culminating in the killing of 38 school children at Bahr Al-Bakar. These raids were in retaliation for Egyptian belligerence on the Suez front and were intended to cow the Egyptian people into quietude. But the bombing had, as always, the opposite effect. The angry Egyptian response made Nasser visit Moscow last January. Moscow, probably worried over the danger to its large economic and military investment in Egypt, sent in Russian combat personnel to install and operate a sophisticated new air defence system. For the first time, the Americans be came seriously worried about the possibility of a Cuba-type confrontation with Russia, an eventuality which also began to worry the Russians. At the end of last June, the Americans put forward peace proposals, largely based on the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. In one respect, the American proposals differed from the resolution. They suggested a definite three-month cease-fire which has now been accepted by Israel and Egypt.

Crime Redefined
The State, Dissent and Democracy

G N DEVY

The coronavirus, a phenomenon not fully understood as yet, has forced humans to revisit many of their dearly held social habits and norms. It has also led people to float new habits and norms. One of them relates to the notions of crime.

Recently, Jeyaraj and Beniks, father and son, were allegedly beaten up, tortured and killed by Raghu Ganesh and Balakrishnan, police sub-inspectors posted at the Sathanukulam police station in Thoothukudi. As is normal, the Tamil Nadu Criminal Investigation Department arrested the cops, the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court ordered a probe, and the Central Bureau of Investigation was asked to take over the case. What is not normal is the act that was perceived as "crime." The two persons killed had been late by half an hour in downing the shutters of their small shop. The police officers felt duty-bound to point out the violation of the COVID-19-related business hour regulation. A great tragedy for all four—the killed and the killers—and their families took place. The brutality involved can never be justified in any civilised society. That, however, cannot be said of the idea of crime in this instance. Sociologists Émile Durkheim had pointed out decades ago that what the formal methods of dealing with crime judge as being crime, may, in the first place, be founded on almost an "airy nothing."

Interpretation of Crime

In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim (1938) writes:

> Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes, properly so-called, will there be unknown; but faults, which appear venial to the layman, will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offence does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, the society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such.

Had this bizarre incident been just one off, the question would not have acquired such an urgency. There have been far too many—mob lynchings, khaap panchayat dictats denying individual freedom, fatwas by sectarian-orthodox bodies, media trials and ostracisation of individuals holding different views as "anti-national" by ideological groups. Their rising occurrence calls for analysis. None of these can be justified, but even an attempt to justify them could be entertained had India not been a democracy and were it not accountable to the constitutional norms. But, the undeniable fact of history is that the immense diversity of people, culture, language and faith is held together as one nation by their allegiance to the Constitution that proclaims a non-negotiable guarantee to justice (social, economic and political), liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship) and equality (of status and opportunity). The preamble is "absolute" in every sense of that term. What sadly is not in step with the values enshrined in it is the tendentious interpretation of what crime is. I offer two apparently distinct but fundamentally linked cases.

Trajectory of the DNT Category

The first of these revolves around the term DNT stands for Denotified and Nomadic Tribes, the second around Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). It needs mention, particularly now as we approach the 150th year of the mind-boggling misreading of the notion of crime by the colonial administrators. It was during the 1820s that the East India Company administration started feeling threatened by stray groups of soldiers disbanded by the defeated Indian states, still in possession of their arms. In order to disarm them and to eliminate the challenge they would have posed, the administration started a "surveillance and survey project." William Henry Sleeman (1788–1856), a soldier by training, was appointed to head the mission. For the next few decades, Sleeman kept a meticulous record of armed clashes taking place in central India and prepared a list of people, by their castes, involved in such incidents. In 1870, a century and half ago, Lord Mayo, who was recently sent to India as viceroy, started working towards a legislation; and in October 1871, the first Criminal Tribes Act (CTA) was passed, with an annexure listing a number of communities and castes, drawn upon the lists previously made by Sleeman. The basic premise of the CTA, 1871 was fundamentally flawed as it had conceptualised "crime" as "a hereditary occupation," this too based on Sleeman's deeply mistaken understanding of violent clashes and the myth of "Thuggee" he had so successfully floated among the British readers of his books.

The first CTA went through subsequent revisions till the last amendment to it in 1924; and in each of the amendments the list of the "Notified Castes/communities" continued to expand. The result was that all persons brought within its scope, irrespective of what they did or did not do, were seen by law as "criminal" or "potentially criminal." Strict area restrictions were imposed on them. Their long-distance movements were curbed. A larger portion of them was detained within the reformatory settlements—read, soft prisons—and forced to contribute unpaid labour to various projects of laying railway tracks, building dams and public buildings. Children and women were not exempted from this punishment, nor were they offered recourse to any court or legal process of redemption. The anger against this brutal treatment among the notified communities was so high that Lord Mayo was murdered by Sher Ali Afridi, held prisoner in Andaman, in February 1872, four months after the passage of the CTA. Afridi was hanged in March 1873. While Sleeman, Mayo and Afridi, all had died by 1873, millions of notified communities continued to languish in their settlements for decades, generation after generation. They were not freed immediately upon the proclamation of Indian freedom. That took some five years until, in August 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru decided to "Denotify" them and to replace the CTA by a Habitual Offenders Act. Prior to the CTA, 1871 these communities had essentially been nomadic in their habits. Since 1952, they are referred to as the DNT. The stigma attached to them persists. Their inclusion in either the Scheduled Tribes or the Scheduled Castes lists has been only partial. Being without land and any assured livelihood opportunities, they have kept surviving way below all of the indicators that define the "minimum human existence." Their estimated population in India today, in 2020, is close to 14 crore. They are testimony to what a tremendous man-made disaster can be caused by mistaken notions of crime and criminality.

Distorting the UAPA

The UAPA, which stands for the Unlawful Activities Prevention act, began with all good intentions and good international conduct. The United Nations (UN), in response to the 9/11 (2001) attack by Al-Qaeda, sensing the need to have a legislative backing for the anti-terrorism drive initiated by the member states had requested the community of nations in November 2001 to form suitable laws.

After several related UN resolutions and particularly the UN Security Council Resolution 1822 of 2008, India formed its UAPA. The amendment to it in 2019, passed through Parliament in August altered Section 35 of the UAPA and made it applicable to "individuals" as well, while in the past, it could be applied to "organisations" alone. The results of this "re-interpretation" are before us. The use of the UAPA against individuals who raise uncomfortable questions, coupled with a plaint judiciary, has now become a deadly instrument for suppressing thought and ideas.

During the National Democratic Alliance government 2014–19, the killing of thinkers like M N Kalburgi and Gauri Lankesh had caused a massive public protest. The arrests under UAPA do not, cannot, create such protests given the very nature of the law. Terrorist activities and sedition are terms that immediately place even a completely innocent individual under a heavy cloud of public suspicion, once charged so by the state. However, in the process, the state is turning free-thinking, holding divergent views, dissent and disagreement on important public issues into "a crime." As it happened in the past with communities that were perfectly innocent but were brought under the spectre of suspicion as "being potentially criminal," the current regime is bringing dissent under the labels like "sedition" and "terrorism." Regimes, by the very nature of how they are constituted, will always find it convenient for them to use law with a semantic twist whenever possible. However, the Constitution, and the fundamental rights guaranteed by it, are bound to get seriously corroded in the process. Yet, to put it in correct historical sequence, governments are creatures of the Constitution. When a regime wilfully ignores the need to deepen it by respecting the guarantees given by it to the people who uphold the Constitution, it displays an imperfect understanding of the historical relationship between the people, the Constitution, and their joint creature, the government. The blatant demonisation of dissent ultimately hurts those who are vying to hurt the foundation of our democracy.

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Why Bihar's Record in Handling COVID-19 Is Dismal

UMESH KUMAR RAY

Among the states, Bihar faces the greatest challenge, particularly in terms of the reverse migration occurring from the lockdown following the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering the poor state of its health services infrastructure, the state government should have taken urgent and appropriate measures to screen, test and quarantine the returning migrant workers. This article takes a look at the trajectory of the government's response to the health crisis.

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Bihar, the second most populous state, has poor infrastructure overall, but especially so in the health sector. The state has witnessed the transfer of the principal secretary of its health department for the second time since 22 March 2020 (*Hindu* 2020; PTI 2020). This is a stark illustration of how the COVID-19 global pandemic is taking on an ugly shape in the state with each passing day. It is also facing severe floods leading to 19 deaths and around 66.60 lakh people from 16 districts being affected by the deluge as on 5 August 2020 (Government of Bihar 2020a).

Bihar has reported 64,732 COVID-19 positive cases and 369 deaths till 5 August 2020 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2020). The state began detecting these cases rather late, though the first infection came to light on 22 March when the patient's test results were reported after his death. He had a history of foreign travel and had met a number of people before he died. Now, after almost four and half months following that case, it appears, then, that a number of factors converged to create this situation, ranging from the government's negligence to poor infrastructure to lack of transparency and willpower to contain the infection.

Low Testing

Even as COVID-19 cases were increasing in over a dozen states in the country, Bihar did not have a single laboratory to test COVID-19-related samples. The testing laboratory for COVID-19 was started at the Rajendra Memorial Research Institute in Bihar on 6 March, but with just 500 test kits (*Prabhat Khabar* 2020). However, its pace was extremely slow, and by 20 March, it had examined only 79 samples, that is, on an average, four samples were being tested daily. As of 22 March, 130 samples were tested, out of which three persons were found to be COVID-19 positive. By 31 March, the number of patients infected with the virus in Bihar had risen to 22, a sevenfold increase in nine days and there was one death.

As of 30 April, a total of 22,672 samples were tested, of which 409 people were found to be positive and two died. The number of workers returning to Bihar from other states in April was minimal. A total of 75,737 tests were conducted till 31 May, that is, 53,065 tests were conducted from 1 May to 31 May. Of these, 3,283 people were infected. In May, 21 people died due to COVID-19 infection. Similarly, a total of 1,45,153 tests were carried out in June, out of which 6,052 people were found to be positive and 45 among them died. Tests in July stood at 3,04,540, and a total of 40,457 people were found to be infected with the virus. The highest number of deaths was 217 in July (Bihar Health Department 2020).

The above figures show that despite the increase in infection and death over the months, the number of sample testing simply did not keep pace. The testing of COVID-19 samples in May increased by 334% over April, while the number of infected increased by 902.6% and deaths by 1,150%. Similarly, in June, the number of testing of samples increased by 291.65% as compared to May, while there was an increase of 263.9% in positive cases and 295.65% in cases of death. Positive cases and death figures in July were higher compared to June. A total of 3,08,257 tests were conducted in July, 237.86% higher than in June, but the number of positive cases shows that it increased by 492.62% compared to June and recorded a 419% increase in deaths.

With the increase in the number of positive cases, the Bihar government on 11 May ordered the health department to test around 10,000 samples daily. On 30 June, Chief Minister Nitish Kumar further ordered the tests to be increased to 15,000 samples daily, but until his second order, less than 9,000 samples were being tested daily (*TNN* 2020).

According to the data made public on 4 July by NITI Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant, Bihar was conducting 2,197 tests per

10 lakh population, which was the lowest among the 10 states included in the list (Kant's twitter handle).

The central team, which came to Bihar on 19 July to take stock of the preparations to fight the pandemic, also expressed concerns over low testing in the state. This team included the Joint Secretary of the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Lav Agarwal, S K Singh, National Centre for Disease Control and Neeraj Nischal of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS). It expressed concern about the rapid growth of COVID-19 cases in Bihar and said that low testing could lead to the spread of the infection. According to the team, far fewer samples were being tested in Bihar than the national average and the identification of late infections could lead to increase in mortality (Kumar and Swaroop 2020).

The Indian Medical Association (Bihar chapter) secretary Sunil Kumar pointed out:

> There were lapses in testing and quarantining the workers who came here, people run from centres, some dodged the screening. All those lapses are now costing the state people. People are dying due to negligence. (Pandey 2020)

Dismal Health Infrastructure

At a time when COVID-19 cases were being reported in six states in the country, the Bihar government had not even started an isolation ward. The first isolation ward in Bihar started on 6 March, that too with just seven beds, in the Nalanda Medical College and Hospital (NMCH). It was later announced as the first dedicated COVID-19 hospital in the state (*Prabhat Khabar* 2020). Till 18 July, Bihar had 2,800–2,900 isolation beds in dedicated COVID-19 hospitals (Kumar 2020). The health sector has been ignored since decades in the state and the results of that are evident now in the time of this crisis. Bihar continues to face an acute shortage of medical colleges, community health centres, primary health centres, doctors and allied medical personnel.

Against the need for 40 medical colleges and hospitals in Bihar, it has only nine. Around 38 district hospitals are needed but only 36 are functional, and while 212 sub-divisional hospitals are required, there are only 44 at present. The condition of the community health centres and primary health centres is even worse. The state needs 838 community health centres but does not have a single one yet. Again, against the need for 3,314 primary health centres, only 533 centres are operational. Sub-health centres should ideally number 20,997, but currently, only 9,728 centres are functioning (Government of Bihar 2020b).

Bihar's ranking in terms of health services is also poor. It has slipped from the 19th position to 20th position in the World Bank's ranking of 21 major states on various aspects of health. The ranking has been calculated based on the performance in the base year 2015–16 and the reference year 2017–18. The basis of the ranking is on neonatal mortality rate, immunisation, HIV-infected population, deployment of medical officers in district-level health centres, vacant positions of health services providers and staff, facilities in referral units and activation of primary health centres.

According to this report, Bihar was 19th in the base year 2015–16 and got 38.46 scores, which came down to 32.11 in the reference year 2017–18. Although the decline in ranking and score has also occurred in eight other states, the biggest decline was seen in Bihar. Out of the 21 states that were included in this ranking, the maximum number of auxiliary nurse midwife (ANM) vacancies are in Bihar. In the base year 2015–16, 59.3% of ANM posts were vacant in Bihar, which increased to 59.5% in the reference year 2017–18. The vacancy of nurses in community and primary health centres increased from 50.3% to 50.7%. Similarly, 59.7% posts of specialist doctors in district hospitals are vacant (NITI Aayog, World Bank and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2019).

To add to the abysmal health infrastructure, Bihar's record in terms of governance, trust and accountability too has not been stellar.

Vikash R Keshri (2020), senior research fellow at the George Institute for Global Health who worked for a long time in Bihar, has opined in an article he wrote on a news website that the state's current state of healthcare has suffered due to the lack of "prominence in the state's and national policy agenda." He points out that the state's health department is heavily centralised and coordinates activities at a number of levels and among different services. The lack of expert and qualified medical personnel at its helm only adds to the inability to deal with public health concerns and even the impact of political control, Keshri observes.

Migrant Workers Ignored

Around 5.2 million people hailing from Bihar stay and work in different states of the country (Kumar and Bhagat 2012). When the lockdown started in the country, they were faced with a crisis of livelihood, which forced a larger number of them to return to their home state. Initially, Chief Minister Nitish Kumar was not in favour of receiving these migrants back home, but after pressure from opposition parties and public alike, he finally agreed. On 1 May, the railway ministry decided to send labourers to their home states via Shramik Special trains. With the start of these special trains, thousands of workers started returning to Bihar. At first, assuming that fewer workers would return, the government ordered the state disaster management department to build quarantine centres at the block level. When the block-level quarantine centres started filling up rapidly, the government issued an order to turn village schools into quarantine centres.

It was quite evident that the workers returning from other states were getting the virus infection, but in spite of this, the government kept changing the rules of testing of these workers and also refused to accelerate the tests. As mentioned above, the number of positive patients increased by 902.6% in May, as compared to April, which meant that there were more cases of infection among the labourers returning to Bihar. On 20 May, the official Twitter handle of the Bihar Health Department released the data on infection among the returnees. According to the shared data, a total of 1,607 cases of infection were reported in the state till 20 May, out of which 788 cases, or roughly 49% of total cases, were related to migrant workers. Interestingly, on that day, Sanjay Kumar, the principal secretary, health department, was transferred.

After 20 May, the government stopped making public a separate figure for infection among returned workers. A study by the Stanford University had included data, which was made public from 19 May to 1 June. The study says that the Bihar government does not publish data on its health department website. The Bihar Health Department publishes data on its official Twitter handle (Rumi 2020).

On 4 May, the principal secretary said that all returning migrants would be screened and kept in the block-level disaster management department's centres. They would be re-screened later and those with symptoms of the virus would be tested.

This rule was later changed. On 18 May, Pratyay Amrit, principal secretary, disaster management department, told all the district officials that workers coming from Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Surat, Ahmedabad and Kolkata would be kept at block-level quarantine centres and Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu. Those coming from Haryana should be kept in the panchayat-level quarantine centre, while those from other parts of the country would be kept in village-level quarantine centres.

After this, on 22 May, the disaster management department issued another letter and ordered that the workers returning to Bihar should be divided into two categories. Those coming from 11 risky cities like Surat, Ahmedabad, Mumbai, Pune, Delhi, Ghaziabad, Faridabad, Gurugram, Noida, Kolkata and Bengaluru should be kept in category one and the rest of the people in the category two centres. Those coming from the above-mentioned 11 cities were ordered to be kept at block-level quarantine centres for 14 days, and the workers in second category were allowed to go for home quarantine, provided they exhibited no symptoms.

Despite knowing that 80% of positive cases do not show any symptoms (are asymptomatic), allowing those without symptoms to home quarantine created a scope for infection at the community level.

Following the order of 22 May, the Bihar government issued another order on 31 May to finally close all quarantine centres by 14 June and also close the camps at the entry points in Bihar. It also said that there will be no divisional registration of workers returning after 1 June. On 31 May, Pratyay Amrit, principal secretary, disaster management department, issued a letter to all district officials of Bihar, citing Unlock-1.0 from 1 June. It said:

> (a) Disaster relief centres and border disaster relief centres running in the state to be closed with effect from 3rd June. (b) a request letter was sent to all the states to send the remaining migrant labourers through the *Shramik* special train by 1 June 2020. Therefore, passengers who come by the *Shramik* special train on or after June 1 will be kept in the block quarantine camp, but in any case, these camps will be operational till 15 June only. Since the normal train service will be operational and public transport will also be resumed from 1 June, the block level registration of people coming by any means other than *Shramik* special train will not take place after 1 June 2020.

However, the figures of quarantine centres issued by the disaster management department from time to time on its website indicate that they were already closed before the official letter was released. On 24 May, there were 14,472 block-level quarantine centres across Bihar, which decreased to 12,478 on 29 May. On 3 June, 10,739 quarantine centres were running. On 9 June, the disaster management department put the last data on the quarantine centres on its website, according to which 4,106 quarantine centres were operating in 534 blocks of Bihar, in which 92,629 people were living. No data was released after this. All these data are now removed from the website.

Increase in Screening

The Bihar government had also said that accredited social health activists (ASHAs) and other health workers would make door-to-door visits and screen those returning after Unlock-1.0. Bihar Deputy Chief Ministyer Sushil Kumar Modi had said, "According to experts, home quarantine is the best quarantine" (Singh 2020). However, since many of those returning to the state live in single-room homes with their families, home quarantine was hardly suitable.

The guidelines for a "contact" of those in home quarantine are clearly laid down by the union government. According to the guideline, a contact is a person living in the same household as a COVID-19 case; a person who had direct physical contact with a COVID-19 case or their infection secretions without recommended personal protective equipment (PPE) or with a possible breach of PPE or person who was in a closed environment or had face-to-face contact with a COVID-19 case at a distance of within one metre including air travel.

The contact should stay in a well-ventilated single room preferably with an attached or separate toilet. If another family member needs to stay in the same room, it is advisable to maintain a distance of at least 1 metre between the two.

Around 44.90% of houses in Bihar contain a single room, 30.07% have two rooms and 10.5% of houses have three rooms. A majority of homes have between four to eight members. Again, only 23.06% of the total houses in the state have toilet facilities inside the house. Apart from this, according to the 2011 Census, 8.20 lakh people live in slums, wherein one house contains six to seven residents who use the community toilets. In view of this poor housing condition, it can be easily estimated how effective home quarantine was.

Apart from this, door-to-door screening also had many flaws. In many places, the ASHAs did not ask questions related to the travel history. They only noted down the names of family members, address, and age and contact details like any other simple surveys. The teams also failed to visit many places. At some places, people complained that the team took down the details from neighbours and also did not properly conduct contract tracing (Ray 2020).

A large percentage of Bihar's population depends on daily wages and is thus most vulnerable because these workers go out for work in groups. The Bihar government needs to ensure that this population gets proper food supply when they do not get work. The central government had announced in March (later extended until November) that people would get foodgrains free of cost through the public distribution system. After this, the Nitish Kumar government announced free supply of five kilograms of rice and one kilogram of pulses for families. However, people are not getting the promised free ration and have to spend money to get foodgrains. The state government needs to monitor the distribution to ensure that people do get the free foodgrains (Zumbish 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic crisis should be treated as an opportunity by the state government to make up for the decades of sheer neglect of the health sector, especially the public health services.

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Need for a Strong and Reliable Statistical System in India

Lessons from a Pandemic

SUMIT MAZUMDAR

The evolution and organisation of the Indian statistical system is reviewed with particular emphasis on social sector statistics. In the light of recent experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic, some evident lacunae in the system of collecting, synchronising, and disseminating data from diverse sources are discussed. The critical need for better financing of the statistical agencies, facilitating homogeneous integration between different agencies, and promoting transparency, accountability, and autonomy of the statistical system are highlighted as key priorities.

Views are personal.

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As the COVID-19 pandemic continues its ominous, uncertain journey worldwide, the need for accurate, regular information on its spread and containment has been felt by all. But most of us do not readily realise that uninterrupted flow of accurate, reliable information is not the default, but involves a careful, planned design.

Information is power. Information that flows from a structured system is equally powerful and useful; both for those who are expected to make use of the information—think decision-makers in government and researchers in the academia—as well as for those to whom such information pertains, like common citizens. Robust information systems are synonymous with better transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of public policy. They are also a natural characteristic of modern citizen societies and welfare states. Weak information systems either follow archaic models of collecting, compiling and disseminating data, or lack critical qualities of credibility and legitimacy in the procedures followed; in some cases, both.

Indian Statistical System

Consider the Indian example. The *Arthasastra* and the *Ain-i-Akbari*, among others, lay out the historical frameworks of how empires might design their statistical systems, primarily with revenue needs in mind. Mapping these to modern nation states in the pre-independence times, a rudimentary statistical system of collecting and compiling information was cobbled together by personal efforts of some pioneering British statisticians and military officers. But, it largely remained at best an annexure to the correspondences flowing between London and Kolkata (and later Delhi) on the state of affairs[1] in Britain's richest colony. These were mostly a catalogue of businesses conducted by different departments with economic relevance, such as agriculture, land revenues, trade and commerce, and, later, of a nascent manufacturing industrial sector. Devoid of integration with any system, the collection and compilation of the reported figures were carried out by different officials and branches of the colonial administration in silos.[2] There were sporadic attempts to set up a Statistical Office, again due to the personal efforts of some officers, for example, the Bowley–Robertson Report (1934) for establishing a Central Statistical Organisation and a separate Economic Intelligence Organisation (Subramanian 1960). But, reminiscent of present-day administrative bickering of which department has jurisdiction over certain technical functions, the debates and arguments within the government ensured that little synthesis took place, and the office functioned with a skeletal staff with little technical training, and little funding.

The Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) in Kolkata (then Calcutta), growing out of a statistical laboratory at the Presidency College (now University) established by the doyen of modern Indian statistics, Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis in 1931, was one of the first academic institutes dedicated to the study of statistics outside the Western world. Mahalanobis, with his famed closeness to Jawaharlal Nehru, was also one of the members of independent India's first Planning Commission and the statistical advisor to the first Cabinet, which set up the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) in 1950. In the early 1950s, Mahalanobis was already a globally renowned figure on statistical sample surveys and, under his influence, India was the first nation outside Europe and the United States to introduce a regular system of national sample surveys, under the fledgling National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) (MoSPI nd).

Sample Surveys and the Census

In the last seven decades, the NSSO has conducted almost 80 national, large-scale surveys on issues such as employment, consumption, health, education, migration, landholding, agriculture, civic amenities, etc. These sample surveys have been the mainstay for estimating national and state-level figures for poverty and employment/unemployment levels across the country for over 50 years. The decennial national census is also another remarkable, gargantuan month-long exercise where almost an entire army of schoolteachers, health workers, and local government officials visit more than 200 million households and collect an enormous amount of information. In recent years, several other excellent surveys on health and education—in some cases (for example, the National Family Health Surveys [NFHS], the Annual Status of Education Reports [ASER]) with technical and minor financial support from international agencies—have significantly improved availability of information on several key social indicators, some of which are essential for monitoring national performance on global development goals, for example, the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations.

Blind Spots and Controversies

However, these surveys have been mostly discrete, independent exercises with little coordination between each other as well as with other similar surveys conducted by other agencies; at times even by the same department of the government! This causes costly overlaps, inefficient use of resources and, naturally, common blind spots—subjects and quantities for which little information is available. Most of such inefficiencies and weaknesses are due to lack of a coherent, integrated statistical system across the country that should link different key sources of information (for example, surveys and routine administrative information) as well as the different agencies (statistical cells of different state and central government departments; and independent academic or non-governmental organisations) responsible for collecting these.

In recent years, there have been several controversies on the availability and transparency of essential information on key aspects of the national economy in India. The most remarkable of these has been the much-delayed release and then hurried withdrawal of data on consumption expenditure from the 2017–18 round of the survey by the government, citing incomprehensible reasons (Seshadri 2019). Similarly, the NSSO employment–unemployment surveys (EUS) have been discontinued since 2011–12 and have been replaced by the Periodic Labour Force Survey, which has been criticised on non-comparability with earlier rounds of EUS, using different sampling designs, and under-representing rural areas (Jajoria and Jatav 2020).

Lacunae Exposed by COVID-19

What the novel coronavirus pandemic has brought to the fore is the glaring gaps and inconsistencies between different agencies in maintaining and reporting public health statistics. Most of this is due to the absence of any standardised system of collecting, compiling and sharing information from patients across hospitals or in the community. This, in turn, follows from long negligence of the need for having appropriate public health surveillance systems that can act as early warning systems for disease outbreaks, which are not entirely a rarity in the country.

Similarly, reflecting on the general lack of organisation between public and private healthcare services in the country and no regulatory systems controlling patient flows into different health facilities, we are perhaps the only country of such a geographic and demographic spread that does not have anything close to patient health records, beyond archaic paper-based case-records, which are not even standardised within states, let alone nationally. In simpler terms, this means in times of need, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the government can hardly start with anything more than groping in the dark if it wants to have a reliable estimate of tests, treatment, cure, and death statistics of infected patients across the country.

Most high-income countries in Europe, and even middle-income countries, such as Brazil, have excellent public health information systems that are integrated between local health authorities such as municipalities and city corporations, hospitals, or physician practices and a national health authority. In times of public emergencies, robust routine information systems that connect key public health functions and outcomes can be the bedrock of hard evidence-based and targeted mitigation measures.

Curious Case of 'Missing' Dead

A glaring shortcoming of health information in India is the weak system of collecting and reporting mortality and causes of death data. In recent years, there has been significant improvement in registration of deaths (Kumar et al 2019), with most cremation or burials requiring death certificates. But the information recorded is not compiled and maintained appropriately, mostly due to lack of technical capacity at local levels, an ignominy for a country that prides itself as an information superpower. Even states such as Kerala or Delhi with near-universal registration do not have the information in standardised databases that one can access, although most registrations use a common proforma provided by the Registrar General of India.

Another weakness is the extremely poor quality of cause of death statistics (Balagopal 2020), which follows the globally standardised International Classification of Diseases (ICD–10). With only about one in every five deaths in India being medically certified (MHA 2019), this remains a major deficiency of mortality data. Often, even for deaths in hospitals, medical certification of death is not properly coded, or is in illegible handwriting. This means most deaths are recorded as either too generic or unspecified causes. In fact, there have been controversies on several deaths during the current pandemic, with claims and counterclaims between direct and indirect or secondary cause of deaths, or co-morbidities. With robust, reliable mortality statistics considered globally as benchmark indicators of prevalent health conditions in any country, neglecting its development only bodes ill for the entire health information system in the country.

In times of pandemics, such as the present COVID-19 one, strong mortality statistics are not only essential for having a correct assessment of the casualties, but also to provide several other useful, policy-relevant information, for example, whether deaths are concentrated among people from a particular socio-economic background. Additionally, a reliable system of mortality data is of direct relevance to assess if pandemics are responsible for "excess deaths"—additional deaths compared to usual mortality patterns of earlier years—as has been observed in several major cities and countries worldwide.[3] In the United Kingdom, availability of mortality statistics according to geographic locations, and in some cases the ethnicity of the deceased, have revealed a disproportionate mortality burden among blacks, Asians, and other ethnic minorities, and in regions where these minority ethnic groups are predominant (Asaria 2020). Availability of such granulated statistics is an essential input to allow public discourses on the whys and hows of such inequalities. In its absence, reliance on government-fed statistics limits the potential for debates and the scope for democratic public action.

Efficient monitoring of public health indicators is not limited to indicators related to health alone. Of the closest relevance is the ability to track movements of people between provinces and cities, and as they change schools or employers, or grow older. This remains a murky issue in India with major debates around human rights and data protection guarantees, particularly around the use of the biometric identification system of Aadhaar and its seeding with documentation relevant to personal identity. Some of these concerns are legitimate and related to questions of citizen trust and credibility of governments, but these are best addressed in appropriate judicial-legislative systems such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) extant across the European Union (EU) and should not be a justifiable reason to dissuade the much-needed integration of information systems across the country.

As several studies and observers have noted, a good statistical system is the one which allows robust, reliable information that are readily relevant for policy decision-making. In addition, it should allow researchers and other technical specialists to dig deeper into the data to highlight other dimensions beyond the obvious such as the socio-economic disparities in disease and death. In democratic societies, legitimacy of governments, and the state at large, rests on transparency and accountability—credible statistics on key questions of the day only cements it.

Better Financing Required

While the immediate public health implications of the COVID-19 pandemic might have been relatively modest in India, frequent reports of confusion, and debates and inconsistencies on key statistics have revealed gaping holes and crippling limitations in the statistical system. A major reason has been the chronic underfunding of the statistical system, both under the central and state governments. While the government statistical architecture has come a long way from the colonial times, notably with the creation of a separate Ministry of Statistics in 1999 and setting up separate directorates of statistics in almost all the states and even district statistical offices, these have largely been devoid of adequate resources. Naturally, technical skills, capacities, and applications of and in these offices have been below par.

India boasts of a national statistical civil service cadre—the Indian Statistical Service—one of the few cadres that requires university degrees in specific subjects. However, such talented mass of technical expertise is arguably not optimally utilised beyond routine planning and implementation of data collection activities, with limited mandate for bringing in innovative, modern reforms, largely due to lack of political interest in this cadre. Statistics make noise when its absence is explicit; in normal times, poor quality of statistics is good enough to tick the required boxes. The National Statistical Commission established in 2005 to provide the required oversight to reforming the statistical system has remained little more than a formality. Some efforts towards initiating the much-needed reform and, more importantly, a convergence across the myriad statistical streams in the country, have been initiated in recent years, but remain largely inadequate.

Hopes from a Redesigned NSC?

The proposed National Statistical Commission Bill, 2019 talks about a few organisational changes, but skirts the core issue of inadequate funding and technical limitations plaguing the system. Also, it proposes little to breathe in the much-needed autonomous, independent spirit in the nation's official statistics system, which has taken a costly dent in its reputation in recent years. An important first step would be to develop the blueprint for integrating the routine statistical system—surveys like the NFHS and NSS are costly and have limitations—across the key departments such as health, education, employment, access to public utilities, etc. A key to this is effective decentralisation of the statistical system, but with a common format of collecting information. Where such a common format already exists, such as for death registrations, the quality of reported data needs to be significantly improved with training the ground-level officials who are on the front line of collecting and entering data.

Statistics has always been and will continue to be political, as it is not the numbers themselves, but the use they are put into that matters. While debating and discussing numbers and their movements over time in the times of the pandemic, it is also the time to push for public awareness on and demand for ensuring its credibility and appropriate use, keeping to its potential.

NOTES

1 The records included a series on "Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India" as the official report of the colonial administration to the British Parliament, and had none other than the budding economist of the day, John Maynard Keynes, as its editor in 1906–07 as one of his first post-doctoral assignments. He was, however, critical of the quality of the data being reported, including on mortality, and argued for the appointment of a trained statistician to oversee and harmonise the efforts. He was reportedly asked to revise his report (Kanbur 2016)!

2 A Department of Commerce and Industry created in 1905 was the first move towards having some identity of the collection and compilation of statistics across different other departments, except the home department which retained the responsibility of conducting the census exercise, and under a Director of Commercial Intelligence with a handful of staff. But the appointment of professional statisticians was turned down a number of times until 1914, when Mr Findlay Shirras was appointed as Director of Statistics and had about 100 staff working in 10 sections (Subramanian 1960).

3 In countries where such reliable statistics are available, this has been instrumental to identify the mortality burden directly attributable to the pandemic. For example, see Wu et al (2020).

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Indian Public Health Associations on COVID-19

The Politics of Knowledge

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Leading Indian professional associations of public health have released a second joint statement on 25 May 2020, on the COVID-19 pandemic and its management in the country. The central issue they raise is the ignoring of technical advice of the country's leading experts and institutions in decision-making about strategies for handling the pandemic. The larger politics of knowledge in public health and its interdisciplinary requirements are discussed.

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National responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have been shaped across countries by a narrative generated by the mathematical models of the anticipated spread of the novel coronavirus first identified in human beings at the end of 2019. Based on the Euro–American experience of influenza and influenza-like illness and China's coronavirus experience, the models were generalised to all countries (Ferguson et al 2020; Adams 2020). The graphs generated by these models pictorially represented steep and tall peaks of cases and deaths, which were then superimposed by a flattened graph that projected the impact of strong "social distancing" measures.

The former triggered initial denial of such a threat, and then ill-planned hasty lockdowns in country after country as the strongest "social distancing" strategy. However, the epidemic curve and the responses have not been the same across continents and countries.

What has been evident in India is that, while the pandemic has affected a large number of people across various states and cities, it has not been as fearsome as projected. The lockdown imposed on 24 March has slowed down but not significantly flattened the occurrence of infections and cases. While the epidemic is still evolving, it is important to review the control strategies and management of the epidemic at this stage so as to draw learnings for mid-course corrections and for long-term policy approach.

Evident in the Government of India's (GoI) style of governance in tackling this pandemic, has been the lack of drawing upon epidemiological and public health expertise available in the country. While handling the biggest public health crisis of the last 100 years, technical inputs from within the country seem to have come solely from the clinical establishment, and bureaucrats.

National institutions meant to deal with such a crisis, such as the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) and the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) too, have been ignored in the strategic planning and decision-making, brought in only to implement decisions. Even more, a matter of concern is that a United States-based business consulting firm is now known to be the technical backroom team for the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Jain 2020).

The ministry's own epidemiologists and health systems teams have been bypassed, including the advice of the National Task Force for COVID-19 set up by the Indian Council of Medical Research (Sethi and Shrivastava 2020). The World Bank is the other institution collaborating with the GoI in deciding its response, with a $1 billion to back it (World Bank 2020). This is when there is a sizeable body of knowledge, experience, and wisdom embodied in the large number of individuals and institutions across the country with public health expertise and ground-level experience of managing epidemics, including the pandemic of HIV and AIDS as a novel viral disease in the 1990s, and the more recent H1N1 influenza.

It is in this context that we view as extremely significant the two statements brought out by the largest professional bodies of public health experts in the country. The Indian Public Health Association (IPHA) and Indian Association of Preventive and Social Medicine (IAPSM) came together to form a joint COVID-19 task force of their own, constituted of senior experts recently retired from leading public health positions, faculty of community medicine and community health in leading institutions (including members serving in the National Task Force on COVID-19), as well as office-bearers of the two associations. The joint COVID-19 task force put out one statement on 11 April and a second on 25 May. In the second they were also joined by the Indian Association of Epidemiologists.

Highlights of the Statements

In the first statement (IPHA and IAPSM, 2020), the joint task force recommended a 10-point action plan for control of the pandemic, including a review of the lockdown and its replacement by "cluster restrictions." It states that

> An interdisciplinary team of public health specialists along with grassroots political and social leaderships and volunteers should continue raising awareness about COVID-19 modes of transmission and methods of prevention in the community by adopting emergency risk communication methods and broad-based community engagement strategies while acknowledging multi-cultural and multi-linguistic realities.

The statement recommended that "social distancing" should be replaced with physical distancing and enhanced social bonding, to slow down the spread of infection while at the same time taking care of those socially isolated by lockdown. Measures should be taken to avoid social stigma, discrimination and fear of isolation and quarantine, by making people aware and treating them with respect and empathy.

It recommended extensive sentinel and active surveillance

> for Influenza like Illnesses (ILI) through ASHA/ANMS/MPWS, and Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI) through clinical institutions (including private hospitals), daily reporting to identify geographic and temporal clustering of cases to trace transmission foci (hot spots/cluster events). This must be supported by trained epidemiologists from local medical colleges and public health institutions.

The statement further went on to emphasise the importance of limited hospitalisation of only those needing intensive care, the necessity of strict infection control and adequacy of supplies of protective materials to prevent occurrence of hospital spread of the virus, affecting patients and the healthcare providers alike.

Long-term recommendations included:

> Local health authorities, municipal bodies and panchayats should be sensitized to enable policy makers and planners not to be instrumental in creating a "pandemic of human misery" by advocating impromptu public health decisions not supported by epidemiological data and evidence based scientific reasoning. Rapid scaling up (five times) of public health, clinical and related social care—both services and research—should be done on a war footing with an allocation of about 5% of GDP.

Noting the ecological approach required to prevent recurrence of such pandemics in the future it ends with the observation that

> Nature has once again reminded us of our tenuous situation in the wider universe. It is high time that humankind takes note of the warning signals and undertakes midcourse corrections urgently and now. The "One World One Health" approach should be central in ensuring optimal harmony amongst all humans and animals of the world based on principle of "*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*" (The world is one family).

The second statement (IPHA, IAPSM and IAE 2020) takes note of new evidence that has become available since the first one, as well as draws on interactions with public health professionals working at national, state, and district levels. It reiterates all the earlier recommendations, and further notes that though the lockdown had "blunted the rapid progress of the infection," the disease burden had got

> coupled with a humanitarian crisis that encompasses an estimated 114 million job losses (91 million daily wage earners and 17 million salary earners who have been laid off), across 2,71,000 factories and 65–70 million small and micro enterprises that have come to a standstill.

It goes on to assert that

> Had the Government of India consulted epidemiologists who had better grasp of disease transmission dynamics compared to modelers, it would have perhaps been better served. From the limited information available in the public domain, it seems that the government was primarily advised by clinicians and academic epidemiologists with limited field training and skills. Policy makers apparently relied overwhelmingly on general administrative bureaucrats. The engagement with expert technocrats in the areas of epidemiology, public health, preventive medicine and social scientists was limited. India is paying a heavy price, both in terms of humanitarian crisis and disease spread. The incoherent and often rapidly shifting strategies and policies, especially at the national level, are more a reflection of "afterthought" and "catching up" phenomenon on part of the policy makers rather than a well thought cogent strategy with an epidemiologic basis.

It, therefore, recommends:

> A Public Health Commission with task-specific Working Groups may be urgently constituted to provide real-time technical inputs to the government,

as also

> constituting a panel of inter-disciplinary public health and preventive health experts and social scientists at central, state and district levels to address both public health and humanitarian crises.

Pointing to a critical lacuna, it urges for correctives:

> each country, and regions within the country, have to adapt the larger general model to its own specifics. Open and transparent data sharing with scientists, public health professionals and indeed the public at large, which is conspicuous by its absence till date, should be ensured at the earliest. This will strengthen pandemic control measures, build bottom-up consensus, and evolve an ecosystem of engagement, faith, and trust.

It states a considered view that

> Clinical, epidemiological and laboratory knowledge for control of the novel corona virus indicates that humankind will have to "live with the virus" and operational strategies rapidly need to be recalibrated from containment to mitigation. The emerging evidence unequivocally indicates that COVID-19 worsened the health inequities, and public health measures need to make that concern central.

Pro-people Perspective

Reading these two thoughtful and fairly comprehensive statements encourages us to flag some further issues. One is the lack of comment on the initial delayed response of the GoI, when it let the entire month of February lapse with lack of strict measures for quarantine of international travellers and without much action in preparation for the epidemic. Timely intervention could have saved India's millions from the lockdown and its consequent misery. Second, an assessment of the public health capacities and medical infrastructure available in the country (public and private), with strategies for their optimal utilisation, would be useful for a planned health systems approach during the rest of this crisis. Third, the role of the central and state governments needs to be clearly delineated. Centre–state relations, that are influencing how responses to this epidemic unfold, needs to be analysed. Fourth, because of the known immune-modulatory effects of traditional health practices and their widespread default utilisation in all parts of India, there has been a debate on incorporation of AYUSH and local health traditions in the anti-COVID measures. A public health perspective needs to be generated in this complex domain. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming joint statements in this series by the public health associations will address these issues.

In the context of public health expertise in the country, there are people even outside these professional associations who have been immersed lifelong in the thinking and practice of public health, epidemiology and ways of strengthening healthcare systems, especially from a bottom-up people's perspective, and who have been active on COVID-19 (Muliyil 2020; Kollanur 2020; Ghosh and Qadeer 2020).

The Jan Swasthya Abhiyan (India chapter of the global People's Health Movement) and the All-India Peoples Science Network, the Medico Friend Circle, the Right to Food Campaign, and their member organisations and individuals, have been studying, discussing and debating issues, and putting out statements of concern periodically since 16 March (phmindia 2020). There have been suggestions for how the epidemic management needs to incorporate lessons from past experience as well as voices of the most adversely affected—the migrant workers and slum dwellers, women, Dalits, religious minorities and rural populations (rather than implement only upper middle class-oriented containment strategies, with even large sections of the lower-middle classes facing the brunt of the lockdown) (Dasgupta and Mitra 2020). Despite the lockdown, younger members have been intensively engaged on the ground, with providing transport and basic necessities to migrant workers stranded on the highways at state boundaries, procuring personal protective equipment for healthcare workers, all through crowdfunding (Yumetta Foundation 2020; Nagaraj and Suneetha 2020). They have creatively designed protective practices that the workers can adopt even in their crowded surroundings in urban and rural dwellings, at low cost.[1] Networks of researchers and practitioners of systems of medicine other than conventional biomedicine too have been extremely active and generated approaches to COVID-19 based on their sciences (Working Group 2020). All these experiences and ideas need to be tapped for rigorous evidence generation and detailed planning.

Public health responses to the present situation need to take a long-term view even while we engage in firefighting during the pandemic. Reflecting on the severe constraints being experienced at policy and field levels in producing an effective response to COVID-19, we need to remind ourselves of how we got here. The last four decades of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation have compromised the importance of the public sector by supporting policies that further commercialisation. Across the globe, in both developed and developing countries, the uptake of economic reforms has been evident, including health sector reforms that led to the weakening of public systems, rising inequalities, and heightened insecurities and uncertainties for the working and middle classes. A fairly strong critique of these reforms had emerged that found voice through public health academics, civil society organisations, health movements, advocacy groups and international non-governmental organisations. The experience of this pandemic demonstrates how reliance on private systems (through insurance or otherwise) is of little value in dealing with public health challenges. The lack of public services and primary-level provisioning is being widely recognised today in both developed and developing countries when struggling against the COVID-19 challenge.

The pandemic calls for a complex systems understanding for policy and programming. Deeper social science evidence and insight need to be built into the public health knowledge base. This necessitates use of interdisciplinary approaches in epidemiology and health systems research, with nuanced understandings about social structure and inequalities, cultural meanings and resources that communities draw from to deal with ill-health, epidemics and death (illustrated by a set of recent articles at CSMCH 2020).

Knowledge Hierarchies

However, there is a politics of knowledge in public health that needs to be addressed. It relates to the multiple hierarchies between the various kinds of knowledge that are essential for the domain of public health. As one kind of knowledge gets priority and power, and others tend to be denigrated or ignored, public health evidence suffers. In the long term, it is necessary to develop a public health cadre in all states and union territories, that moves from primary to higher levels with ground experience, and is capacitated to study, analyse and operationalise the biomedical, social, cultural and managerial dimensions of public health (Priya 2013).

The point is not to be adversarial to any form of knowledge, but to bring them together in an optimal combination: the medical, clinical and the epidemiological public health; mathematical modelling and shoe-leather epidemiology; social sciences, epidemiology and health systems research. The issue is whether we adopt monolithic approaches or openness to plural options that are best suited to the problem as located in its context.

This pandemic provides us with an opportunity to rebuild healthcare from the comprehensive perspectives provided by the Alma Ata declaration (1978) and the Astana declaration (2018), with universal access, inter-sectoral linkages, self-reliance and centring of community level interventions (Qadeer et al 2019; Priya et al 2018). Therefore, it is incumbent on governments at the centre and state levels to recognise the various kinds of knowledge inherent in public health and draw upon all the contextually rooted expertise to design interventions that can be most effective in mitigating people's suffering. In what is a difficult and uncertain situation by any standards, ignoring such experience and knowledge available in the country during the pandemic and in the post-pandemic period, can only further imperil the lives of millions.

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Intrusions and Violation of LAC in India–China Border

SEBASTIAN N

The lack of a clearly defined borderline and a mutually accepted actual line of control is the major reason for continuous tension and clashes between India and China. The political leadership of both the countries should see the present crisis as an opportunity to find an everlasting resolution to the border question.

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After a brief interlude of about three years since Doklam crisis in 2017, yet another round of tensions started in the India–China border at Ladakh in May this year. It is "normal" that tussles occur in usual intervals in different sectors of the 3,488 km long India–China border. Mostly, such situations are handled at local levels and rarely lead to human casualty. The current clashes started when around 250 Indian and Chinese soldiers stood face to face at the banks of Pangong Tso, near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Eastern Ladakh. The tussle started on 5 May and has spread to adjacent areas of Naku La and Galwan Valley and turned to bloody clashes, which caused the death of many soldiers from both sides. This type of a clash between the forces leading to human casualty happened after more than 50 years (Goldman 2020). The terrain where the current tensions have taken place is important for both the countries for its geostrategic and political reasons, though it is a wasteland situated at a very high altitude and not suitable for human inhabitation as it is covered by snow almost round the year. The current crisis gets special attention as it emerged in a time when almost all countries in the world are undergoing through the COVID-19 pandemic, and China is accused by the Western countries for its laxity that caused the global spread of the pandemic.

The border or territorial dispute between India and China has its roots in the colonial construction of states and their boundaries in the Himalayan region (Karackattu 2017; Noorani 2011). By the end of 19th and early 20th centuries, the region became a theatre of big power conflicts, popularly known as "The Great Game." The three major global empires/powers at that time, the British India, Chinese Empire and the Russian Tsarist Empire, shared borders in the region and played in the great power game that was very crucial in setting the cartography of this area. They had made many agreements and drawn lines to demarcate the boundaries in the geostrategically important locations in the region during the 19th century (Mehra 2007). The decline of the Chinese Empire started when it got defeated by Japan in the last decade of 19th century. This led to the emergence of Tibet as a major regional player and it started enjoying great amount of autonomy from the central authority in China. It is in this context, in 1907, the Russian Empire and the British Empire had re-emphasised upon the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet (Eekelen 2016). According to this, any border demarcation in the region requires the ratification of the central authority in China or could be valid only after China becoming a party/signatory to it.

History of Border Dispute

The Simla agreement of 1914 is a major source of controversy that appears very often in the border dispute between India and China. The agreement ratified the much-debated 550-mile long "McMohan Line" passing through the Himalayas as the border line between British India and China/Tibet (Goldman 2020; Mehra 1974; Eekelen 2016). The final agreement was signed between the British Indian Empire and Tibet, but not ratified or endorsed by the central authority in China. It is also important to note that the Chinese central authority was very weak due to the outbreak of civil war in 1911. The Peoples' Republic of China that succeeded the Chinese Empire in 1949 questioned the sanctity of Simla agreement since the very beginning. To China, Macartney–MacDonald Line of 1899 was the legitimate border, as it was also a party in it (Eekelen 2016; Noorani 2011).

The geopolitical scenario of the region had changed completely by the mid-20th century. The British Indian Empire was replaced by the Republic of India and the Chinese Empire was replaced by the People's Republic of China. None of these states have raised any serious territorial claims in the early years and, therefore, the status of border in the region remained "undemarcated" (Smith 2014). By the mid-1950s, a serious discussion started from the Indian side on making a proper demarcation of border line in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. The issue became much more complex as Aksai Chin—a territory claimed by India as its integral part, but situated in POK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir)—had already gone under Chinese possession with the support of Pakistan. In the 1,200 km long highway constructed by China between Xinjiang and Tibet, about 179 km is passing through Aksai Chin. India came to know about the construction of this highway very late and Nehru made a public statement claiming Aksai Chin part of India. He accused China of construction of roads in the region by violating the territorial integrity of India (Bajpai et al 2020). All these developments have resulted in mounting tensions between two countries by the late 1950s. The Chinese military intervention in Tibet in 1959 followed by the exile and political refuge of Dalai Lama and his followers in India further deteriorated the bilateral relations (Guruswamy and Daulet 2009). The tensions started escalating in the border areas with the invasion of Tibet by China. China accused India for protecting Dalai Lama and his supporters who were involved in anti-China activities.

The tensions and clashes soon moved to a full-fledged border war in 1962. India had faced clear setback in the war, as Chinese forces advanced into the Indian territory and captured about 43,000 sq km land (Dalvi 1968; Dutta 2017). Later, the Chinese withdrew from the areas that they occupied and an agreement was signed. The major aspect of the agreement was the establishment of an LAC between the two countries. This LAC has nothing to do with either the border demarcated by Macartney–MacDonald Line of 1899 (the base of Chinese claims) or the Shimla agreement of 1914 (base of Indian claims). Eventually, this LAC has got the status of a "de facto border line" between India and China. The root cause of escalation of current tensions in the border is connected to the disputes on the status of this LAC, not the McMahon Line of 1914 or Macartney–MacDonald Line of 1899 (Sharma 1965; Noorani 2011).

The 1962 events created a big gap between China and India. Diplomatic relations between these two states were nominal for about a quarter of the century (Maxwell 2011). The Chinese military actions in Tibet, the presence of Dalai Lama and his followers in India, and the merger of Himalayan Kingdom Sikkim with Indian Union in 1975 further intensified tensions between the two, even though none of them turned into a major conflict/war. The 1967 crossfire between the forces of India and China at Nathu La and Cho La—two passes in Sikkim–China border—were the only major clash during this period, which resulted in the death of a few hundred soldiers on the Indian side and almost double on the Chinese side (Dasgupta 2019).

The efforts for reconciliation began by the late 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi, then the Prime Minister of India, visited China in December 1988. Both the countries had taken some fresh steps to strengthen bilateral cooperation, particularly in trade and commercial activities. Joint Working Groups (JWGs) were constituted and bilateral talks started to open new avenues for cooperation (Bajpai and Mattoo 2000; Panda 2020). This has further expanded and strengthened through diplomatic negotiations and high-level political visits/meetings. As a goodwill gesture, both the countries decided to maintain status quo in the borders and stopped large-scale infrastructure development projects in the border areas mainly due to the security concerns from the other. By then, both countries became more realistic on the border/territorial issue.

In the 1990s, the changed global situation and the big power aspirations forced India and China to reconcile and expand the chances of cooperation. Eventually, two agreements were signed by India and China—in 1993 and 1996—that gave legal status to the LAC of 1962 (Bajpai and Mattoo 2000). The Chinese de facto acceptance of Sikkim's merger with India and the agreement signed by India and China for cross-border trade through Nathu La pass in Sikkim were the clear indications of the changing priorities. Both the countries have explored the chances of cooperation in trade and commerce. The agreement signed in 2015 to start trade and commercial activities through the Lipulekh pass of Uttarakhand is another major development in this regard (Panda 2020). On the other side, the intrusions and minor clashes in the border regions, the claims made by Chinese Ambassador to India on Arunachal Pradesh and the Indian build-ups across the border areas remained as cause for tensions.

Contemporary Conflicts

One can link the current tensions in Ladakh with the tensions developed in Dokhlam, a tri-junction between India, China and Bhutan, in June 2017 (Goldman 2020). The clashes started when the Indian forces started disrupting the Chinese efforts to construct a road in the border area at Dok La, by raising security concerns. This incident was the outcome of the long-time mutual suspicion of states on the constructions for infrastructure development in the border areas. The current crisis in the Eastern Ladakh is also related to the constructions in the border areas. Chinese forces have put up tents in the areas where Indian forces used to do routine patrolling for a long time. This has intensified tensions that has led to use of force and ended up in violent clashes. China even intruded into those places on which they have not made any claims in the past. It is observed that the military upper hand that India got in the Eastern Ladakh region through large-scale development of military infrastructure is the reason for Chinese provocations. It is a fact that, in the recent years, India has strengthened its military capabilities substantially on the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. It has constructed a bridge across Shyok River in October 2019, which facilitates the Military Tanks movement much closer to the LAC. Besides, the construction of a 3.5 km long airstrip at Anantnag and the renovation of military airfield at Daulat Beg Oldi should have provoked China to violate status quo (Gamble and Davis 2020). It is a fact that all these developments have substantially increased India's military capability in the region and the power equations moved in favour of India, at least in the Eastern Ladakh region. The demand of China—that India should stop all its constructions in the Western Ladakh sector—can be connected to this.

The discussions at various levels are still on to reduce the tensions and resolve the issue. In the high level military talks, it is decided to step back the forces of both the countries from the LAC at Galwan Valley—2 km by Chinese forces and 1 km by Indian forces. It is also decided to avoid further clashes and maintain a status quo. In the discussions, India demanded to restore the status quo in the LAC as it was in April 2020. Further, India demands complete withdrawal of Chinese forces from the areas where Indian military carry out routine patrolling and also from the northern part of Pangong Tso, a territory for which China had never made any claims before (*TOI* 2020; Price 2020). On the other side, China wanted India to stop all constructions, including the construction of roads, in the border areas in general and Western Ladakh in particular. The discussions helped in easing tensions, even though a concrete solution is yet to be arrived. The negotiations at the diplomatic and political levels are still on between the two countries.

The current developments in the India–China border region at Ladakh can be linked to certain other crucial political developments. First, the abolition of Article 370 from the Constitution of India that gave special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Second, the bifurcation of the state into two different union territories—Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. These moves had attracted harsh criticism from China, whereas India took a clear position that it is an internal matter of India. Indian claims of Aksai Chin, a territory originally part of Ladakh, which later became part of PoK and currently under the possession of China, is another major concern for China. Third, the Chinese believe that India's efforts to build close relations with anti-China axis of Western powers like Australia, and United States (US) and also with Japan are a move to push its economic and political interests in the region. Interestingly, it is the first time that India is openly discussing this issue with the the US and Russia and seeking their support to counter Chinese military at LAC in Ladakh. Fourth, China suspects that India may try to grab the economic opportunities that it might lose in the ongoing tussle with the Western countries on the COVID-19 pandemic issue. Many Western countries are accusing China for its irresponsible handling of coronavirus cases as a reason for worldwide spread of the pandemic. In this context, any serious break-up between China and the West may lead to a huge outflow of foreign capital investment from China.

In Conclusion

The lack of a clearly defined border line and a mutually accepted LAC is the major reason for continuous tension and clashes between India and China. Therefore, the only perpetual solution of the crisis is an amicable settlement of the borders. The countries are working to resolve this dispute for more than three decades now, without any significant progress. The current developments show that there are differences between China and India even on the status of LAC. It is a fact that both India and China are the two fast growing economies in the world, having the potential to emerge as leading powers in the world. The resolution of border conflicts would certainly strengthen their global aspirations. A close cooperation will remain as a distant dream, until the border/territorial dispute is resolved. While realising this, the political leadership of both the countries should see the present crisis as an opportunity to find an interminable resolution to the border question. The discussions and negotiations are to be channelised towards this direction by the leadership of both the countries.

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Reverse Migration of Labourers amidst COVID-19

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Migrant workers returning to native places in COVID-19 times were the host for urban to rural transmission of cases as the migrant-receiving states witnessed over five times increase in the number of districts having a more significant concentration of COVID-19 cases from 1 May to 31 May 2020. There is an urgent need for the skill mapping of the migrant workforce and creating social security schemes to protect them under any socio-economic or health emergency.

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The highly contagious severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has overnight created a nightmare worldwide, leading to lockdowns in many countries, which have victimised the informal sector migrant labourers in most of the developing countries like India. With increasing reverse migration of the workers, there was a common perception among various state governments that the migrant labourers are carrying COVID-19 from high contagion zones in metropolitan or million-plus cities to low-risk rural areas in the process of reverse migration amidst COVID-19. Given the inherent heterogeneity in employment opportunities and wage differentials in rural and urban areas, metropolitan cities and larger urban agglomerations have historically emerged as the hub for job opportunities for daily earners.

Impact on the Indian Economy

The pandemic-triggered lockdown 1.0 (L 1) from 25 March to 14 April 2020, lockdown 2.0 (L 2) from 15 April to 3 May, Lockdown 3.0 (L 3) from 4 May to 17 May 2020 and lockdown 4.0 (L 4) from 18 May to 31 May 2020 impacted the Indian economy, governance structure, public health system and society at large, adversely. For the months of March, April and May, the industrial sector experienced a 55.5% plunge in the industrial output (*Trading Economics* 2020). The predictions of fiscal deficit by the economists are 5%–6% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in India. The nation faced enormous economic loss, many innocent lives were lost, and unemployment surged. According to the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) data, the prevailing rate of unemployment at the time of lockdown increased three-folds and reached up to 26%. Even after unlock 1.0 from 8 June, 2020 in pandemic-hit Maharashtra, Delhi, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh (UP), West Bengal, Telangana, places which are responsible for 60% of the output of the Indian economy and employment of 58.4%, are facing massive staff shortage. Their capacity utilisation is at the time of writing from 20% to 60% only (*BQ* 2020; Pullanoor 2020).

Political Economy

The villages and smaller towns, especially of the states dominated by agriculture-based economies are victims of the vagaries of nature, limited job opportunities, which are also low paying. Hence, cities and towns turn up as better alternatives. As per the Census of India, 2011, there are 5.6 crore migrant labourers in the country. The number of interstate migrants grew at 55% between Census 1991 and 2001. The states that have a significant portion of their working-age population engaged in other states, are UP, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, and the north-eastern states. The countrywide lockdown to contain

Figure 1: Total Number of Shramik Special Trains Originated from Different States and Terminated at Home State of Migrant Workers/Families



Source: Ministry of Railways, https://sr.indianrailways.gov.in/view_detail.jsp?lang=0&dcd=9146&id=0,4,268, viewed on 21 June 2020.

the spread of COVID-19 pushed the labour migrants towards a pathetic situation marked by homelessness, hunger and unforeseen human miseries (SWAN 2020). A recent survey among migrant workers conducted in the middle of April 2020 revealed that 90% of them were not paid their wages in various states, 96% did not get rations from the government outlets, and 70% did not get cooked food during lockdown 1.0 (*Hindu* 2020).

Global Scenario

The Government of India (GoI) had shut its borders entirely, put in place restrictions on inbound travel and announced a national lockdown for weeks starting 25 March 2020 for all people except those involved in providing essential services. Railways and interstate bus services were suspended (Bajpai 2020; *Economic Times* 2020a). To curtail the spread, physical distancing, with proper hygiene, is the only workable solution along with quarantining of suspected cases and timely treatment of confirmed cases (Prem et al 2020; Singh et al 2020). The government announced free cereals and cooking gas to 800 million people through direct transfers for three months. Besides, ₹1.7 lakh crore relief packages aimed at providing a safety net for those hit the hardest by the COVID-19 lockdown, insurance cover for front-line medical personnel, has been announced (*Economic Times* 2020b). It also declared an economic package worth ₹20 lakh crore to support various sectors, including those employing skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled migrant labourers.

At the time of entering the fourth month of the pandemic in India, there was a massive demand for health workers and essential supplies like protective gear, ventilators, testing kits, etc. These differentials are even more glaring in rural areas, especially in the existing situation of the reversal of labour migrants, which has been worsening the COVID-19 situation in 116 districts of the six larger states of the country. To limit the spread of this disease through the process of migration and reverse migration of labourers, it is crucial to strengthen tracking, testing, and treating the positive cases even at the district levels.

Intersectionality in Vulnerability

The efforts to curtail the chain of transmission of COVID-19 and minimise its socio-economic and health effects on the community are dismal, as the vulnerability of people to protection strategies is too heterogeneous. There are five dimensions of vulnerability to the migrant workers in these unforeseen times. First, a wide range of hardship faced in returning led to enhance their vulnerability and working as a link between urban and rural transmission of COVID-19 cases. Second, loss of job and wages, third, overcrowding at the place of origin as a challenge in maintaining social distance, fourth, lack of practising hand hygiene, and fifth, disadvantageous for the urban economy.

The nationwide shutdown affected lakhs of labourers, daily wage earners, hawkers, domestic workers and petty traders, self-employed food/fruits/tea stall owners who were hard hit.

The lockdown affected the livelihoods of nearly 4 crore internal migrants. Around 104 lakh of migrant labourers moved from urban areas to rural areas of origin in about 30 days from 1 May to 31 May 2020 using various modes of transportations, including Shramik trains bus, truck, autorickshaw and walking for thousands of kilometres (*Economic Times* 2020c). Many died in the process.

Around 4,150 Shramik trains operated across the country to ease the reverse migration process of labourers in the country and the real crisis due to lack of transportation (Figure 1). Indian Railways claims that about 55 lakh labourers used these services. Nearly half of the Shramik trains (2,069) originated from Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Punjab, while for 90% of these trains, the destination was either UP or Bihar. Other major states, which were destinations of these Shramik trains, were Jharkhand, Odisha, MP, Rajasthan, and West Bengal. Majority of the migrant workers returning from metropolitan or million-plus cities in May were from 116 to the districts of the six larger states, namely Bihar (23.6 lakh from 32 districts), UP (17.5 lakh from 31 districts), MP (10.7 lakh from 24 districts), Rajasthan (12.1 lakh from 22 districts), Odisha (2.2 lakh from four districts) and Jharkhand (1.1 lakh from three districts).

As per the 2011 Census, over 4.1 crore daily wage earners migrated from rural to urban areas for work; the crisis, and the lockdown compounded their difficulties and diminished their motives to stay (Nair and Verma 2020). The unorganised sector and informal workers in the organised sector account for 92% of the total workforce.

Within the category of informal workers, the largest group is own-account workers (32%), followed by informal employees in the informal sector (30%) and contributing family workers (18%) (ILO 2017). This informalisation is highly pronounced in the case of female workers. In India, 94% of women are employed in the unorganised sector, involved in work that lacks dignity of labour, social security, decent and timely wages, and in some cases, even the right to be called a "worker" (Banerjee 2019). Migrant women workers who are at the bottom of the informal employment pyramid work as part-time, contract, unregistered, home-based workers, and most of whom do not have an official status. Citing the underestimation of women in the workforce, informal sector women's work in the normal time and multifaceted miseries during the pandemic period of the lockdown remain unrecognised. The unemployment varied significantly by gender and poverty, leading to the plight of migrant workers from larger cities and urban agglomerations to their places in the states dominating the agriculture-based economy. Adding to the precarity of the migrants losing their jobs in towns, villages do not have the employment capacity to absorb so many return migrants.

Increasing vulnerability of migrants at the place of origin in their inability to follow preventive measures is concerning. The most recent Directorate of Health Services data shows that nearly half of Indian households (49%) face overcrowding with three or more people per room used for sleeping (Singh et al 2020). Such households are in significant numbers in rural areas (51%). Highly populous states have a majority of migrant families inhabiting slums and other structures with deplorable sanitary conditions. Despite all the structural interventions, people of slums use common drinking water sources, toilets, and hence, maintaining physical distancing with so many returnees is a far-fetched dream. As per National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4) (2015–16) data, almost one in seven households did not have water available and over one in three households did not have soap or detergent at the handwashing area, a larger concentration of such households were in the primarily outmigrating states like Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Rajasthan, UP and West Bengal (IIPS and ICF 2017).

With people going back to their villages, the rural parts of the country are equally vulnerable to the virus. We have a gradual shift of COVID-19 cases from urban to rural regions. More than half of the infected cases are the migrant workers who returned from larger urban agglomerations (Barnagarwala and Rajput 2020). In Bihar, in May, one in four migrant workers were COVID-19 positive (Sheriff 2020). Odisha had exponential rise in the number of cases (Mishra 2020). On 1 May, India had 37,257 confirmed cases and 1,223 deaths, by 31 May, the numbers were 1,90,609 and 5,408, respectively (Figure 2).

The recent trend in the increasing number of COVID-19 cases portrays two

Figure 2: COVID-19 Cases and Deaths, India (1 May–31 May 2020)



Figure 3: Spatial Heterogeneity in the Prevalence of COVID-19 Cases per 1,00,000 Population and Case Fatality Ratio across 640 Districts in the Country during 1 May and 31 May 2020



Source: COVID-19 official portal, GoI.

contrasting patterns. First, old containment zones in cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Ahmedabad, Chennai, Indore, Jaipur, Pune, Bhopal, etc, are converting into hotspots with community transmission, where those infected are not able to identify the source of infection. On the other hand, the migrant workforce receiving states/districts witnessed a sharp spurt in the total number of cases since the people have started coming back.

Figure 3 portrays a relative situation of different districts in the country in terms of the number of COVID-19 cases per 1,00,000 population and case fatality ratio. The number of districts with a prevalence of COVID-19 cases of 20 or more per 1,00,000 population (projected population for 31 March 2020) has increased from 10 on 1 May 2020, to 54 on 31 May 2020. This is over a fivefold increase in clusters of a higher number of COVID-19 cases within a short span of 30 days when migrant men–women, children and elderly people started reverse migration. The distribution of such districts on 1 May 2020 was limited to major urban agglomerations like Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Ahmedabad, Indore, Bhopal, Jaipur, etc, which, on 31 May 2020, spread out across the country from north to south and east to west (Figure 3), which may be primarily due to reversal of migrant workers to those districts.

Several districts in Bihar and UP, receiving a majority of migrants workers returned from high containment zones in the states in the western and northern parts of the country, have a sudden jump in the number of COVID-19 cases per 1,00,000 population during 30 days. A significant increase was observed in Azamgarh (from 0.0 to 2.0), Agra (9.7 to 17.2), Basti (0.9 to 6.1), Jaunpur (0.2 to 3.5), Lucknow (4.0 to 7.3), Kushinagar (0.0 to 2.0), Varanasi (1.4 to 4.4). Similarly, in about 11 districts of Bihar, which are traditionally famous as out-migrating districts, the prevalence of COVID-19 cases on 1 May 2020, was less than one which increased to around 10 or more per 1,00,000 population. Some of these districts are Arwal, Begusarai, Bhagalpur, Jehanabad, Khagaria, Madhubani, Munger, Kishanganj, etc. Similarly, there has been a substantial increase in the number of COVID-19 cases in Burhanpur (0.1 to 35.2), Khandwa (3.1 to 16.2), Indore (14.9 to 94.1), and Ujjain (6.5 to 29.8) districts of MP. In Odisha, the major increase in COVID-19 cases due to reverse migration of labourers has been reported in Ganjam (0.0 to 11.3) and Jajpur (2.1 to 14.1). Another migrant-receiving state, Jharkhand, has two districts with sudden spurts in the number of COVID-19 cases after reverse migration are Garhwa (0.2 to 4.2) and Koderma (0.1 to 5.4). The increasing number of COVID-19 cases in the rural-dominated districts are likely to increase the tremendous burden on the already suppressed health system. This is concomitant with the states facing hardships in following all the guidelines. The standards of public health facilities of these districts are questionable, without proper infrastructure facilities, vacant positions, and non-availability of medicine. Besides, the health workers in the public health facilities have not been adequately aware of the COVID-19 situation and strategies to deal with the cases. Lack of oxygen facilities and ventilators are another major challenge in those resource-poor public hospitals.

Conclusions

The existing health infrastructure in predominantly rural districts of states (where a majority of migrant labourers returned) has been inadequate in dealing with the increasing number of COVID-19 cases. Additionally, problems of household crowding, in the households of migrant workers, belonging to socially deprived and economically marginalised sections, lack of hand hygiene and loss of job and wages, are pushing returnees to a highly vulnerable position at the place of origin. On the other side, this pandemic has acted as a revelation of the vulnerability that people in our cities face in terms of livelihood, shelter, and food. The package announced by the union finance minister on 14 May 2020 as a relief from the COVID-19 impact has importance for the rejuvenation of the economy by fiscal broadening for micro-, small- and medium-scale industries, strengthening of agriculture infrastructure and creation of COVID-19 detection centre in the civil hospitals in the rural areas. However, an urgent need is the economic well-being of migrants workers by "cash-in-hand" income support and enhancement of social sector spending, 6% of GDP for public health and 6% of GDP for education, so that children from the poor migrant families are not forced to drop out of education and as a repercussion of the pandemic, end up as child workers. It is imperative to motivate people to adopt micro-level physical distancing even within their households to as much extent as possible, developing a support system, and creating an enabling environment to practise hand hygiene to reduce their vulnerability. Further, there is an urgent need for the skill mapping of the migrant men and women workforce and register them for skill-based job opportunity, both in rural and urban areas in different states. In the process of reinstating them in the workforce, the state governments at the origin, as well as the destinations, should develop a suitable mechanism to ensure social security schemes to protect them under any socio-economic or health emergency.

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Some Methodological Issues in India's SDG Index Report 2019

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The second edition (2019) of the Sustainable Development Goals Index India Report released by the NITI Aayog is an enhanced version that builds on the baseline report of 2018. However, the second edition could not address the methodological issues sufficiently. The justifications and coverage on several aspects, such as proxy indicator identification, target setting, state categorisation, imputation of indicators, data gaps are found to be weak. This commentary highlights some of the problems identified in the report and suggests possible solutions, which can bring more credibility and statistical acceptance to the future SDG index reports.

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NITI Aayog launched the first edition of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Index India Report in 2018 to measure India's and its states' progress towards the SDGs for 2030. It was meant to provide an aggregate assessment of performance of Indian states and union territories on social, economic and environmental parameters. Further, it was aimed to serve as a tool to benchmark progress, identify data issues, devise better policy strategies coupled with a sense of competitiveness among the states (NITI Aayog 2018). It was also one the first few attempts by a country to rank its subnational governments by using an index on SDGs (NITI Aayog 2019). The second edition of the report has been recently released. This is an enhanced version with 100 indicators covering 54 targets across 16 SDGs leaving SDG 17 as compared to the base version with 62 indicators covering 13 SDGs (leaving 12, 13, 14 and 17). This is a progressive sign with regard to larger coverage of goals, targets and indicators, and alignment with the National Indicator Framework (NIF), which serves as the backbone of SDG monitoring in the country (MoSPI 2019).

However, there is a need to critically analyse and relook at the methodology of SDG index and the policy implications it directs for the country. The following sections highlight some of the methodological issues and policy perspectives identified by the authors in the recent SDG Index India Report, 2019. The discussion also highlights possible solutions for each problem along with the relevant global context.

The methodology for identifying targets is very briefly touched. The National Target values for few indicators, such as those in SDG 14: "percentage increase in use of nitrogen fertilisers in the coastal states," "percentage increase in area under mangroves," "average marine acidity (pH) measured at representative sampling stations in the shore zone" are found to be missing, though justifications and index calculations have been presented for the same. Further, these justifications are very general in nature and do not give any idea about the target value. It should be based on a well-defined criterion or with a supportive reference. Sustainable Development Solutions Network's (SDSN) SDG Index and Dashboard Report (whose methodology has been followed by NITI Aayog in preparation of India's SDG index) gives a detailed five-step method to set targets in its methodological paper by Lafortune et al (2018). A clear methodological section explaining stepwise methods to handle different targets should be presented in future versions.

The SDG report mentions that some of the NIF indicators for which data was not available, "suitable indicators" or "proxy indicators" were identified. For few, indicators were modified and refined to fill the data gap in consultation with line ministries. For state and union territories, where data was not available, "null" was used. It is well-accepted that there are data gap issues with SDGs, and contribution and role of various stakeholders, such as states, civil society organisation, institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is crucial. However, the present report did not utilise any data support from non-government sources and state governments. It is important to note here that SDSN itself reported 35% data from non-government sources in its first version of the SDG Index and Dashboard Report (Lafortune et al 2018). Columbia's National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) reported to have used private sector data to fill gaps in its national SDG indicator set (Rodriguez and Schonrock 2018). If such data sources have the potential to reduce the existing SDG data gaps in India, NITI Aayog should utilise their support, ensuring the criteria of relevance, national context, statistical adequacy and data quality.

Data issues and data gaps on SDG indicators are a common problem globally, particularly in the developing world and the African region (Sachs et al 2018; Khalid et al 2019). One of the common issues is handling missing development data or SDG indicator values. There is no fixed technique reported in literature for handling such data. Studies such as Khalid et al (2019), Campagnolo et al (2017), Lafortune et al (2018), Kapoor et al (2017) have suggested few alternatives to impute missing development data. SDSN has also described procedures to handle missing data in its SDG Index and Dashboard (Lafortune et al 2018). However, such adjustments may distort results as assigning zero may not represent the actual efforts and achievements of a state or union territory (Khalid et al 2019).

India has one of the most progressive statistical systems in the world. NITI Aayog with the help of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), Central Statistical Office (CSO), national and international development experts should come up with a detailed methodological framework on aspects, such as "identify proxy indicators," "handle missing development data" among many others. This framework should be used across the country for measurement of SDGs or aspects related to development.

Defining Scale and Categorisation

The categorisation of states into four categories—aspirants (<50), performer (51–64), front runners (65–99), achievers (100)—needs to be relooked. This categorisation has no clear statistical significance and is too vague to explain the achievements. First, there is an urgent need to clearly define the category and expectations from the states within these categories. Second, the category front runner spanning from 65–99 (35 points) is too broad a range. A better suggestion here would be to either use quartiles or categories based on standard deviation that has well-accepted statistical significance. Studies such as Suryanarayana et al (2016), Ghosh et al (2019) demonstrate few such efforts. Another way could be to create one more category (fourth one) where the highest performing states fall in the range of 75–99 or 81–99. An achiever with 100 should remain the fifth. Third, the wide difference in scores of states or UTs within the same category does not represent the correct picture of development (Table 1).

Table 1: Score Difference between States within the Same Category

SDG	States (Score)	Category	Score Difference
SDG 2	Jharkhand (22), Tripura (49)	Aspirant	27
SDG 6	Tripura (69), Andhra Pradesh (96)	Front Runner	30
SDG 7	Kerala (70), Sikkim (97)	Front Runner	27

Source: Author's compilation based on NITI Aayog (2019).

For example, both Tripura and Andhra Pradesh are placed in the same category of front runner despite a large difference in their achievement scores (30 points), which is difficult to understand. It seems as if a whole new category could be created within a category when differences are so large. Also, supportive to this argument is the existence of a "performer" category that has a range of only 15 points.

Common Scores

The SDG Index India Report, 2019 shows several cases of common scores being obtained by different states on the overall SDG index scores as well as individual SDGs. Table 2 presents few examples where common scores have been obtained by three or four states.

Table 2: States with Common SDG Scores

SDG	States	Common Score
SDG 2	Andhra Pradesh, Meghalaya, Rajasthan	35
SDG 11	Kerala, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand	51
SDG 16	Odisha, Telangana, Tripura	88
SDG 16	Goa, Jharkhand, Meghalaya, Odisha	99

Source: Author's compilation based on NITI Aayog (2019).

Another important question is, how is the developmental achievement of all the states with the same scores explained? For example, it does not give any hint, whether considerations on crucial factors, such as state or union territories physical and development attribute has been considered, that is, whether the state is a hilly state, north-eastern state, high-income state, low-income state or a coastal state.

Incidences of states with common scores are rare in SDG indexes developed by Ghosh et al (2019), Khalid et al (2019), Jain et al (2018), Sachs et al (2018). So, there is a need to explore and scrutinise the existing methodology of the SDG Index India Report on why there are a large number of cases of states with common SDG scores.

The localisation of SDGs is at the core of "no one is left behind" principle of the Agenda 2030 (Sachs et al 2018). The SDG Index India Report, 2019 identifies the role of states towards localisation in terms of power and responsibilities on programme and policy design, implementation and monitoring (NITI Aayog 2019). However, the structure and role of local governments at district level, such as municipalities, panchayats, blocks needs strengthening in terms of resources and institutional power. According to Khan (2019), local governments are not prepared for SDG implementation because of inadequate capacities with respect to finance, human resources, domestic resource mobilisation, unclear implementation structure, lack of indicators at districts and block levels. As a solution, Khan (2019) suggests that the SDG localisation should focus on newer policy design, creation and strengthening of new and existing institutions, and adequate resource mobilisation. Further, reviewing local sustainability studies and efforts of subnational governments can bring newer insights on ground realities and identification of appropriate indicators (Khalid et al 2018).

Universities and Premier Institutions

Several stakeholders were engaged during the creation of national SDG index of India. It included stakeholders comprising government, experts, ministries, statistical offices, civil society organisations and private firms. The role of universities and premier institutions like Indian Institute of Technical Studies (IITs), Indian Institute of Management (IIMs), Indian Institute of Science (IISc), etc, in this process, however, has been limited. Higher educational institutions as stakeholders have a special position in society because of their neutral and trustworthy stand (SDSN Australia/Pacific 2017). Several researches, such as Bhowmik et al (2018), El-Jardali et al (2018), SDSN Australia/Pacific (2017) highlight the crucial role universities play in taking the sustainable development agenda forward. Universities with their academic expertise, trained human resources and research facilities in development, statistics, economics, engineering can lower some of the government's task associated with the SDGs.

> For the SDGs to be truly successful at a global scale, universities need to become champions of sustainable development and play a leading role in the implementation of the SDGs. (SDSN Australia/Pacific 2017)

City–university or state–university partnerships can also be explored as local universities or institutions are already involved with several projects with their respective governments and are aware of the local issues and challenges. For example, a greater role could be assigned to universities and institutions in preparing the state SDG vision reports, city or municipality SDG plans and strategies, state or local climate action plans, vulnerability studies, monitoring, assessments and training the local stakeholders on SDG implementation. This can make the process of SDG implementation more efficient and more timely. Work of Withycombe Keeler et al (2018) covering five city–university partnership case studies (Arizona State University—Tempe, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology—Karlsruhe, National Autonomous University of Mexico—Mexico City, Leuphana—Lüneburg, Portland State University—Portland) is a very good resource to start with. Works of Hall et al (2016) and Malekpour et al (2017) demonstrate research discussion and workshops at university campuses of University of Queensland and Monash University respectively, aimed at transforming SDG implementation in Australia. UNESCO lists several examples of university partnerships and initiatives on SDGs, such as COPERNICUS Alliance, Global Universities Partnership on Environment and Sustainability, the Higher Education Sustainability Initiative, Mainstreaming Environment and Sustainability in Africa, Higher Education for Sustainable Development portal.

Way Forward

The number of SDG indicators is bound to increase in future SDG index reports. It is important to identify indicators that are distinct and statistically sound. A constant yearly revisit of the existing data set may also allow deletion and addition of better indicators. Issues pertaining to target setting, addressing data gaps, identifying proxy indicators can benefit from existing works in the area, such as Sachs et al (2018), Lafortune et al (2018), Khalid et al (2019), Kapoor et al (2017). The achievements under the SDG index on various SDGs should focus more on actual achievements on ground for the country or the subnational regions. A well-defined and structured coordination between the state and the central governments in terms of SDG implementation, fund devolution, institutional responses is crucial for SDG implementation. Strengthening local governments (municipalities, panchayats) along with utilising expertise of universities and premier academic institutions will further enhance the rate of SDG implementation and adoption in India.

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Chronicling a Newly Independent Nation

PULIN B NAYAK

REVIEW ARTICLE

Reading India: Selections from the Economic Weekly edited by Pranab Bardhan, Sudipto Mundle and Rohini Somanathan, *Volume I: 1949–1965, Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2019, xiii + 430, price not stated.*

The *Economic Weekly* (EW) was launched in Bombay (now Mumbai) in January 1949 under the editorship of Sachin Chaudhuri. Chaudhuri was an economist of rare intellectual timbre, who had studied in Dacca University during 1922–26, having been a classmate of A K Dasgupta, the doyen among India's economic theorists. Due to the peculiar rules and conventions governing the institutions of higher learning in our subcontinent, poor result in his master's examination ensured that a career in academics was sadly denied for ever to the young Chaudhuri. But Chaudhuri never lost his lust for ideas, regardless of whether they were from history, economics, sociology or archaeology.

The several twists in his life's chances saw Chaudhuri giving tuitions in Kolkata to make a living, and then shifting, in the 1930s, to Mumbai to stay alternately with his two younger brothers (for a fascinating account, see Mitra 1967, 1977, 2016), and earning his keep by writing political, economic, and even film commentaries for some newspapers. For a brief period, he took up the position of general manager of Bombay Talkies after Himanshu Rai passed away! But his final calling came in 1948 when his younger brother Hiten, working in the corporate sector, was able to prevail upon an initially reluctant Chaudhuri to edit a brand new weekly publication. Hiten's close friends in the Seksaria Group of financiers had been persuaded to provide the entire equity capital. Thus was born the *Economic Weekly*.

India's independence had come about less than a year and a half earlier, after nearly two centuries of colonial rule and a protracted, hard-won, freedom struggle. The long years of colonial subjugation had left the average Indian in utter penury, with little education, poor health, and indigent living conditions. But the extraordinary political and intellectual leadership of M K Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose, and innumerable other stellar names, had raised the hopes and aspirations of the masses like never before. Despite the huge disruptions and the terrible loss of lives due to the partition, the dreams and expectations of the nascent nation were seemingly boundless. World War II was over; India had led the process of drawing the curtains on colonialism in a whole host of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the human mind, at least in this part of the world, was intoxicated with the notions of freedom and development.

It was in this setting that this new weekly made its appearance. The first issue was published on 1 January 1949. Even though economics was the stated focus of the journal, its holistic ambit included politics, sociology, history and culture. In a mixture that had the imprimatur of the editor, the journal was to have, in addition to the usual fare of editorials, commentaries and discussions on current affairs, etc, some learned research papers in economics and other social sciences. It was this last feature that gave the weekly its unique character, which it has managed to preserve for over seven decades now, allowing for a brief disruption during 1965–66, after which the journal was renamed *Economic & Political Weekly* (EPW).

The volume under review consists of 43 pieces, chosen from the special articles published in the first 16 years of the journal. In addition to the two or three special articles published each week, there used to be two large special numbers each year, consisting of about 15 articles in each number. So, there would have been a vast pool of articles to choose from, and the act of choice could not possibly have been easy. The articles are by sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and economists. The authors, from India as well as from foreign countries, read like a who's who of the major names and movers of ideas of those times. The editors, scholars, in their own right, must be commended for providing the reader a flavour of the turmoil of ideas during those heady years of a newly independent nation.

The essays have been divided into nine, somewhat uneven parts with the following titles: (i) early village studies, (ii) rural structures, (iii) identity and politics, (iv) analytical frameworks, (v) development and planning, (vi) policy debates: agriculture, (vii) policy debates: industry, (viii) public finance and distribution, and finally (ix) culture, administration and leadership. Even a simple listing of the titles provides an instant glimpse of the range of themes that captured the imaginations of social scientists, policymakers, politicians, journalists and the lay public alike in the first decade and a half of the country's launch into planned economic development. The editors have also helpfully provided a succinct account of the entire collection of articles in their introduction.

In this brief review, owing to space limitations, it would be impossible to comment on each of the valuable and wonderful pieces included in this volume. I would necessarily have to pick and choose some on which I would like to make a few observations. This should not lead the reader to conclude that I hold the ones unmentioned as being in any way less important.

Village Studies

That said, let me now come to the matter at hand. The first part deals with village studies, with the opening paper being a classic study of a Mysore village by M N Srinivas. It was published in the *EW* of 1951. Srinivas draws an intricate sketch of the caste hierarchies and mutual interrelationships that define the village of Kodagahalli. Despite the obvious variations in terms of caste status, and economic power captured principally in terms of the size of landholding, Srinivas observes that "the village is a unity in several senses of the term." Interestingly, this is so despite the intense group rivalries and antagonisms that the author elaborates upon with some illustrations. Attention is drawn to the observation of Charles Metcalfe, made in 1832, that Indian village communities are self-sufficient republics. Yet the idea behind his essay is to show that while the age-old caste courts continue to remain relevant in many ways, the legal system introduced by the British gradually established their primacy over the older social system of adjudication. Perhaps, the best way to describe Srinivas's contribution would be to think of Kodagahalli at the time of India's independence as a village in transition.

The sociology department at the Delhi School of Economics (DSE) was founded in 1959 and M N Srinivas was its first professor. André Béteille, with a master's degree from Kolkata, was recruited as a lecturer the same year. Srinivas was particular to insist on fieldwork as a basic component of the master's training as well as in the doctoral research programme. The first doctorate of the DSE sociology department was André Béteille, who was registered under Srinivas, and did his fieldwork in Tanjore district in Tamil Nadu. Béteille was in due course to emerge as possibly the most prolific Indian sociologist of the past half century who has been a frequent contributor to the *EW* as well as its later avatar, the *EPW*.

Kishan Garhi

Moving on with the first part, there are two more brilliant village studies, published in 1952 and 1953, respectively, by McKim Marriott on the social structure and change in a Uttar Pradesh village and F G Bailey on an Oriya hill village. Marriott, now professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of Chicago, had been, in his youth, a resident for 14 months in 1951–52 in the village of Kishan Garhi, in the Brij division of the upper Ganges-Jamuna doab. We learn that 70 years back, the 535 acres of rich alluvial flat plain consisted of 160 mud houses. There was a fortress shared by three one-time landlords, and then there were the people with special skills (45 houses), traders (10 houses), tenant farmers (68 houses) and landless agricultural labourers (34 houses). Most cultivators were dependent on short-term, unwritten leases granted by one of the three families of a single line of landlords. Marriott found out that the landlords in those days always kept about a third of the village lands in their own control, and used to make their personal servants till the land. Most villagers were borrowers of grain and money, and most had then to turn to some wealthier tenants or to the same landlords for credit in their hour of need.

In Kishan Garhi, the Brahmins, comprising 40 households, were all farmers. They were followed by the smaller caste groups of Chamars, Jats, Kumhars and Muslim Faqirs, each of whom numbered more than a dozen families. There are numerous features of kinship that Marriott records, which cannot be gone into in this review. In marriage, for example, the usual norm, prevalent in the rest of the country, was to give a daughter into a "high" relationship, while the family and village from which one took a wife had to occupy a "low" relationship. To secure, a daughter's good treatment, lavish entertainments and gifts had to be made to the husband's family. The broad conclusion of the author is that the existing social structure with its rigid caste boundaries became an inhibiting factor in arriving at decisions on the village-level provisioning of public goods and related welfare measures. This is also the conclusion of the district-level officials who were of the view that for most programmes of technical or economic development, a modicum of classless local cooperation is a prerequisite that was sadly lacking in Kishan Garhi circa 1950.

The author of the third essay, F G Bailey, is the well-known British social anthropologist of long standing. He is most remembered for his fieldwork conducted in the early 1950s in the village of Bisipara, 100 miles east of Cuttack and 40 miles south of river Mahanadi in Odisha. The village is about 1,750 feet above sea level, surrounded by hills that rise between 500 feet and 1,000 feet higher. The Salki river, about 80 yards wide, runs from south to north through the plain, and there is a small tributary as well, and both of these cut channels about 10 to 20 feet deep. Bailey observes that the "hills around are jungle-covered and infested by tigers and leopards." He also observes that "bears make the forest paths dangerous." That was then. Anyone familiar with this area today would aver that it wears a vastly different look in 2020, hammering in our minds the inexorable nature of natural and social change.

Bisipara and Hatapadara

Bailey observes that since times unknown, the hills of Bisipara were occupied by Kui-speaking people. They originally came from Baud in the north, and the ruling caste were given the surname Bisi by the Oriya kings. Genealogies indicated that they had been in Bisipara for 200 years and later fought against the soldiers of the East India Company. The lowland areas were ruled by Oriya rajas. There is a detailed description of Bisipara with its six neighbourhoods, or "sais;" thus, Kumharsai, Sudosai, Panosai, Sundisai, Khodalsai and Hatapadara, with the total population then being about 750. Kumharsai is the area where the potters live, and the houses are built in the Kui fashion, "two lines of houses, not detached, with gardens behind them." At each end of a Kui street, there was a tall fence to protect the village from wild animals. Bailey surmised that the Kumhars were the true Adivasis and the first occupants of the site. But even at the time Bailey was studying the village, he felt that their assimilation to Hinduism and the prevailing Oriya mores were almost complete.

The author notes that the last neighbourhood, Hatapadara, was distinct from the other sais, or localities. This was the locality of the market, which had been closed by the early 1950s when Bailey was studying the village, and the name derived from that fact. The houses were sited irregularly, in several streets and blocks and the inhabitants were from different castes. The Sundis and Kuis were predominent here, but there also were some from the Keuto (fisherfolk), Brahmin and Gauda (milkman) castes. There were two families of Panas and a family of Ghasis (sweepers) who were Dalits. The Kuis and Sundis were here in search of labouring work.

Village as a Self-sufficient Unit

Bailey contends that before 1850, the village would have been more of a self-sufficient unit. In addition to working on the land, there would have been some people practising traditional occupations like "barbering, oil-pressing," etc. It would have been an autarkic situation, with all production and consumption activities being carried out within the village precincts. After 1850, part of the village income was paid out as taxes and expended outside the village. A portion of this would have returned as salaries and government expenditure and consumed within the village. There would now have been greater and freer circulation of money, with a new class of salaried workers, such as policemen, postmen, schoolteachers, etc, as part of the village economy.

There is an important section on "village unity" where Bailey draws a sketch of the seemingly disparate caste members coming together for group activities like the daily *thakur* puja or the seasonal hunting outings, which nevertheless follow certain strict caste-based norms. With the passage of time, some members of the village begin to look for economic opportunities elsewhere, and the relatively strong bonds of unity slowly weaken.

The next two parts of the volume deal with rural structures and the issue of identity and politics. Srinivas and A M Shah have a piece published in 1960 where they bust the myth of self-sufficiency of the Indian village. Charles Metcalfe's thesis of the self-sufficiency of the Indian village had later been endorsed by personages as diverse as Henry Maine, Karl Marx and Mohandas Gandhi. Srinivas and Shah contest the thesis at several levels. First, they argue that in coastal Kerala, Coorg and highland Gujarat, nucleated villages do not exist. Villages in these areas consist of distinct farms, which are geographically dispersed. Second, they argue that in much of India, especially in the North, relatives are not preferred for marriage, and there is the practice of village exogamy and village hypergamy. These refer, respectively, to the following: a man may not marry a girl of his own village, and, he is not permitted to give his sister or daughter in marriage to the village from which he has obtained a wife. This would give rise to a marriage circle that would include at least 200 villages, seriously questioning Metcalfe's hypothesis from the sociological angle. But more fundamentally, pilgrimages and festivals took the villagers, to places beyond their own village. They conclude, quite reasonably, that the Indian village is part of a wider entity, subject to the winds which blew from without.

Irawati Karve was possibly India's first major female anthropologist, who taught at Deccan College, Pune, from 1939 onwards. She obtained her doctorate from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology in Germany. In her *EW* piece published in 1963, she addresses the issue of individual case study and the statistical method in social investigation, and emphasises the importance of the latter. She suggests that this can be done by studying a large number of samples belonging to different times or different geographical spaces. She addresses these issues in her study of the joint and non-joint family systems in India. A key point to note is that between the two extremes, there are several kinds of semi-joint families, where, for example, a younger brother, working in a metropolitan township, might have left his wife and children in the village under the care of the elder brother and his wife. In a variation of this, the younger brother might have moved to the metropolitan town along with his family, but might still be sending money to his elder brother, residing in the village, to help finance some land improvement activities in the family plot of land.

RSS in the Past

If in the India of 2020, there is a more than nominal presence of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) ideology underlying the various initiatives of the current government, it would be worthwhile exploring the historical antecedents of the entire movement. The earliest published piece in this volume is dated 4 February 1950 and is authored by D V Kelkar. The RSS had been banned precisely two years prior, that is, on 4 February 1948, barely five days after the assassination of Gandhi. A communique by the Government of India stated:

> It has been found that in several parts of the country individual members of the RSS have indulged in acts of violence involving arson, dacoity and murder, and have collected illicit arms and ammunition.

The author of this piece, Kelkar, had been personally known to Keshav Hedgewar of Nagpur, who founded the RSS on Dussehra day in 1925. Kelkar notes that during 1919–23 at Nagpur, "not a day passed without our meeting." They addressed public meetings together and Kelkar testifies to Hedgewar, whom he addressed as the doctor, of being a good orator, who "kept his audience spellbound." Hedgewar was critical of Tilak's idea of obtaining swaraj "within the British Empire." Hedgewar wanted freedom without having to be tied to any apron string, and was in favour of Gandhi's non-cooperation movement which sought to, at least in the initial phase, wrest swaraj within one year.

However, Hedgewar's appreciation of Gandhi was only short-lived because he was critical of Gandhi's policy of "appeasing" the Muslims. For a brief period, Hedgewar was supportive of the activities of Vinayak Savarkar, but never allowed his RSS to be subservient to the Hindu Mahasabha. Hedgewar was keen to strengthen the cultural instincts of Hindu society and was openly in favour of the fascist ideology of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. He later became sceptical of Gandhi's non-violence and doubted that the Congress had the organisational strength to win freedom. He died relatively young at the age of 51 in June 1940. His health had begun to fail towards the latter part of his life and he had begun to delegate his responsibilities to Madhav Golwalkar. Kelkar suggests that in order to understand the full ideology of the RSS, the first edition of the book "We, or Our Nationhood Defined" by Golwalkar is indispensable. Golwalkar talks of the five "unities," geographical, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic, and argued that any person who had foreign, read Muslim, elements, had to either merge themselves in the national race and adopt its culture, or live at its mercy.

The book had a foreword by the Gandhian social worker Madhav Aney, who disagreed with the author and argued that no person of a minority community ought to be treated as a foreigner in their own country. Aney's thoughtful foreword was deleted from all subsequent editions. Kelkar seeks to make the point that at an individual level, most of the rank and file of the RSS consists of dedicated workers who are willing to sacrifice their career and wealth for a cause. He hopes and wishes for a successful harnessing of this power to a humane conception of society, which could yield valuable results. The situation today, in 2020, seems like a replay of what Kelkar wrote in 1950. The proverbial "elephant in the room" are the Muslims. It was so then. It is the same today. Nothing seems to have changed. There should be no surprise that any dispensation informed by the RSS ideology will manufacture justifications for the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, National Population Register and National Register of Citizens.

Essay on Sripuram

Béteille's essay "Sripuram: A Village in Tanjore District" formed part of his doctoral dissertation at the DSE and was published in the *EW* of January 1962. The village is about eight miles to the north of Tanjore. The population of the village was about 1,400, distributed in 349 households, of which the Brahmins constituted 92, non-Brahmins 168, and the balance 89, were Adi Dravida. Thus, the Brahmins were about 26% of the households, but it should come as no surprise that they owned most of the land, and indeed, considerably more than the non-Brahmins. The non-Brahmins, in turn, owned more land than the Adi Dravidas. The Brahmins did not actually till the soil, and absentee landlordism was common. Tilling was actually done by the Adi Dravidas and some non-Brahmins. The Brahmins represented three linguistic groups: Kannada, Telugu and Tamil, and had been far more mobile than the other groups.

Béteille's article offers a glimpse of the caste and class dynamics at play in the beginning of the 1960s in rural Tamil Nadu. Some Brahmins had their land cultivated by directly engaging agricultural labourers who were mostly Adi Dravidas, but some non-Brahmins as well. Beteille noticed that the relations between the Brahmin landowners and the Adi Dravida and non-Brahmin labourers had deteriorated rapidly over the previous two decades. There was a sense of political insecurity among the Brahmins, as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam was gaining in popularity among the peasants and the working classes.

In a perceptive piece on the class orientation of political factions, Rajni Kothari and Ghanshyam Shah present a study of Modasa, an assembly constituency of Gujarat state, situated very close to the Rajasthan border, and with easy access to business centres in both states. They show that there is no simple correlation between caste and political allegiance. The Baniya community is split into two major castes, the small but largely urban-based "Nima," and the more numerous rural cousins called "Khadaita." However, the Baniyas were no more than 3.5% of the population, and the much larger community, of mostly peasant stock, were the "Patidars" who have come into much prominence in recent years. The largest community, about half of the population, was that of the Kshatriyas, comprising of various castes and sub-castes. There also were a smattering of Dalits, Brahmins and Muslims. This area used to be under the hegemony of the Congress party since independence. Kothari and Shah weave a fascinating interplay of caste and politics that points to the gradual weakening of the Congress and the simultaneous rise of the Swatantra Party in the early 1960s.

In an insightful theoretical discourse, Nirmal Kumar Bose, possibly the foremost sociologist of the pre-independence times, and a long-time associate of Gandhi, raises the fundamental issue of "class and caste" in the Indian context. For Marx, class was an instrument of action and change. Bose seeks to understand if caste may be thought of as a variety of the class system. In this context, he makes a case for historically grounded categories of social boundaries, and seems to favour the Weberian, rather than the Marxian, approach to an understanding of caste.

Contributions by Economists

The next five parts, with 24 papers, consist of contributions by economists on a variety of themes. After presenting three papers by way of defining the analytical framework, there are papers on development and planning, agriculture, industry and public finance and distribution. Altogether, these comprise a rich fare, and we will make no attempt to even briefly describe each paper here, owing to space limitations.

Fairly early on, in the 26 January 1954 special number of the EW, Dasgupta, had published a piece with the title "Keynesian Economics and Underdeveloped Countries." Dasgupta had very convincingly argued that the Indian conditions were vastly different from what Keynes was talking about in relation to the economy of the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1930s. The problem there was one of lack of aggregate demand along with the presence of excess capacity in industry, and the Keynesian prescription was to introduce a strong dose of public expenditure to revive demand. In India, however, the problem was one of a total absence, or, at least, a lack of capital stock, and the urgent need was to give a fillip to capital formation. This piece essentially presaged the same ground that William Arthur Lewis was to present in his celebrated paper in the Manchester School, where he outlined a process of development with unlimited supply of labour at a subsistence wage. This key paper was to earn the Nobel prize for Lewis in later years, but one must acknowledge that the idea was very much there in Dasgupta's paper at a somewhat earlier point in time. A somewhat expanded version of Dasgupta's 1954 paper was published with the same title in the EW in August 1965, and is included in this collection.

Joan Robinson must remain one of the great names among the economists of the 20th century. She was a member, in the 1930s and 1940s, of Keynes's "circus" in Cambridge, England, and in later years was a formidable critic of the neoclassical school, of which the two most prominent names were Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow of Cambridge, Massachusetts. For all her conceptual brilliance, she was denied the Nobel prize, possibly for being an "intellectual communist." In her characteristically trenchant piece on "Teaching Economics" she despairs of the tendency among some bright young Indian students in the UK who are focused on abstract theorising, much as their best British counterparts, who pursue the "dreary desert of so-called welfare economics," founded on the notion of individualistic pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. She would rather have preferred these bright young men from India to ask the fundamental question as to whether the problems of deep poverty and unemployment in their country could be solved by private free-enterprise capitalism. Robinson makes a plea for seriously studying the alternative economic systems, and eschewing the simplistic price theory by delving into the serious issues of production, accumulation and distribution.

George Rosen was professor emeritus of Economics at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He died in 2018 at the age of 97. He was one of the early foreign scholars who worked on independent India. He was a good friend of Chaudhury and visited Chaudhuri's Churchill Chambers flat often. He contributed frequently to both the EW as well as the EPW later. His book "Industrial Change in India," first published in 1958, was revised and republished several times. In his 1962 piece published here, he put forward the plausible hypothesis that despite the substantial investment in the railways in the latter half of the 19th century, economic growth in India was aborted because the average income of an Indian was too low, and insufficient to sustain a stable consumer goods industry. The problem was worsened by the refusal of the government to protect domestic industry, at least during its "infancy" period. Further, there was a significant drain of income to the metropolitan country by way of payments for the services of the British personnel.

There follow some brilliant and classic papers by, among others, Ashok Rudra, Lewis, M L Dantwala, Amartya Sen, Raj Krishna, Jan Tinbergen and V K R V Rao. Lack of space prevents us from making any comment on those. These provide a feast to any social scientist trying to understand the social and economic antecedents of India's developmental path.

Culture and Administration

The last part of the volume consists of nine papers on the theme of culture, administration and leadership. At first sight, they may seem like disjointed notions, but every collection of readings must allow the editors their own way of addressing large issues. To an unerring degree, the editors present a coherent choice of holistic pieces written by some of our best home-grown minds. Through the 1950s, there were two major issues that had consumed the attention and energy of the entire country. The first had to do with the language question. There were some genuine fears in the non-Hindi speaking belt of the obvious disadvantages, owing to the hegemony of Hindi, which had been named the national language. More fundamentally, there was the issue of encouraging the natural flowering of regional languages like Bengali, Telugu and Tamil, etc, which, it was feared, would be hampered if Hindi was to be given official sanction from the central government. This was also linked with the idea of state reorganisation on the basis of language. There were language riots, and several young men martyred themselves in the 1950s.

The second had to do with the role the bureaucracy was to play in nation-building. Did a newly independent country, which had embraced economic planning, need more specialists or more generalists? Would the Indian Administrative Service be able to provide the steel frame the Indian Civil Service had provided to colonial Britain? Not surprisingly, the issue has not become irrelevant even after the lapse of seven decades. During the intervening period, serious questions have come up from time to time regarding the probity and integrity of some of the top occupants of the administrative pyramid who have been known to pursue pelf and power.

D P Mukerji, economist and polymath at Lucknow and Aligarh, has the first essay in this last part, with a piece he had written in 1953 with the title "Man and Plan in India: The Background." Incidentally, it should be pointed out that the very first editorial in the very first number of *EW* in 1949 was written by Mukerji and had the title "Light without Heat." The present reviewer had known some economists, now deceased, and some other social scientists, who had been students of Mukherjee. I have heard of Mukherjee's intellectual abilities, both in the classroom and outside, only in the highest of superlatives and with the greatest of fondness. Mukherjee offers a magisterial overview of Marx, Tagore and Gandhi and closes his essay with his assessment of Jawaharlal Nehru, and his sense that the future leaders of the country would need to be planners and technocrats.

Nehru's Legacy

Despite all his frailties, Nehru, in Mukherjee's mind, was the tallest person to lead India in its earliest years of growing up as an independent nation. Of Nehru, he says:

> But he is also the idol of the middle-class educated man who knows that the world is not exhausted by India, that India must make confident strides towards the future, that willy-nilly, modern forces like nationalism for the colonies, democracy, science and technology, have come to stay, that civilisation belongs to the city, that culture is man made, that history halts unless it is pushed, that there is no marching back like frogs to the well, that the blind forces of nature or of social systems have to be harnessed, and that the universe has to be faced openly and squarely, without fear or favour.

The last two essays in the volume by Kothari and Dantwala are also on the intellectual legacies of Nehru. With all their caveats, both the seasoned political scientist as well as the economist come around to recognising Nehru as the liberal democrat who fundamentally stood for modernity, scientific temper and institution building. This, as well as Mukherjee's assessment of Nehru, the man and the leader, is clearly orthogonal to anything one has been hearing about our first Prime Minister in very recent times. History will judge which of the two views is the appropriate assessment of the man. The present regime too will pass, but the real fear is that it will have altered or subverted the Nehruvian liberal and secular ethos to such a devastating extent that there might possibly be no turning back.

Politically, sociologically, economically and ecologically, India today, in 2020, is at very important crossroads. In order to understand our present predicament with any degree of accuracy, the present-day thinkers, scholars, academics and bureaucrats do require a holistic understanding of where the story began, at the turn of independence. There certainly are many accounts available, in the plethora of books, articles and reminiscences by people from different walks of life. But it is possible to argue that the first 16 years of Chaudhuri's distilled efforts at the editorial desk of *EW* offer a most unique vantage point to understand the multitude of forces that shaped our country during the most crucial years. The entire academic world, and social scientists in particular, owe a deep debt of gratitude to Pranab Bardhan, Sudipto Mundle, Rohini Somanathan for having sifted through the huge fat volumes of *EW* to select these substantial and delectable pieces for us to savour.

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Rethinking India's Energy Policy

Development Challenge around Multiple Objectives

Radhika Khosla, Navroz K Dubash

An energy supply approach is inadequate to India's energy requirements at a time when multiple objectives need to be addressed. The state of play in energy supply and demand is examined, and the recovery of an older tradition of attention to energy demand patterns in addition to energy supply is argued for. The gains from an explicit attention to the fact that India has to address multiple and simultaneous objectives in shaping energy policymaking are laid out, and emerging methodologies to serve this goal are discussed. Shifts in governance patterns are a necessary part of transitioning to a broader, and more development-focused approach to energy policy.

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The provision of energy has long been central to India's development. However, India's energy strategy and planning has largely been constructed in supply-oriented terms, which can and has been limiting, given the complex and interconnected set of energy issues facing India. This is especially relevant to the current context in which India is undergoing multiple large-scale transitions in its demography, job creation, urbanisation, provision of energy access and built environment, all of which have implications for energy needs and consumption patterns. While energy policy in response to these transitions is often reduced to simply ensuring sufficient fuel growth, in reality, the challenge is more complex and includes ensuring energy security, providing equitable energy access, and protecting both the local and global environment. In this article, we argue that India's long-standing supply focus needs to give way to a more explicit strategic approach based on addressing multiple objectives simultaneously. We then describe emerging methodologies in the literature which provide examples for ways to operationalise an integrated approach and discuss their corresponding institutional features, to help shape the still fluid future energy supply and demand patterns.

India's Energy Strategy

There is little doubt that India will need to substantially enhance its total energy use if it is to develop. India's per capita energy consumption is a third of the global average, at 0.55 tonne of oil equivalent (toe)/cap compared with the global average of 1.78 toe/cap (British Petroleum 2017). Analogously, in 2014 India consumed 806 kWh/cap of electricity compared to the global average of 3,125 kWh/cap, United States' (US) consumption level of 12,987 kWh/cap and Chinese consumption level of 3,927 kWh/cap (World Bank 2014). These low levels of energy serve as a constraint to development, as evidenced by the Human Development Index (HDI) which is a measure of social development and is strongly correlated with high energy access (Gaye 2007). For India to reach higher levels of human development, it will likely need to at least double, if not triple, its energy needs, making energy critical to its development aspirations (Sreenivas and Prayas Energy Group 2014). In fact, existing modelling studies suggest that India may double its energy use by 2030 (Dubash et al 2017).

Historically, a perennial sense of energy scarcity has dominated India's policymaking for the past two decades (Dubash 2011). The landmark Integrated Energy Policy of 2006 called for increasing primary energy use by a multiple of three or four, and to do so by pursuing "all available fuel options and forms of energy" (Planning Commission 2006: xiii). Successive Five Year Plans set ambitious targets, which until recently, were almost always dramatically underachieved, exacerbating the sense of scarcity. The need for enhanced energy availability has also been tempered by a growing attention to energy security, as energy imports climbed up 50% of India's total primary energy use in 2017–18 (CSO 2019: 42, 43, 60, 76).

More recently, spurred by shortages and security considerations, energy supply has picked up. After a problematic effort at coal auctions, and a steep decline in coal supply, administrative measures appear to have stimulated coal production (Sarma 2013). At the same time, an ambitious renewable energy target of 175 GW, driven both by energy security and a focus on clean energy, has led to a spurt in renewables generation, with solar energy exhibiting falling costs and double digit growth rates (Bridge to India 2017: 8; Saran et al 2019: 8). In addition, the government has announced the construction of 10 large new nuclear plants (Das and Bera 2017). As of 2018, India was still heavily dependent on coal use,

Figure 1: India's Primary Energy Supply, 2006–18



Source: CSO (2018: 28, 44; 2019: 42, 43, 60, 76); NITI Aayog (nd); Central Electricity Authority (2017: 1B; 2018: 1B).

Figure 2: India's Energy Demand, 2012–18



Source: Compiled by authors from CSO (2013: 60; 2014: 68; 2015: 60; 2016: 58; 2017: 64; 2018: 28, 44, 57; 2019: 42, 43, 60, 76).

but had a rapidly growing renewable energy sector (Figure 1).

However, even from a supply point of view, recent uncertainties about India's energy future have by no means been banished. Looking to the future, the technological transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy depends on the complementary development of storage technology at low cost, around which there is uncertainty. Even more problematic is the fact that levels of access to commercial energy remain low and usage levels remain well below the thresholds associated with high scores on the HDI. By some metrics, usage remains at a quarter of the levels associated with high HDI (Ministry of Finance 2019: 163). Increasing energy supply has by no means guaranteed sufficient energy access.

This suggests that to understand the future of Indian energy requires looking beyond the supply side. In particular, for a rapidly transforming economy and society like India, paying attention to demand patterns and their determinants is equally important. Moreover, an examination of energy sector institutions and governance—the mechanisms through which supply and demand are mediated—is necessary particularly given past flawed governance arrangements in Indian electricity systems. Finally, there is growing concern about environmental externalities, whether local issues such as water, land use and air pollution, or global concerns like climate change.

Demand patterns and their determinants: Understanding the patterns of future energy use is both challenging and complex, in part because they will be shaped by a set of imminent transitions. First, as part of a demographic transition, the country is expected to add at least 10 million people to the job market each year for the next two decades, with consequences for energy use (Tandon 2018). Second, ongoing urbanisation will lead to about 300 million more Indians moving into urban spaces by 2050, who will demand more resources for improved lifestyles (UN Habitat 2016). Third, infrastructure is rapidly developing and estimates suggest that two-thirds of India's buildings that will exist in 2030 will be built after 2010 (Kumar et al 2010: 1). Fourth, India's transition to full commercial energy access is still a work in progress; while the government states that it has achieved more than 99% of household electrification, as per the Saubhagya dashboard of the Ministry of Power, usage rates remain low at about a third of the world average (Prayas Energy Group 2017), and while about 95% of houses have access to modern cooking fuels, the proportion of total needs met by gas versus biomass remains inadequate (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 2019). Indeed, studies predict that electricity generation in business-as-usual scenarios will grow approximately by two to three times by 2030 (Dubash et al 2017).

These structural transitions make the implications for future energy needs immense but also uncertain, because future needs will depend on the form that each transition will take. For example, the implications of a services-led jobs trajectory will be quite different from one that is led by manufacturing. Or, urbanisation built on dense cities would require very different energy needs than sprawling cities. And urban form—with its networks of buildings, transport and streets, which are some of the longest lasting components of the economy—once built, will sustain its spatial patterns for decades. These spatial patterns, in turn, will lead to corresponding patterns of energy consumption, on the order of similarly long timescales (Creutzig et al 2016). In other words, the reality of how India's energy future unfolds will depend on the manner in which the transitions are undertaken, and explicitly on their energy services consumption resulting in demand-side patterns (Figure 2).

Without explicit consideration of these factors, energy challenges will be compounded by the risk of accidental "lock-in" to potentially suboptimal consumption technologies, and analogous institutional structures and behaviours, since the bulk of development in cities and infrastructure is yet to occur. If investments are made in technologies and subsequent behaviours with poor energy performance levels, it can lead to a series of path-dependent outcomes which are difficult to reverse (Seto et al 2016). That is, if energy saving practices are not followed during the current phase of new construction, then subsequent measures to go back and capture benefits from these infrastructures typically provide fewer savings, and include significant transaction costs (Urge-Vorsatz et al 2012). To give an example of the scale of the lock-in effect, studies estimate that the lost potential energy savings from the buildings sector alone in 2050 (compared to 2005) will be in the range of 53% in the US, 63% in China, and 414% in India (Urge-Vorsatz et al 2012). The numbers demonstrate the distinctive opportunity ahead of India to avoid energy and carbon lock-in, and instead, to shape long-term consumption patterns. To avoid doing so, risks missing out on a substantial opportunity to determine India's energy demand future.

Energy institutions and governance: India has a long history of confused and contradictory governance arrangements around energy exploration and supply, including flawed coal auctions (Mishra 2016), disputed gas contracts (Dabadge et al 2016) and disputes over "compensatory tariffs" for electricity (Rautray and Prasad 2017; Chitnis and Dixit 2017).

The traditional supply-side approach has contributed to these issues as it fails to account for the institutional complexities of shifting from ensuring adequate energy supply to actually meeting energy needs. The supply-side focus, driven by a historic scarcity mentality, has led to a strategic choice to pursue all supply (but not demand) options—coal, renewable energy, gas and nuclear—with equal vigour. But such an "all of the above" approach is deeply non-strategic. It fails to recognise that in the context of limited political focus, diplomatic attention, administrative capacity, and technological resources, it may make sense to be more discriminating across options, by developing a better understanding of demand.

A crisis-driven supply-oriented focus can also lead to bad decisions, with long-term consequences. In the mid-1990s, for example, generous financial incentives to independent power producers were put in place to ensure enhanced supply. Not only were few new plants realised, but they led to unsustainable financial burdens in some states (Dubash and Rajan 2001). In another more recent example, based on an argument that much-needed power could not be foregone, private producers were able to successfully argue for a rewritten set of contracts to reflect rises in imported coal prices, although there are certainly grounds to argue that private producers should have accounted for price risks when they bid for the contracts (Chitnis et al 2012).

As in the 1990s, a priority on ensuring supply without adequate attention to whether the conditions of supply are favourable can have negative implications for consumers. Since about 2015, India has swung from a crisis of fuel shortages, notably coal and gas, to having what is labelled "surplus" power in the electricity system, and idle capacity (Singh 2016). This surplus capacity coexists with continuing chronic shortages for actual consumers, and hundreds of millions unserved by electricity. This seeming paradox is driven by flawed institutional mechanisms, notably, financially weak distribution companies and a regulatory mechanism that fails to link electricity suppliers and users in viable ways (Ramdev 2015). A supply orientation, without paying attention to the ultimate objective—affordable quality energy services for end-users—thereby perpetuates perverse results.

Local and global environment: In recent years, there is growing recognition that the energy sector generates substantial social and environmental externalities of both local and global nature. For example, public unease over worsening local air pollution, which is ranked amongst the worst in the world in Indian cities, and driven in part by energy use, is bringing lifestyle issues to the fore (WHO 2016). In some locations, such as Delhi (*Indian Express* 2015) and Goa (Shetye 2016), this has resulted in a push to reduce the activity of coal-fired power plants, a major source of harmful particulate matter. The land and water implications are equally severe, and studies indicate that there are 117 GW of inland coal-based power plants with environmental clearances granted, which would consume enough water to irrigate about 9,20,000 ha of land in a year, or provide drinking and domestic use water to about 7% of India's population every day for a year (Dharmadhikary and Dixit 2011: 14–15). Untangling domestic energy and environmental concerns is made more challenging by the overlay of global climate change. As energy accounts for 71% of India's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (MoEFCC 2015a), India's energy choices carry important implications for climate mitigation, a linkage that is laid out in India's contribution in the 2015 Paris Agreement and one that can no longer be ignored by mainstream planning (MoEFCC 2015b).

In sum, it is clear that assessing India's energy future is not straightforward. The country faces a complex and interconnected set of issues to which it must develop a longer-term response. In light of these complexities, past pathologies, and future uncertainties, how should India effectively plan its energy use for development? In the next section, we explore the need and potential for integrated energy decision-making.

An Integrated Approach

As we discuss above, to be effective, Indian energy policy must increasingly juggle economic considerations such as adequacy of energy supplies, macroeconomic costs of energy imports, incentives for efficient energy use, social considerations, namely access of energy services, and environmental factors such as local pollution, and global GHG emissions. The task is made more complex by considerable uncertainties about the scale of future energy needs, an ill-functioning electricity sector, rapidly changing technology, and the growing impact of environmental pollutants. In this section, we argue for an alternate demand-based approach to nuance the traditional assumption that higher energy supplies spontaneously lead to equitable and better living standards for all.

The principles of pursuing a development focused planning approach are, formally at least, already enshrined in India's Twelfth Five Year Plan and National Action Plan on Climate Change (Planning Commission 2013; MoEF 2008). Both plans call upon India to take actions which promote sustainable development objectives, which include inclusive growth, job creation, energy security, local environmental goals, and in recent years, addressing climate change. Energy policy is thus increasingly seen as needing to serve a range of economic, social and environmental development objectives simultaneously. The consideration of these multiple dimensions of development is articulated in the language of "co-benefits" in the context of the climate debate, and in the larger context of energy policy it is more usefully referred to as an assessment of "multiple objectives," which does not require declaring one objective as primary

(Khosla et al 2015). A multiple objective-based approach is useful because it allows the synergies and trade-offs across different objectives, arising from different potential policy options, to be made explicit during the process of policymaking.

Consider the example of coal to illustrate the nature of multiple objectives-based planning. Coal is a key component of India's energy mix and represented 70% of the economy's total generation capacity in 2012 (Dubash et al 2015: ii). Coal demand and the absolute volume of coal imports continue to increase, in response to which the government has set a target to increase domestic coal production from 600 MT to 1,500 MT by 2019 (PIB 2014). Continued coal use is most likely necessary in the next decade. However, a focus on ramping up coal production in the absence of complementary end-use analyses misses several important questions. What is the actual amount of additional energy supply that India will need? How much of additional supply will be met by coal, given the shifting economics of solar versus coal? What are coal's environmental consequences, as evidenced by an increasing number of court rulings over pollution? (*M P Patil v Union of India and Others* 2014; *Sudiep Shrivastava v State of Chhattisgarh and Others* 2014; *Ratandeep Rangari v State of Maharashtra and Others* 2015; *Jeet Singh Kanwar and Another v Union of India and Others* 2013). At what level is there a risk of overshoot resulting in high cost coal assets that are "stranded," that is, undercut by more efficient demand-side options and/or a future cheaper energy source? Given the domestic challenges of extracting coal—it tends to be located in areas of internal conflict with high transportation (rail freight) costs—what is the optimal mix of domestic versus imported higher quality and costlier coal? Finally, how will the expansion of coal affect the realisation of India's international climate pledge? Development-oriented decision-making around India's coal future, thus, must be based on an assessment of the linkages between coal and the use to which its energy is put, along with other socio-economic and environment aspects, and not merely on increasing domestic supply.

More broadly, if energy is to truly support development, energy policy and planning should be rooted in a more explicit process of matching energy needs to development objectives. This requires widening the emphasis of energy planning from a focus on energy security, to the security of energy services (Khosla et al 2015). But working through these interconnections is complex, and in spite of the acceptance to broaden the dimensions of energy planning, there are few efforts to put it into practice to maximise the synergies between energy and development.

Integrated Energy Sector

In this section, we introduce and discuss an emerging domestic literature on efforts to integrate political, socio-environmental and economic aspects of energy decisions. Part of this analysis uses global models, which provide strong evidence of substantial complementarities between climate mitigation, reduced air pollution and energy security outcomes in the South Asian region (Rao et al 2015). Indian studies, on the other hand, have paid limited attention to such linkages, but a few track achievements *ex post* of the multiple objectives of energy policy (Sreenivas and Iyer 2014).

The limited consideration of the different dimensions of Indian energy is evident in a review of national energy–climate modeling studies (Dubash et al 2015: ii). The review shows that most studies emphasise supply trends, and fewer provide comprehensive data on the distribution, patterns and requirements of future end-use energy (Table 1). The current studies are also limited in their treatment of the other complementary objectives of Indian energy, such as job creation or implications for the local environment, or on the trade-offs across development objectives when pursuing a particular growth path.

The studies have an implicit assumption that an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) will mean the achievement of development goals. But this often may not be the case—energy use and GDP may grow, even as access to electricity and energy services remains stagnant, environmental quality worsens, and energy supplies become more insecure (Reddy 1991: 4). By contrast, an explicit focus on end uses of energy provides a better understanding of the link between energy and development (Dharmadhikary and Bhalerao 2017).

Fortunately, there is growing literature that is encouraging an alternative and integrated framework for Indian energy decisions. Originally, such a narrative change was promoted in the 1980s in the work of A K N Reddy, who underlined the need to extend the energy system beyond its conventional supply-side definition and move from the idea of "energy sources" to "energy services" (Goldemberg et al 1994). In Reddy's work, the objective of the energy system (and its supply and utilisation activities) is to provide energy services, for instance, lighting, comfortable indoor temperatures, refrigerated storage, transportation, and appropriate temperatures for cooking to achieve development outcomes for all sections of society (Reddy and Balachandra 2006).

Table 1: Informing Multiple Objectives

Objectives		LCSIG	TERI–WWF	Shukla et al	CSTEP-QoL	IESS-v2	IEA	DDPP
Energy for growth	Supply	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Demand	○	●		●	●	●	●
Energy security			●		○	●	○	●
Inclusive growth		○			●		○	○
Local environmental objectives			○	●		●	●	
CO_2 mitigation	Emissions	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Intensity	●			●		○	●
Costs		●	○			●	●	●

○ Partial coverage: Addressed to an extent, but falls short in some respects, including accessibility.
● Full coverage: Reasonably comprehensive and transparent treatment.
Study name acronyms are as follows—Expert Group on "Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth" (Planning Commission 2014); Climate Change Impact on the Indian Economy—A CGE Modelling Approach (NCAER 2009); The Energy Report – India, 100% Renewable Energy by 2050 (WWF-India and TERI 2013); Energy-Emissions Trends and Policy Landscape for India (Shukla et al 2015); A Sustainable Development Framework for India's Climate Policy (CSTEP 2015); Energy Intensive Sectors of the Indian Economy: Path to Low Carbon Development (World Bank 2011); India Energy Security Scenarios 2047 (IESS) (NITI Aayog 2015).
Source: Dubash et al (2015: ii).

Figure 3: Multiple Objectives and Policy Alternatives for the Cooking Sector



Source: Khosla et al (2015).

While Reddy's interventions remained unimplemented, in part because they required an institutional re-envisioning of how energy policy is made, of late, other studies are reintroducing a broader conception of energy planning that draw, at least in part, on elements of Reddy's work. Sreenivas and Iyer (2014: 7) propose an "energy sector assessment index" to capture the relationships and impacts of energy policy across different dimensions of development. The index includes assessment of energy access and use, assessment of energy supply diversity, management and import exposure, assessment of social implications such as resettlement and rehabilitation in the vicinity of energy projects, assessments of GHG emissions and the local environment, and an economic assessment of trade deficits from imports and subsidies. In another approach, Narula and Reddy (2016) develop a "sustainable energy security index" using energy security and sustainability as the frame to analyse the energy system. The index's energy security indicators include availability (adequacy and access to energy), affordability or the economic dimension (prices and paying ability), efficiency (productivity in resource use), and acceptability (environmental protection), with sector-specific and detailed indicators under each dimension. In addition, others approaches that focus at the city scale are being introduced, such as the Smart Cities Index (Mohan et al 2017) and the government's City Livability Index (MOHUA 2017).

While these efforts to consider diverse objectives are important, their focus is largely on enabling policymakers to monitor success or failure across multiple policy priorities ex post, or after implementation. A complementary need, however, is for policy design tools that allow policies to be designed ex ante to meet multiple objectives. If equitable access, sustainability and energy security are not factored explicitly into policymaking at the start, it is unlikely they will adequately be reflected in policy outcomes.

One line of thinking aimed at an ex ante focus on achieving multiple objectives propose a "multi-criteria decision analysis" (MCDA)-based approach for addressing India's simultaneous economic, social and environmental objectives (Dubash et al 2013; Khosla et al 2015). Such an approach is finding prominence in international energy decision-making contexts as well (Cohen et al 2019; Kumar et al 2017; Pohekar et al 2004). The approach provides a methodology by which development goals can be made explicit and discussed within an open process. It also enables a transparent assessment of complementarities and trade-offs across objectives; that is, it helps decision-makers understand where co-benefits exist, and can be realised, and where trade-offs exist, and can be avoided. Significantly, the approach also recognises the political nature of energy decisions—that different actors will place different values on competing objectives. It is thereby underpinned by a continuous involvement of stakeholders to deliberate on the trade-offs and complementarities between objectives. The MCDA approach is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the policy objectives map that is laid out at the start of decision-making, in this case using the example of India's modern cooking fuel transition.

The fundamental shift implied by an integrated and multiple objective-based policy approach is that objectives which historically receive only lip service, such as access and environment, are instead explicitly considered when assessing policy choices. For example, if access of energy services is important, then any policy to enhance energy supply would need to ensure that the generated energy reaches the currently unserved. It would no longer be acceptable, as happened in the last decade, to have a doubling of electricity generation capacity and yet have more than 300 million people remain without access to electricity (Adve and Kothari 2015).

Another reason to consider the spectrum of policy objectives *ex ante* is that it allows policymaking to reflect on factors that are often not incorporated in decision-making, such as assessing obstacles to policy implementation. Ignoring implementation and its underlying structural incentives (for example, vested interests or limited bureaucratic capacity) risks obscuring the larger, more explicitly political, analysis of the reasons for the inequalities and inefficiencies in India's energy sector.

Conclusions

To address the challenges of Indian energy, we first need to change how we think about the problem. A limited supply-centric perspective has not served India well. Instead, we suggest a reorientation to explicitly organise Indian policymaking in the service of multiple objectives of energy policy, which include energy services provision and linked socio-environmental and economic goals. This reorientation, and the resultant intended transparency and clarity in decision-making, increases the likelihood that long-ignored goals, such as energy access and environmental quality are given their due importance.

Developing a conceptual and methodological framework for energy planning that internalises development objectives is only part of the challenge. Bringing about this shift is more than a technical process—requiring new methodologies and approaches—and in part institutional, requiring shifts in data collection (Dukkipati et al 2014), analysis of synergies and trade-offs, and decision processes. Data on energy demand is particularly scattered and incoherent, and difficult to collect or estimate. A serious gap is the lack of data on the use of non-commercial energy, primarily in the form of biomass and non-motorised transport (World Bank 2010). It is necessary for the institutional framework within which energy choices are made and implemented to be sufficiently elastic to adopt this approach. At the moment, Indian energy institutions tend to operate in sub-sectoral supply-based silos—ministries for coal, oil and gas, power, renewable energy and so on, with little integration with and across demand sectors. Energy demand is even more complex as it is indirectly governed by ministries that typically have non-energy objectives, such as urban development, and are often governed at the state and local scale, introducing a further complication to coordination (Khosla et al 2017). Forms of tight coordination and, ideally, integration across ministries and governance levels, and across demand and supply side ministries is necessary to enable the required integrated thinking.

Ultimately, both technical and institutional changes cannot be drivers in themselves. However, they can open spaces for more productive engagement with energy policymaking. This will require a process of transparent discussion often involving conflicting points of view. The framing of multiple objective-based energy policy provides a construct that allows more democratic engagement in energy policymaking, which has historically been a technologically opaque arena. But it does not guarantee that those spaces will be occupied. To bring about real changes on the ground in Indian energy, requires the productive interaction and reinforcement of technical, institutional and political spheres.

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Critiquing the Industrial Relations Code Bill, 2019

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The Industrial Relations Code, one of the four labour codes codified from the erstwhile central labour laws, aims to promote the ease of doing business and spur investment by encouraging labour flexibility. A critical examination of the code suggests that it will fail to create a conducive and efficient industrial relations environment, and will neither promote the ease of doing business nor serve workers' welfare.

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The Second National Commission on Labour (SNCL) has recommended that

> the existing set of labour laws should be broadly grouped into four or five groups of laws pertaining to (i) industrial relations, (ii) wages, (iii) social security, (iv) safety and, (v) welfare and working conditions and so on. (SNCL 2002: 322)

The National Democratic Alliance-II (NDA) government has cited these recommendations to frame four labour codes—the Labour Code on Industrial Relations (IRC), the Labour Code on Wages (WC), the Labour Code on Social Security and Welfare (SSC), and the Labour Code on Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions (OSHWC). Of these four codes, the government has already introduced the IRC in Parliament in November 2019. It combines the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (TUA), the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA) (GoI 2019).

Employers and Unions

Employers have been demanding reforms of labour laws in the sphere of industrial relations to afford them labour flexibility and regulate trade unions, collective bargaining and strikes (CII 2014; Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2019). Chapter V–B in the IDA requires that industrial establishments employing 100 or more workers must secure prior permission from the appropriate government before effecting lay-off or retrenchment of workers and closing establishments, among other measures. Employers argue that this restricts their freedom to make economic decisions and to demand either its abolition or amendment. Employers have also demanded that the minimum number of workers for this measure be changed from 100 to 300 or, in some cases, even 1,000. On the other hand, they require flexible labour like fixed-term employment (FTE) and contract labour in both core and non-core operations in the establishments to respond to ever-changing market forces. They have also demanded stronger laws to widen the definition of strikes, regulate the conduct of strikes, ban outsiders in trade unions and improve trade union governance (CII 2014).

The trade unions have stridently opposed employers' demands, conducted 19 nationwide strikes and protests from 1992 until early 2020 and placed their charter of demands before the government (Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2020). Primarily, they demand increased employment security, time-bound registration of trade unions, strengthening of union recognition, collective bargaining rights and a more efficient system of industrial disputes settlement (Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2019). It is in these contexts that the government has introduced the IRC. The code claims that it seeks to promote business and worker welfare simultaneously (GoI 2019: 55). This article critically examines the veracity of this claim.

One of the main demands of the trade unions is that labour laws should have universal coverage. It is understood that progressive legislation will gradually but surely achieve it, given that the IRC was conceived after 75 years of the enactment of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the IDA was conceived after nine decades of the enactment of the TUA. However, far from a progression in their coverage, the IRC has retained the existing thresholds (Table 1, p 46).

Collective Bargaining and Strikes

The government often talks of the need to reallocate its legal and other resources to strengthen the unorganised sector, given its enormity (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2003). The SNCL (2002: 335–36) strongly urged the need to exempt trade unions in the unorganised sector from the rather stringent eligibility conditions that apply to unions in the organised sector. But the IRC has not relaxed the eligibility conditions for registration, nor has it allowed more external leaders in trade unions in the unorganised sector. It has retained the existing provisions concerned with eligibility conditions and outside leadership in the TUA, 1926 (Sections 6[1] [2] and 23).

The IRC has sought to cure the historical deficit in the national law concerning industrial relations by providing for the recognition of trade unions. But, as the saying goes, this cure is worse than the disease since the statutes are unrealistic, vague and ambiguous. For example, the code (Section 14), unlike the IRC 2015 draft (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2015), provides for a negotiating union (NU) or a negotiating council (NC). In the case of a single union in a firm, it automatically becomes the NU of the workers. In the case of multiple unions, the trade union having 75% or more workers as its members will be recognised as the "sole bargaining agent." In case no union has this following, an NC will be constituted with unions having 10% or more following.

The threshold for the sole bargaining agent is quite stiff and one wonders how many trade unions would be able to have or achieve such a huge following. There are three methods of determining the bargaining agent—membership verification, check-off (a method by which an employee provides a written undertaking to the employer, authorising them to deduct the union membership fees from their wages/salaries and credit the same to the union in which they are a member) and secret ballot. The code has not specified the method of determining the NU/NC, unlike the union recognition rules and regulations in Maharashtra, Kerala or West Bengal.

The code continues the existing legal arrangement to provide much broader

Figure 1: Share of Lockouts in Total Work Stoppages (Frequency) and Total Workdays Lost (WDL), 2005–14



Source: Labour Bureau, various issues of indian labour statistics.

Figure 2: Trends in the Number of Strikes, 1991–2014



Source: Labour Bureau, various issues of indian labour statistics.

applicability of conciliated settlements and awards of labour judiciary (all workers, trade unions and employers, present and future) as compared to that of the collective agreement (only the contracting parties). This will weaken the incentive for the parties to prefer collective bargaining to conciliation and compulsory adjudication (Shyam Sundar 2010).

Despite the declining frequency of strikes and the rising dominance of lockouts in the share of workdays lost during 2005–14 (Figures 1 and 2), the IRC has toughened up the provisions related to strikes.

Employers have argued that workers disrupt the normal functioning of establishments not only by strikes but also by go-slow and mass casual leave, and have demanded their inclusion in the definition of strikes (CII 2014). The government has obliged by defining "strike" to also include "concerted casual leave on a given day by 50 percent or more workers employed in an industry" (Section 2[zf] in the IRC). According to the IDA, in public utility services (PUS)—industries like railways, ports and docks, and also those added from time to time by the appropriate government under Section 2(n)—strikes cannot be conducted without a prescribed strike notice, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. These restrictive conditions on strikes do not apply to the non-public utility services (NPUS).

The government has also agreed to the demand that the distinction between PUS and NPUS be removed and these conditions be applicable to all establishments (AIOE nd). The elaborate regulations on the conduct of legal strikes will render strikes very difficult, if not impossible (Ramaswamy 1984), because employers could press for conciliation or adjudication, which might go on for weeks if not months. Effectively, workers would be unable to strike in the middle of continuous dispute resolution proceedings. The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) and the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) have condemned this procedural abridgement of the legal right to strike (Mohanty 2019).

On the other hand, the penalties for illegal striking are quite stiff. In the new penalty regime of continuing offence, for the first-time offence of an illegal lay-off, retrenchment or closure by employers, the penalty will be a meagre fine of ₹1 lakh up to the tune of ₹10 lakh. After being convicted for it, if the same offence is committed again, then the penalty shall be a fine of ₹5 lakh to ₹20 lakh (Section 86[2] in the IRC) and/or six months' imprisonment; in a practical sense, an employer cannot close the same establishment twice, unless it is a partial closure, and hence, a repeat offence in the case of closure does not apply. But in the case of first offence of commencing, continuing or otherwise acting in furtherance of an illegal strike, offending workers shall be punished with differential fines and/or a month's imprisonment (Section 86[14–16]). The question here is whether the illegal strike is socially more harmful than, say, illegal retrenchment or closure. Thus, the IRC will weaken the collective

Table 1: Thresholds Concerning Selected Variables/Clauses/Chapters in the IRC 2019

Variable in IRC	Threshold	Remarks
Application of standing orders (Chapter IV)	100	Since 1947, it is 50 in Karnataka and Maharashtra
Works committee Section 3(1)	100	Since 1947
Grievance redressal committee 4(2)	20	During 1982–2010, it was 50
Chapter IX, Sections 67–69 (lay-off, retrenchment and closure)	50–99	During 1953–76, more than 50; since 1976, 50–99
Chapter X (special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments)	100+	During 1976–84, 300; since 21 August 1984, it is 100

Source: Author's construction from clauses in the IDA.

institutions substantially and put workers at a disadvantage.

Dispute Resolution

In reforming the dispute settlement machinery, the primary shortcomings of the existing system need to be understood, which the code does not. There are four issues with industrial justice delivery. It is important to note the inadequacy of labour judiciary infrastructure relative to the industrial population (Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2018), even though it is an administrative issue and hence remains outside the purview of lawmaking.

First, labour judiciary bodies in India have delivered conflicting awards that have adversely affected the governance of industrial relations in a firm or industry. Second, the awards of the labour judiciary are challenged under Articles 226 to 227 as suitable in the respective high court jurisdictions and the high courts' judgments also differ. Third, in the absence of an all-India judicial body with all-India jurisdiction, either by a special appeal (Article 136) to challenge the high court's judgments or under Article 32, disputes are further taken to the Supreme Court. As a result, the higher courts' workload increases tremendously. Fourth, judicial officers lacking technical expertise in industrial relations adjudicate on them, which lead to further contestation and even inefficient outcomes. Together, they lead to "inordinate delay" in the delivery of justice (LCI 1987).

These issues engaged the attention of various bodies like the first National Commission on Labour in 1969, the Law Commission of India (LCI) in 1987 and the SNCL in 2002, and they have accordingly made recommendations on the reform of industrial dispute settlement machinery to cure these systemic issues. The IRC just needed to follow these threads and issue reforms, which it has not. On the contrary, it has created a convoluted system of dispute settlement and messed up the recommendations of these illustrious bodies.

The IRC has removed the conciliation board, the court of inquiry and the labour court, and retained conciliation officers and the industrial tribunal. It altered the latter in a convoluted manner. Unlike the existing single-member tribunal, the tribunal in the IRC will have two members—a judicial and an administrative member. Section 44(2) stipulates that every tribunal shall consist of two members (judicial and administrative) and Section 44(3) provides for a "bench" of the tribunal that shall comprise two members or a single member (either the judicial or the administrative).

Section 47(1) stipulates that the tribunal shall decide by consensus. Immediately after it, it contemplates the possibility of no consensus and provides for reference of the point(s) of difference to the appropriate government, which shall add a judicial member of "another tribunal" to the existing two-member bench. Now the three members (two judicial and one administrative) shall adjudicate on the differences based on majority.

Rather than this convoluted measure, the lawmakers could have straightaway constituted a three-member bench so that awards are given either by consensus or by a majority rule. Furthermore, this process will delay the adjudication proceedings, which are already subject to delays due to the factors noted above.

In the IDA, some subjects are allocated to labour courts (Second Schedule) while others to the tribunal (Third Schedule). Since the lawmakers removed "labour courts," they have allocated some of the matters from the First and the Second Schedules to the two-member bench and the remaining to a single-member bench of the tribunal (Section [44][9]). This is an arbitrary and random distribution of issues. Clearly, this scheme of dispute settlement will neither enable the ease of doing business (as disputes settlement will be longer and hence, expensive) nor aid labour welfare (as they will have to wait inordinately and incur huge costs).

Labour Flexibility in FTE

The central government introduced fixed-term employment (FTE) in March 2018 but the state governments did not notify the same. The IRC 2019 has reintroduced FTE (Section [2] [l]) along the lines recommended by the employers (CII 2014). Under the FTE, workers will be formally engaged for a fixed tenure and their compensation and benefits will not be less than those for regular workers performing the same work, and they will be eligible for statutory benefits proportionate to their tenure. This makes the FTE costlier than contract labour. Furthermore, in the case of contract labour, the principal employer shifts the monetary and real costs (like monitoring) to the contractors, while these are not possible in the case of FTEs. So, employers who are looking to maximise their profits by reducing labour costs will avoid FTE. However, most worryingly, the IRC has omitted an important safeguard, which was included in the said notification, that the employers shall not convert the existing regular/permanent posts into an FTE. Then, there is a good prospect that employers might convert the future permanent vacancies into FTEs.

The more serious issue with FTE in India is that lawmakers did not apply their mind while drafting regulations concerning FTE. FTE regulations generally stipulate three aspects—material and objective reasons for resorting to FTE (for example, maternity and seasonality of business), the maximum number of successive FTEs, and the cumulative duration of successive FTEs. In the absence of caps on tenure and extensions, workers might permanently end up on FTE. Lastly, FTE is not good news for unions, as FTE employees will be risk-averse and avoid unions for the fear of not getting their contracts renewed or even getting permanency in the firm (Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2019).

Hire and Fire Flexibility

Employers have been primarily demanding freedom to fire workers and close down establishments, which is proscribed by Chapter V–B of the IDA. Trade unions oppose this on two grounds—it will lead to unemployment and create low quality of jobs, and there is no social security like unemployment insurance and benefits. Several researchers have argued against the labour rigidity of the IDA advanced by some academics (Chapter X in the IRC) on two grounds, since there is no scientific basis to support it, and labour regulation is the least obstacle for improving the ease of doing business (Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2020; Bhattacharjea 2019; Srivastava 2016).

However, although the central government seemed committed to creating a flexible labour market (Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2019), it did not have the political courage to implement the corresponding reforms. Instead, it has shifted this reform mandate on to the state governments using the constitutional provision of placing "labour" in the Concurrent List. Several state governments like Rajasthan, Haryana, Assam and Jharkhand have liberalised the threshold from 100 to 300 due to the absence of social dialogue, and muted protests by a fragmented trade union movement. Also, the central government did change the threshold of Chapter V–B from 100 to 300 in the IRC, 2015 draft (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2015) but the IRC, 2019 bill retained the existing threshold because of widespread protests by trade unions, including the BMS. But, it has empowered the state governments to "modify" it by executive order and, at the same time, protected the amendments made by the state governments (Section 77[1]).

These two clauses have effectively shifted the flexibility mandate to the state governments. The mode of effecting such reform is far more dangerous than the reform itself. Lawmaking is essentially the business of the legislature, and only during emergency conditions should the executive use the facility to enact ordinances that later get converted into laws. Even as the codification of laws is taking place at the national level, several state governments have either proposed or actually made disruptive changes in labour laws, including the IDA, during the COVID-19 crisis (*EPW* 2020; Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2020).

Conclusions

The IRC is a hasty and a bad exercise in lawmaking. It has merely copied the existing provisions (for example, work committees), retained the thresholds (for example, standing orders), tinkered with the existing provisions in the name of rationalisation in an unimaginative manner (for example, adjudication forum), sought to cure the historic deficits in an inadequate manner (union recognition), and provided a false sense of status quo while allowing the state governments to execute sly reforms (for example, retrenchment and closure).

The lawmakers have, in several ways, honoured employers' demands under the uninformed perception that labour flexibility will aid the ease of doing business and will secure investment. However, several scholars have contested these notions (Bhattacharjea 2019; Shyam Sundar and Sapkal 2019; Srivastava 2016). The government is rather naïve to imagine that digitisation of some procedures, like submission of documents by trade unions or employers and conferment of endorsement by government officials, will lead to the promotion of business.

The government, contrary to its claims in the code (GoI 2019: 55), has not effectively consulted trade unions and has not paid attention to their concerns (Chhabra 2019). Labour flexibility cannot be granted unconditionally unless it is complemented with a universal unemployment insurance/assistance scheme and social protection. These will ease labour mobility and also contribute to lessening of the firm's burden of bearing the cost of restructuring as it is now primarily in the form of severance pay. But the reskilling fund idea in the code needs to be thought of carefully. It is important to see all the four codes as an integrative exercise rather than segmented exercises. In an ironical sense, the IRC will neither promote the ease of doing business nor serve workers' welfare as it will fail to create a conducive and efficient industrial relations environment.

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Out-of-pocket Expenditure on Healthcare among the Urban Poor in India

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Focus on healthcare patterns and their determinants among the urban poor is crucial in order to move towards universal health coverage. However, published literature on these aspects in India is scarce. This study was undertaken to estimate out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures and resultant catastrophic health expenditure rates among the urban poor. It has been found that CHE rates are significantly higher among males, illiterates, older age groups, those hospitalised at private facilities and those reporting non-communicable diseases as the reason for hospitalisation. The study not only indicates high OOP expenditure incurred by the urban poor, but also points to many socio-economic inequalities.

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More than 54% of the population globally lives in urban areas, and this percentage is set to increase to 68% by 2050 (Gupta and Mondal 2015; DESA 2018). Much of this expected urban growth is taking place in developing countries, where a large proportion of new arrivals can only afford to live in informal settlements. This population represents the lowest socio-economic stratum in the cities, which faces many challenges, including but not limited to the access to infrastructure, housing, healthcare services, education and employment. The United Nations estimates around 10 crore people living in urban slums in India (DESA 2018).

Not only are their health indicators worse than their rural counterparts, they face significantly higher social and financial barriers to accessing healthcare (Chowdhury 2009). High rates of communicable diseases, such as respiratory infections, diarrhoeal infections and skin problems, have been reported in this population (Sarode 2014; Nair et al 2015). More than 40% of the urban poor pregnant women have been reported to be malnourished (Agarwal et al 2009; Usmani and Ahmad 2018). Besides communicable diseases, the unhealthy lifestyle in urban slums has also been linked to a greater risk and increased burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) (Singh et al 2013; Barua et al 2017; Lumagbas et al 2018).

Urban poor populations also frequently report problems in accessing affordable quality healthcare. Whereas rural areas in India have an established three-tier public healthcare system (sub-centres, primary health centres [PHC] and community health centres), the urban poor do not have access to a well-designed public healthcare system for primary healthcare, except a district hospital that mainly provides secondary care (Agarwal 2009). The lack of access to public facilities and qualified primary healthcare providers in urban areas results in a large proportion of outpatient care accessed through the private sector, which is highly fragmented and relies mostly on informal or less qualified practitioners (NSSO 2015). This also results in high out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure on health, which exacerbates the financial burden on the poor and leads to further inequities between the rich and the poor (Balarajan et al 2011). Most of the financial risk protection mechanisms—such as government-sponsored health insurance schemes—focus on the below poverty line population, which leaves a large segment of the working urban poor population out of their ambit (Bhat et al 2018).

A focus on the healthcare patterns and their determinants among the urban poor population is, thus, crucial in order to move towards universal health coverage (UHC) as envisaged under the Sustainable Development Goal 3 (UN 2017). While the Government of India has recently announced the ambitious Ayushman Bharat programme, which aims to strengthen primary healthcare through health and wellness centres (HWCs), and provide financial risk protection through the publicly-financed health insurance scheme—Pradhan Mantri Jan Aarogya Yojana (PMJAY)—its positive outcome will significantly depend on its success in reaching out to the urban poor. There have been a few studies from India that document the extent and determinants of the morbidity profile, health seeking behaviour and OOP expenditures on health among the urban poor population but the literature is scarce. The present study was undertaken to fill the existing gaps in evidence. In this paper, we report the extent of morbidity, healthcare utilisation patterns, OOP expenditures and financial risk protection, and their determinants, specifically among the urban poor.

Methodology

Study design and sampling: A composite reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child and adolescent health (RMNCHA) index was computed using data obtained from the National Family Health Survey 4 (IIPS 2015–16) to rank and stratify Indian states into four categories. A cross-sectional household survey was undertaken in urban areas in Rajasthan, Telangana, West Bengal and Odisha—states randomly selected from each of these categories. The districts in these states were again stratified into three categories as per the same index. One district was selected randomly from both the above average and below average-performing district categories in Rajasthan and Odisha, while one average-performing district each was selected from Telangana and West Bengal. A stratified random sampling design was then used for the selection of 26 primary sampling units (PSUs) (urban slums) in the largest urban areas of these districts. The sample size for the state was divided among the PSUs using probability proportional to size sampling methodology. The first household in each area was selected randomly, followed by consecutive sampling, till the desired sample size for that area was completed.

Sample size: Since the states fared differently in terms of key coverage indicators, an expected coverage of 50% was utilised for calculations to yield maximum sample size. With an absolute error of 5%, 95% confidence interval and design effect size of 1.5, a sample size of 576 was computed at the state level. The total sample size for the four states came out to be 2,304, which was adjusted to 2,400 to compensate for any non/partial response during the survey.

Data collection: A predesigned and pretested tool was slightly modified for electronic data collection by a computer-assisted personal interview through a tablet (Prinja et al 2016). The data on socio-demographic characteristics, household assets and consumption expenditure were collected from the head of the household. The respondent was interviewed for the presence of any member with an illness in the last 15 days or a hospitalisation during the last 365 days. The reasons for illness, treatment sought, associated OOP expenditure incurred and mechanisms to cope with the OOP expenditure were subsequently elicited. Quality control was undertaken by field supervisors, who revisited 5% of the sampled households to check for accuracy and completeness of data. Any discordance was resolved through discussion and revisiting the household. All incomplete records were discarded and not allowed to proceed to the analysis stage.

Data analysis: The data was analysed using IBM SPSS software version 21. Along with healthcare-seeking characteristics and OOP expenses on health, prevalence of catastrophic healthcare expenditure (CHE) and impoverishment due to hospitalisation were computed.

Socio-economic strata for households were determined by dividing the total sample arranged according to annual per capita household consumption expenditure into three equal parts. Equivalent household size and equivalised food expenditures were computed using the standard methodology prescribed by the World Health Organization (Xu 2005). These were used to generate subsistence expenditure and capacity to pay for each household. Households incurring healthcare expenses equal to or more than 40% of their capacity to pay were considered as having CHE. If the annual household consumption expenditure (HCE) was less than the subsistence expenditure, the household was characterised as poor, and vice versa. Households that were above the poverty line before incurring healthcare expenses but shifted below the poverty line after healthcare expenditure were characterised as impoverished due to healthcare expenses.

To identify the determinants of hospitalisation in the urban poor, a logit model with a dichotomous dependent variable was utilised. Socio-economic strata and enrolment in health insurance schemes were used as the predictor variables. The age of the individual, gender, education status, religion and social group were adjusted for to remove any confounding. The same model was restricted to households with hospitalisation to identify the determinants of CHE. The dependent variable was the dichotomous event of CHE. In addition to the other variables in the previous model for hospitalisation, the variables for the place of hospitalisation and type of ailment were added to the list of predictor variables in the model for CHE.

Ethical clearance: Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the institute ethics committee of the lead author's institute. Written informed consent for participation was obtained from respondents in the household survey.

Results

Sample characteristics: Majority of the households covered under the survey reported Hindu as their religion (89%) (Table 1, p 51). The overall sample represented almost equal proportion of Scheduled Caste (SC) (31%) and general category

(35%) participants. Almost half the population (48%) in the surveyed households belonged to the 15–45 years age group. While 40% of the sample consisted of housewives, another 41% of the sample belonged to the working class. Around 40% of this working class was employed in the private sector, 25% worked on their own, and only a small proportion worked in the government sector. Around 8% of the household members were graduates or had higher educational qualifications.

Healthcare-seeking behaviour: Around 36% of respondents seeking treatment for an illness in the last 15 days utilised the public healthcare system, in comparison to the 49% who went to the private sector. Around 9% respondents purchased drugs over the counter from pharmacies (Table 2). However, the poorest tertile households utilised public sector facilities (57%) more than the private sector (42%) for outpatient care. The education level of the patient did not affect the choice of healthcare facility for outpatient care. More than 65% of respondents reported undergoing hospitalisation in public healthcare facilities. The largest proportion of these hospitalisations were at tertiary-care hospitals (19%) and district hospitals (9%). Around 25% reported undergoing a laboratory test, while 9% reported other diagnostic tests during the hospitalisation episode. Forty-eight percent patients were prescribed allopathic medications. More patients with an education above graduation expressed a preference for private sector facilities (43%) as compared to illiterates (32%).

Table 1: Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Study Population (%)

		West Bengal	Telangana	Rajasthan	Odisha	Total
Religion	Hindu	84	90	88.9	99.8	89.5
	Muslim	13.2	6.6	5.4	0	7.5
	Christian	2.7	3.4	0	0.2	2.1
	Other	0	0	5.7	0	0.9
Caste	SC	36	36.2	24.5	17.5	31.1
	ST	4.1	14.1	15.6	10.5	10.5
	OBC	10.6	24.5	36.9	31.2	23.1
	General	49.3	25.2	23	40.9	35.4
Age profile (in years)	0–4	23.4	27.8	22.2	23.6	24.5
	5–14	9.4	15.8	17.2	11.3	13.2
	15–29	29.2	28.8	26.6	26	28
	30–44	19.8	22.3	19.7	20	20.6
	45–59	10.1	3.4	8.4	8.7	7.6
	60–69	5.1	1.3	4	7.2	4.2
	≥ 70	2.9	0.6	1.8	3.2	2.1
Occupation characteristics*	Government service	1.6	0.5	1.7	0.3	1.1
	Labourer/ own-account worker	29.5	19.7	17.2	25.5	23.7
	Private sector employees	7.8	29.5	22.3	12.7	17.3
	Student	7.4	4.2	11.8	6.5	7.3
	Unemployed/not working	9.4	3.3	6.8	5.3	6.5
	Housewife	36.1	40.8	38.2	43.6	39.1
	Other	8.3	1.8	2.1	6.3	5
Education characteristics	Illiterate	39.9	38.8	41.8	37	39.4
	Up to primary school	35.7	24.9	26.3	40.3	31.5
	Up to higher secondary	18.5	25.2	20	18.9	20.9
	Graduate and above	5.9	11	11.9	3.9	8.2

ST- Scheduled Tribe; OBC- Other Backward Classes
* Excluding children less than five years of age.
Source: Data collected during fieldwork.

Table 2: Healthcare-seeking Behaviour among Urban Poor in India (%)

		West Bengal	Telangana	Rajasthan	Odisha	Total
OPD	Public facility	40.0	27.3	28.6	44.7	36.3
	Private facility	34.4	71.6	59.6	46.3	48.6
	Pharmacy/drugstore	13.6	0.6	7.8	7.1	8.9
	Others	12.2	0.6	4.2	1.9	6.0
IPD	Public facility	73.0	39.1	43.5	77.5	65.9
	Private facility	26.9	60.8	56.5	22.4	34.1
Indoor treatment characteristics	Clinical examination	88.2	52.9	70.4	61.8	67.1
	Intravenous infusion	50.6	30.4	77.8	23.2	37.2
	Laboratory investigations	26.4	17.4	67.6	14.5	24.4
	Radiological investigations	10.1	10.1	39.8	1.7	9.8
	Medications (allopathic)	79.2	20.3	89.8	34.3	48.7
	Surgery	29.8	22.5	8.3	1.2	11.7

OPD- outpatient care; IPD- inpatient care.
Source: Data collected in fieldwork.

Figure 1: Average Annual Household Healthcare Expenditure



Source: Data collected from fieldwork.

Healthcare OOP expenses: The annual household healthcare expenditure ranged from ₹3,075 ($45) in West Bengal to ₹8,569 ($125) in Telangana state (Figure 1).[1] Mean healthcare expenditure in the overall sample was ₹6,689 ($97). Mean expenditure on hospitalisation was ₹27,025 ($392), with 95% confidence interval ranging from ₹22,734 ($329) to ₹31,815 ($461) (Table 3, p 52).

A trend of increasing OOP expenditure was observed while moving from the poorest to richest tertiles. Mean OOP expenditure for institutional delivery at public and private sector facilities was found to be ₹2,235 ($32) and ₹19,185 ($280) respectively. While OOP expenditure as a proportion of total HCE was found to be 5.2%, it varied from 2.6% in West Bengal to 9% in Odisha. The majority (86%) of households reported the use of personal income as the main mechanism to cope with OOP expenses, which ranged from 81% in West Bengal to 98% in Rajasthan. More importantly, insurance schemes were reported to be used by less than 1% of the households surveyed in the four states.

Financial risk due to OOP health expenditure: Around 10% of all households with a history of hospitalisation were observed to have CHE (Table 3). The CHE was higher among males (10.8%), non-Hindus (14.8%), those over 55 years of age (12%), illiterates (12.1%), non-enrolled in health insurance schemes (10.4%) and those belonging to poor tertiles (11.7%), though the differences were statistically non-significant. The use of private sector facilities (17.5%) and patients with NCDs (14.3%) presented significantly higher CHE in comparison to those admitted to public sector facilities (6.6%) or hospitalised with communicable conditions (7.7%). Geographic variations were also observed in CHE, with Telangana reporting the highest (17.9%), followed by West Bengal (13.1%), Rajasthan (9.4%) and Odisha (6.8%).

Table 3: OOP Expenditures and CHE for Hospitalisation among Urban Poor in India

		Expenditure (INR) on Hospitalisation Mean (95% CI LL- UL)	Catastrophic Health Expenditure % (95% CI LL- UL)
Overall		27,025 (22,734–31,815)	10.3 (8.2–12.3)
Gender	Male	23,091 (16,872–30,486)	10.8 (7.5–14)
	Female	29,954 (24,398–36,109)	9.9 (7.2–12.6)
Age	<15 yrs	20,598 (14,205–28,114)	7.8 (4.7–10.9)
	15-55 yrs	29,139 (24,408–34,255)	11.5 (8.5–14.4)
	>55 yrs	36,309 (16,974–60,413)	12.0 (5.3–18.6)
Religion	Hindu	25,684 (21,501–30,562)	9.8 (7.7–11.9)
	Non-Hindu	41,939 (25,950–60,099)	14.8 (5.3–24.3)
Social group	SC/ST	32,455 (24,230–42,329)	11.6 (8–15.1)
	OBC	29,684 (21,285–41,803)	7.9 (3.9–11.9)
	General	20,654 (16,747–25,422)	10.3 (7.1–13.5)
Education	Illiterate	24,223 (17,547–32,608)	12.1 (8.5–15.6)
	Literate	28,820 (24,149–34,618)	9.1 (6.6–11.6)
Wealth tertile	Poor	11,766 (8,712–15,330)	11.7 (8.6–14.7)
	Medium	35,250 (27,531–44,802)	8.8 (3.8–13.8)
	Rich	48,476 (36,832–64,061)	8.7 (5.4–12.1)
Health insurance enrolment	Yes	21,563 (12,561–33,925)	9.7 (4.7–14.7)
	No	28,071 (23,585–33,139)	10.4 (8.1–12.6)
Place of hospitalisation	Public sector facility	13,438 (10,065–17,585)	6.6 (4.5–8.6)
	Private sector facility	53,711 (44,478–65,181)	17.5 (13–22)
Ailment	Communicable disease	12,250 (9,484–15,445)	7.7 (5.1–10.4)
	Injury/trauma	59,218 (31,528–90,763)	22.7 (5.2–40.2)
	NCDs	49,352 (39,445–37,323)	14.3 (10.7–18.7)
	Other	23,464 (22,645–31,455)	8.4 (4.2–12.6)

CI- Confidence interval, LL- Lower limit, UL- Upper limit.
Source: Data collected from fieldwork.

Determinants of CHE: Table 4 shows the determinants of hospitalisation and CHE due to hospitalisation. Hospitalisation rates were found to be significantly lower among males as compared to females (odds ratio 0.75, $p < 0.01$) while the CHE rates were significantly higher among males (odds ratio 1.77, $p < 0.05$). Hospitalisation rates were also observed to be higher (statistically significant) among those above 55 years, Hindus, belonging to the general category and poor patients. Social group and religion had no association with the catastrophe due to healthcare expenses. While statistically higher hospitalisation rates were observed among those enrolled in health insurance schemes (odds ratio 1.35, $p < 0.01$), there was no difference in CHE rates among the non-enrolled households as compared to those who were enrolled (odds ratio 0.73, $p = 0.28$).

Discussion

UHC is at the epicentre of systemic efforts to strengthen health systems across different countries, the eventual aim of which is to improve the level and distribution of healthcare in the community. Rapid urbanisation and associated informal settlements pose a significant challenge to the achievement of UHC, as the characteristics of this population present significant deviation from the well-understood health characteristics of rural and proper urban populations (Srivastava 2017). It is, thus, important to understand this in order to prepare evidence-informed policies. On these lines, we have presented the results from a cross-sectional household survey on urban poor in four states of India on their healthcare-seeking behaviour, OOP expenses, coping mechanisms used, and the extent of financial risk protection. Moreover, we also determined the social determinants for these important goals of UHC.

Findings in context of previous evidence: Our results showed a preference among the urban poor for private sector

Table 4: Determinants of Hospitalisation and CHE on Hospitalisation among Urban Poor

Determinants	Categories	Hospitalisation in 365 Days: Odds Ratio (95% CI LL- UL)	Hospitalisation in 365 Days: p value	CHE due to Last Hospitalisation: Odds Ratio (95% CI LL- UL)	CHE due to Last Hospitalisation: p value
Sex	Male	0.76 (0.65–0.88)	0.00**	1.77 (1.00–3.13)	0.04*
	Female (Ref)	-	-	-	-
Age	<15 yrs (Ref)	-	-	-	-
	15–55 yrs	1.06 (0.88-1.28)	0.55	3.41 (1.47–7.91)	0.00**
	>55 yrs	1.74 (1.34–2.26)	0.00**	3.36 (1.30–8.72)	0.01*
Religion	Hindu	1.71 (1.28–2.27)	0.00**	0.41 (0.16–1.02)	0.06
	Non-Hindu (Ref)	-	-	-	-
Social group	SC/ST (Ref)	-	-	-	-
	OBC	1.02 (0.84–1.24)	0.85	0.60 (0.27–1.33)	0.21
	General	1.28 (1.08–1.51)	0.00**	0.93 (0.51–1.69)	0.81
Education	Illiterate (Ref)	-	-	-	-
	Literate	1.04 (0.87–1.24)	0.68	0.36 (0.18–0.70)	0.00**
Wealth tertile	Poor	2.10 (1.78–2.47)	0.00**	4.78 (2.32–9.85)	0.00**
	Medium	1.09 (0.88–1.36)	0.43	2.07 (0.87–4.93)	0.10
	Rich (Ref)	-	-	-	-
Health insurance enrolment	Yes	1.35 (1.10–1.67)	0.00**	0.73 (0.42–1.28)	0.28
	No (Ref)	-	-	-	-
Place of hospitalisation	Public facility (Ref)			-	-
	Private facility			5.51 (3.10–9.81)	0.00**
Ailment	Communicable disease (Ref)			-	-
	Injury/trauma			2.45 (0.64–9.43)	0.19
	NCD			2.33 (1.22–4.48)	0.01*
	Other			0.64 (0.29–1.45)	0.29

* Significance < 0.05; ** Significance < 0.01
Ref: Reference category.
Source: Data collected from fieldwork.

facilities (48%) to utilise outpatient care, while public sector (65%) was sought predominantly in case of inpatient treatment. The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) 71st round survey reports that 32% of the urban population sought inpatient care in public hospitals (NSSO 2015). However, a closer look reveals that nearly half (48%) of the poorest 20% in the urban sample were hospitalised in public hospitals. Our findings also show similar trends. A clear preference for private sector facilities was also observed in our study among patients with an education above graduation and those enrolled in health insurance schemes. Similar results have been reported in the literature by various researchers for the urban poor population as well as the general healthcare-seeking behaviour of the community (Banerjee et al 2012; Ranson et al 2012; Gupta et al 2016; Naydenova et al 2017; Singh and Kalaskar 2017; Černauskas et al 2018). This also validates the argument that strengthening the public sector would lead to more favourable outcomes on an equity scale, both in terms of horizontal and vertical equity (Kumar et al 2015).

We found a mean expenditure of ₹27,000 for hospitalisations by the urban poor, which is very similar to what has been reported by the NSSO 71st round (₹26,455) for urban areas (NSSO 2015). Another study from Haryana reported slightly lesser average hospitalisation expenditure in their sample (Sharma et al 2017). Their results could be lower because they employed different sampling characteristics in their study. Healthcare expenditure as a proportion of total consumption expenditure was found to be around 5.2% in our study. However, there were significant interstate variations. Low OOP expenditure observed in West Bengal may be because of the lower utilisation of private sector facilities, for both outpatient (34.4%) and inpatient treatment (26.9%), along with a high reliance on over-the-counter purchase of medicines (13.6%), in comparison to other states. A previous study from West Bengal reported a 4.2% share of total HCE to be spent for healthcare, while that from Karnataka found it to be slightly less (3.5%) (Mondal et al 2010; Bhojani et al 2012).

We found household income to be the main mechanism for coping with healthcare expenses in our study. The NSSO has reported similar results earlier, with household income and borrowings from friends being the source of finance for more than 93% households (NSSO 2015). The failure of health insurance in its present form to provide requisite improvement in access to care or financial risk protection has been well documented in the literature (Prinja et al 2012; Shahrawat and Rao 2012; Singh et al 2017; Prinja et al 2019). The lack of any differences in healthcare utilisation rates among the enrolled and non-enrolled have been attributed to the lack of awareness, especially in relation to the coverage of medical conditions and empanelled hospitals under the schemes (Ahlin et al 2016). Perceptions regarding the non-seriousness of the medical condition and the distance of empanelled hospital from the household have also been reported to contribute to this (Kusuma et al 2018).

The trends from NSSO surveys of 52nd, 60th and 71st rounds show that the OOP expenditure on health as a proportion of household consumption expenditure has risen over the years. This implies that healthcare expenditures are rising at a rate that is higher than the general inflation rate. These findings point to a need for regulating the cost of healthcare services through regulatory and policy instruments, besides merely debating about providing higher spending or insurance to cope with the OOP costs. Recent attempts by the government to cap the prices of essential drugs, cardiac stents and orthopaedic implants are likely to be beneficial, provided the regulatory agencies are able to implement the same and ensure that the private hospitals do not cartelise to maintain the overall costs by raising charges for other procedures (Wood 2017).

Our study found that 10% of all households faced CHE, while 4.7% of the households were impoverished due to hospitalisation-related OOP expenses. A study from southern India had reported a 16% CHE rate among urban poor households; their results being slightly more because of a difference in methodology applied for the computation of catastrophe-inducing expenses (Bhojani et al 2012). Similar impoverishment results have also been reported earlier, ranging from 1.3% to 3.5% (Garg and Karan 2005; Bonu et al 2007; Berman et al 2010, Shahrawat and Rao 2012). Our study found that the use of private sector facilities and non-enrolment in health insurance schemes was associated with higher OOP expenditures. These social determinants have been well documented in the literature to have an adverse impact on the financial health of households in the case of a hospitalisation event (Chowdhury 2009; Patil et al 2009; Hooda 2017; Puteh and Almualm 2017). Associations between the utilisation of private facilities and higher OOP expenses have been established earlier as well (Shubha et al 2016; Puteh and Almualm 2017).

Our study results also indicated the inefficiency of health insurance enrolment to protect households from CHE, despite the higher hospitalisation rates among the enrolled households. A recent systematic review of impact evaluations of publicly-financed health insurance schemes also had a similar finding that while utilisation of healthcare did improve among those enrolled in the healthcare insurance schemes, there was no clear evidence to suggest that these resulted in reduced OOP expenditures or higher financial risk protection (Prinja et al 2017). Several potential reasons to explain this finding have been proposed. The lack of adequate financial risk protection could result from a lack of awareness about empanelled hospitals among those enrolled, continuous unregulated practice of balance billing, which continues to increase OOP expenditures for those enrolled in empanelled hospitals, and lack of an effective benefit package, which covers ₹30,000 worth of hospitalisation for a family of five members.

Policy implications: There are significant implications of our findings for the Indian government's plans to universalise health coverage. The recently announced Ayushman Bharat programme has two components—the HWCs in public sector to provide comprehensive primary healthcare, and the PMJAY to provide free, cashless secondary and tertiary care up to ₹5,00,000 for each household per year. First, it is important that the government places enough importance on commensurate funding for the HWCs so that these become functional. The importance of comprehensive primary health for achieving UHC in India has been stressed upon by the National Health Policy. Second, since a majority of the urban poor seek care in public hospitals, and they also incur significant OOP expenditure, mainly due to medicines and diagnostics, the government needs to improve the availability of these at public facilities. Finally, the monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of PMJAY will have to be strong enough so that hospitals do not charge patients over and above the agreed package cost, which will be paid by the government.

Strengths, Limitations and Conclusions

The current study adds to the yet miniscule but growing literature reporting on healthcare-seeking characteristics and treatment expenditure burden on the urban poor. Most of the earlier studies from the country have either focused on rural areas, or a combination of urban and rural populations. This study thus fills the gap by providing information specific to the urban poor section of the society. Another strength of our study has been its large sample size from a representative geographic area. None of the previous studies reporting about the urban poor in India have been able to cover 2,400 households, interviewing more than 11,000 individuals across four states of the country.

We would also like to acknowledge some limitations of this study in terms of the methodology employed. As the reference period for data collection was one year, there is a possibility of recall bias creeping in. However, collection of data for hospitalisation using a one-year recall is a standard practice globally in household surveys (Kjellsson et al 2014). We did not explore the role of supply-side factors in the study areas due to design limitations, which could have also influenced care-seeking behaviour. Additional data on factors, such as the number of health facilities available, types of services delivered and their acceptability, affordability and allocation of resources, could have been useful to further explain the study results. Finally, as the calculation of OOP payments did not include indirect costs, such as the loss of household income, the proportion of CHE might have been underestimated, as also the extent of financial hardship caused to the households. However, the comparability of our results to those from previous surveys and studies validate our findings.

The urban poor are a complex group, with high OOP healthcare expenditures. A higher utilisation of the private sector was observed for curative care in both outpatient and inpatient settings, without an effective coverage of insurance. Inequities in healthcare utilisation as well as financial risk protection, in terms of gender, social class, education and wealth status, were common. NCDs and trauma-induced higher catastrophe rates due to OOP expenses, while insurance enrolment did not lead to a significant reduction in these rates. Creating comprehensive primary healthcare and strengthening the public-sector hospitals for secondary care will thus be the cornerstone to achieve UHC. Strategic purchasing of tertiary care through risk-pooling mechanisms need to be done in a better, more efficient manner to provide effective financial risk protection.

NOTE

1 All dollar denominations refer to the US dollar.

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Attitudinal Barriers in Education
Experiences of Women with Disabilities in Odisha

SANKALPA SATAPATHY

Women with disabilities are subjected to double discrimination in Indian society. Despite growing concern for the disabled community in society at large, their education remains only aspirational. The attitudes that women with disabilities encounter in their educational endeavours are explored. A thematic analysis of 27 narratives of women with disabilities from Odisha identifies and distinguishes the familial and communal attitudes they face. Policy must aim at ensuring not just physical integration, but also the social acceptance and inclusion of women with disabilities.

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Education is a means to the all-round development of a person—it nourishes the body, mind, and soul. It has been recognised as one of the primary indicators of a society's development. According to the 2011–12 Report to the People on Education (Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, 2011–12), high levels of educational attainment in a country will lead to economic well-being because education ensures higher intellectual and professional capabilities among citizens. With the growing acknowledgement of the importance of education, there has recently been a major shift in the educational sector. The shift was evident with the passing of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act in 2009, which makes education a constitutional right for every child.

Despite this policy focus on education, there are sections of society deprived of its benefits of education. These are mostly minority groups, like people belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs), women and girls, people from weaker socio-economic backgrounds, and those from rural areas (Baruah 2013). Similarly, disabled people are likely to have fewer or no educational qualifications (Groce and Bakshi 2011). A report by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit in the United Kingdom (UK) aimed at improving the lives of the disabled also highlights the difficulty associated with disabled people achieving ordinary milestones, like attaining education (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, United Kingdom, 2005).

Coupling disability with gender reveals that disabled women are likelier to have fewer educational opportunities than disabled men or non-disabled women. The 2011 Census of India shows that literacy levels for women stand at 65.46%, compared to over 80% for their male counterparts, highlighting the huge gender disparity in education. This is despite governmental efforts at multiple levels of education—the Saakshar Bharat Programme[1] targets adult women's literacy, the Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan[2] increases accessibility to secondary education, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan[3] addresses elementary education, the Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya[4] offers residential upper-primary schools to girls, the Dhanalakshmi Scheme provides conditional cash transfers for girl children (*India Live Today* 2016), and separate day- and night-time classes are held for women. Even the non-governmental sector has played an active role in increasing literacy, but the gap still remains (Ernst and Young 2012). This disparity is even greater among the disabled, with about 44.56% literacy among disabled women as opposed to 62.37% among disabled men.

Numerous reports by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and others estimate that the literacy rate among disabled women worldwide is about 1%, as against 3% among all disabled people, regardless of gender (Groce 1997; Rousso 2003; Munoz 2007). A 2014 report by one of the UK's leading charities that works on disabilities discusses how the double marginalisation of women with disabilities lowers their chances of being economically or socially independent; their access to education, employment, or social inclusion is limited compared to disabled men and non-disabled women (Leonard Cheshire Disability 2014). O'Reilly (2003) explains how disabled women experience inequality in living standards, access to credit, and participation in economic decision-making. Lower rates of literacy and employment also reduce their chances of escaping poverty or even push them further into poverty (WHO 2011). Despite the empowering role of education in individuals' lives, studies discussing illiteracy among disabled people, and disabled women in particular, remain scant (Groce and Bakshi 2011; Singal 2011).

The neglect of gender in studies on disability, and of disability in studies on gender have rendered disabled women invisible. Studies have demonstrated a clear discrimination against disabled women in education, which is part of the larger reality of discrimination they experience across the spheres of employment, health, income level, marriage, and parenting. Halder (2012) contends that a greater number of people with physical disabilities drop out from mainstream educational and vocational institutions because of accessibility and mobility problems due to architectural barriers. Rousso (2003) adds attitudinal barriers and a lack of safety to the list of issues that prevent disabled women from getting an education. A report by Leonard Cheshire Disability (2014) presents statistics from the UK that show that disabled girls have a much lower educational attainment average (42%) than disabled boys (51%) and non-disabled girls (53%). This disparity, present even in developed countries, presents a need to study the factors that create this inequality in the first place, and understand why this difference, based on disability and gender, continues to exist even after policy interventions have been created to tackle it the world over. The need is more urgent in emerging countries, where the disparities are larger.

In India, disabled people comprise 2.21% of the total population, as per the 2011 Census, of whom 44% are women. There is about 55% literacy among members of the disabled population compared to 74% in the general population. With literacy at 45% among disabled women, 62% among disabled men, and 65.5% in the general female population, there is still much ground to be covered. Thus, it is necessary to conduct further research to understand the educational needs of disabled girls and the barriers to fulfilling those needs (Rousso 2003). While a few papers have tackled these issues, literature relating to attitudes that aid and obstruct disabled girls attaining an education is rare (Maya Dhungana 2006; Lamichhane 2015).

Situating my paper in this context, I explore the attitudes that disabled girls and women encounter or experience in their communities during their educational endeavours. It is very important to understand attitudes in India where, despite increased concern about special needs education for more than two decades, the situation remains bleak (WHO 2011; Bhatnagar and Das 2014). My paper aims to bring a nuanced picture of the lives of disabled women to the attention of policymakers so that gender- and disability-sensitive policies aimed at social inclusion can be formulated to help disabled women reclaim their lives from the multilayered system of oppression that confines them. This is crucial in this period of rapid economic growth and social upheaval in India, when women are finding opportunities to leave behind the notions of womanhood that have bound them for centuries and are striding ahead to leave a mark in the world.

Literature Review

Disability is now widely recognised as a public health problem (Lollar 2002). It is increasingly being redefined as a form of social oppression, where disability is seen as a social construct (Begum 1992). The oppression is observable in how people with disabilities are discriminated against in education, employment, and healthcare, and the high prevalence of abuse against them (Srivastava et al 2013; Scullion 1999; Kitchin 1998; Baldwin and Johnson 1994; Waxman 1991). Historically, the concerns of disabled people have been sidelined. However, the active politicisation of issues concerning disabled people through the disability rights movement in the 1970s created an environment in which they can no longer be ignored (Scotch 1989).

Therefore, the inclusion of disabled people—with perceived physical, sensory, or intellectual impairments—in mainstream economic and social life is now a major issue for policymakers and politicians in rich and poor countries alike. Indeed, many nations now have some form of legislative framework with which to combat discrimination on the grounds of impairment (Barnes 1997), and education features prominently in all of them; for example, Americans with the Disability Act, 1990 in the United States (US) and the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 (hereafter, PWD Act), in India. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2016[5] (hereafter, RPD Bill) by the Indian Parliament (in December 2016), meant to replace the existing PWD Act, also persists in promoting the right to education for people with disabilities, in order to build a more inclusive society (see Clause 43 of the bill).

Addlakha (2013) provides manifold perspectives on disabilities and the disability movement in India, and discusses key issues in Indian and South Asian disability studies. There has been a paradigm shift from a welfare-based model to a rights-based approach, with respect to issues concerning disabled people. Failure to provide education and training to disabled people, among a host of other factors, such as a lack of healthcare, poor communication services, and lack of protection from abuse, prevents them from actively participating in their communities (Barton 2013; WHO 2011; Wendell 1996). Earlier, education for people with physical or learning disabilities was not a point of focus for primary or secondary schooling; thus, there are currently issues of accessibility in most educational institutions (Morris 2014).

For disabled girls, accessibility is just one of the reasons why their numbers are comparatively lower than those of disabled boys, even in specialised schools (Kalyanpur 2008; Caseau et al 1994; Wehmeyer and Schwartz 2001). Rousso (2003) cites transportation, architectural, and economic barriers, alongside attitudinal barriers to education. Pilot studies from the US reveal that disabled girls are more vulnerable to violence and face more harassment than disabled boys and non-disabled girls. In contrast, an interesting find in Northern Ireland was that disabled women were more likely than their male counterparts to pursue higher studies despite fewer employment opportunities (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 2003).

In India, a largely patriarchal society, parents still consider educating girls as non-essential, especially in parts of rural India (Sonawat 2001; Mazumdar 2012). Azam and Kingdon (2013) document how, despite increasing gender equality in India, an educational spending bias against girls continues to exist. This manifests in fewer girls enrolling and in lower quality educational institutions. Similarly, Woodhead et al (2013), in a study that tracked 3,000 students over 15 years in Andhra Pradesh, not only revealed the under-representation of girls but a widening gender gap, and discussed increasing accessibility to education for all. This inequality continues despite existing documentation on the benefits of educating girls (UNICEF 1996). Through her narratives on the lives of impoverished girls being educated at a privately funded school in Uttar Pradesh, Sahni (2017) highlights how education can significantly transform the lives of girls and their families.

Girls with disabilities have even lesser chances of being educated (Oswald et al 2003). Despite the widespread existence of gender and disability biases in India, research aimed at examining the determinants and impact of doubly discriminating against disabled girls and women is lacking. Sharma and Ng (2014) document this lack of research and neglect of the disabled in India in their extensive review. They also identify various determinants of the phenomenon, including transportation, accessibility, and affordability. Rates of girls dropping out from school get higher when they hit puberty because of safety concerns (Singh 2008). The increased vulnerability of disabled girls and women causes their families to prevent them from travelling far for education or employment.

While research has traditionally focused on physical barriers, there has been a recent shift in the field towards examining social barriers. Gregorius (2016) discusses how disabled people face greater educational exclusion due to not just disabling physical environments, but also such similar social environments. Riddell and Weedon (2014) highlight the importance of social context in how disabled students negotiate their identities in educational institutions. More relevant to the context considered here, Nayak (2013) demonstrates a positive association between having a disability and being a victim of physical or mental harassment in a qualitative study of women with disabilities in Odisha. The paper also documents how the probability of this harassment reduces with increased education. In an article in the *Indian Express*, Sahu (2016) highlights some woes of disabled daughters in Odisha.

The attitude that persists in society, of education not being a priority for girls, is further magnified if they are disabled, which leads to the double discrimination of disabled women (Traustadottir 1990). The discrimination prevails in other aspects of life, too—employment, receiving economic and social support, and sexuality. Rousso (2003) and Halder (2012) identify the role of societal attitudes in disabled women being educated. Attitudes may be positive or negative. Research detailing the types of attitudes present in society, which affect disabled women's educational processes, is sparse. Without an awareness of what ails the system, it becomes harder to treat the problems or better the system. The present paper adds to the nascent, but growing, stream of literature by exploring the attitudes that disabled girls and women encounter or experience in their educational endeavours, with a particular focus on Odisha (Mohanty 2016).

Methodology

The research was conducted in rural and urban areas in Odisha, a state in eastern India. Odisha was chosen as the study site for multiple reasons. The percentage of disabled people in the population varies between 1%–3% across all Indian states, with Odisha having the highest percentage in 2001 (2.78%) and 2011 (2.96%). However, Odisha lags behind in implementing many of the basic entitlements stated in the PWD Act, along with Maharashtra, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh (Menon et al 2014; Mehra 2013). This makes the environment in Odisha an important one to study. Another reason was the ease of conducting fieldwork, when it came to understanding the local language.

The sample consisted of women with physical disabilities, that is, locomotor disabilities, which restricted movement or physical activity, from various strata of society. A locomotor disability is defined as a disability of bones, joints, or muscles leading to substantial restriction of the movement of the limbs, or any form of cerebral palsy (PWD Act 1995). Snowball sampling was employed, since the sample population is a minority and the questions were sensitive in nature (Kalton and Anderson 1986). I contacted Aaina,[6] a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that works with disabled people in Odisha. With the assistance of the field workers from the NGO, I approached women with physical disabilities, and over a continuous period of acquaintance, interviewed them. All participants were between 18–60 years old, had a physical disability, had no mental or intellectual impairments, and responded to oral communication. I conducted semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face interviews in the local language with 27 women. Most of the interviews took place at the interviewees' homes. I explained the purpose of the study to them and received informed consent from them before conducting and recording the interviews.

All the women interviewed had some difficulty in locomotion, with varying degrees of impairment. The most common disability prevalent in the sample was post-polio residual paralysis (PPRP), followed by the amputation of a lower limb, arthrosis of a lower limb bone, and club foot. Two women had cerebral palsy and experienced difficulty in moving. One woman used a wheelchair because she suffered from paresis of all four limbs. Seven women had become disabled after meeting with accidents; 11 women had acquired their disabilities because of polio attacks in early infancy, and the rest of the disabilities had congenital origins. The severity of the disability was determined based on the percentage of disability recorded in the disability cards issued to them by the government, and also my personal observation.[7] With respect to problems with movement, nine of them had mild issues (for example, they had a limp when they walked), 13 had moderate problems (that is, they used supports like crutches while walking), and five had severe issues (for example, they used wheelchairs).

Of the 27 women interviewed, 26% were 18–25 years old, 48% were 26–35 years, 22.2% were 36–45 years, and the remaining 3% were 46–60 years old. Nineteen women were from rural areas and eight were from cities. The educational status of the women ranged from not being able to sign their names, to having a postgraduate degree. Nine women held graduate and/or postgraduate degrees. Fifteen women were employed—nine in the organised and six in the unorganised sector. Two women worked in the primary sector (in the fields), three in the manufacturing sector (such as candle and paper bag making), and 11 in the service sector (including an NGO worker, a rehabilitation professional, teacher, and ward member). About 48% of the women interviewed belonged to middle and upper-middle class families.

Findings

In view of the existing literature and the statistics discussed above, I expected to find very low education levels among disabled women, and more so in rural pockets. However, through my study, I found that the majority of women in my sample (74.1%) had received at least a secondary education. More than 33% had at least graduate degrees, including four women who had postgraduate degrees. The women had a variety of experiences that aided them in getting an education or, in certain cases, strengthened their resolve to pursue an education.

All the women interviewed admitted that they were lucky to have had the good fortune to attend school. However, they also spoke at length about the challenges they faced at school. These included tangible challenges like accessibility, being denied admission, and health-based attendance issues. The more stressful challenges were intangible and related to their interactions with their families, society, and academic institutions. Most women discussed facing attitudinal barriers, such as unwanted stares, catcalls, preconceived notions about disabilities from teachers, peers, and parents, and societal discouragement with respect to their quest for education.

In the following analyses, I provide narratives to help understand the attitudes that exist towards disabled women pursuing an education. Through these narratives, I highlight the attitudes that support their educational aspirations as well as those that discourage them.

Iravati (40)[8] was just one year old when she got polio, which paralysed both her legs from the waist down—she uses a wheelchair now. She came from an orthodox joint family in urban Bhubaneswar. Her family, in which her grandparents were the decision-makers, did not think it necessary for girls to be educated. Her disability compounded their view, along with the realities that going to school would be difficult because of issues related to transportation, accessibility, and safety. The absence of role models in their society was also a major deterrent to the idea of sending a disabled girl to school.

> They (my parents) did not see or hear about any disabled girl in the community who went to school. Neighbours and well-wishers who had something to say about every matter in the family never remotely suggested sending me to school. Going to school meant going out of the house and I needed help with my toilet activities. A male attendant would have been necessary which would have been an added stress. So it was decided that I was better off at home whereas my sisters and brothers attended school.[9]

However, and encouraged by her sister, she demanded to be homeschooled. When she turned 20, she decided that she wanted to attend regular college classes. In the beginning, her pleas were ignored, but when she went on a hunger strike, her father began to pay attention. He told her, "I am not educated. I will not be able to help you academically. But I have money. If you can tell me specifically the college, the procedure to get there and how you would be able to move around in the campus, I will help you." Iravati requested a car and two attendants who would help her go to college and carry her up the stairs to her classes and her father obliged.

In college, Iravati made good friends who helped her move around, and the teachers were lenient if she came late to classes. However, she recalls a particular lecturer who took her shyness to be arrogance. She had never been in a classroom environment before, so the experience was entirely new to her; however, the lecturer misconstrued her nervousness about asking questions as a superiority complex that stemmed from thinking she knew everything. The lecturer went so far as telling her that she had just come to college to have fun. Iravati was hurt and depressed by the comment, but she was afraid to talk about the incident at home because she did not want her family to stop her from going to college to shield her from hurtful remarks. Although her education began late, Iravati went on to complete a master's degree.

Dipti (28), who had cerebral palsy, recounted how her school refused to allow her to take examinations. Her parents advocated for her right to be educated, but the school did not budge. It was only when her parents, who came from a secure financial background, took up the case with higher authorities in Delhi that the school agreed to let her take the examinations. It was a long and tedious fight for the family.[10]

Tini (32), at the time of the interview, worked as a lecturer in occupational therapy and also attended to patients. Her ability to walk has declined steadily since she was a teenager because of reduced strength in her lower limbs due to progressive myelopathy (a neurological deficit related to the spinal cord).

Unfortunately, she was denied entry into a meritorious medical school despite having passed her entrance examinations, on the grounds that she was not medically fit to be a doctor and would not be able to take care of patients. She contested the decision in court to no avail. However, she was accepted into a rehabilitation course and found people who were willing to help her in the course. She could not walk fast, so teachers did not penalise her if she turned up late to class. She had friends who helped her navigate the campus and hold her book bag.[11]

Shraboni (30), a ward member in her village, fondly recalled that it was only because of her mother that she stayed in school until Class 9. Her right ankle gave her problems and she cannot stand or walk for long periods.[12] Pramila (28) who has polio also credited her mother with helping her finish high school.[13] For these mothers, it was imperative that girls with disabilities should be educated, since they believed that their daughters would have to fend for themselves as "no one will ever care for them." Pramila's mother went on to say, "Our daughters with disabilities will never have any family to fall back on so they have to be educated and have some financial means to see themselves through their lives." This type of socialisation occurs very early in life and is internalised by these women. Moen, Erickson, and Dempster-McClain (1997) found that effective socialisation occurs predominantly through verbal persuasion rather than role modelling, which is true in these cases, as these mothers did not have high levels of literacy.

Family support was not always present for the women I interviewed. Chaya (45) recalled that her family never took much interest in her studies. She had a fused right elbow due to a burn accident. She went to the school in her village, but when she failed the board examinations in Class 10, her brothers stopped helping her. Although she wanted to continue studying, her father, manipulated by her brothers, did not encourage or support her interest in studying. She started working for an NGO immediately afterwards.[14] Chandni (27) had to stop studying after passing her higher secondary examinations because of her brothers' machinations, as a result of which her father stopped supporting her interest in attending classes. She had a polio attack as an infant and uses a home-made crutch to ambulate. She supports herself by taking tuition classes and is, at the time of the interview, is trying to save her meagre income to pay for college.[15]

Jogita (23), who has cerebral palsy, overcame all odds, and now has a graduate degree. She had to attend a school a little far away from her home when she was in Class 10. This was difficult because of the weakness in her lower limbs due to cerebral palsy, but she was adamant. Her father, who never wanted her to study in the first place, used this as an excuse and wanted to terminate her studies. She did not let it happen and successfully passed her board examinations. Her father was against her attending college.

> I went to college on my own and spoke to the teachers but the admission dates had already passed. I spoke to the peon and he agreed to get me admitted but asked for extra money. I was already running late in academics by a whole year. I agreed, went back home and fought a lot with everyone to arrange the money and finally got the admission. I completed my graduation. I could do it only because I put my foot down at each and every step since there was never any support for me from my family.[16]

Over-protectiveness from the family can also lead to a delay in starting school, as in the case of Bina (31), who had polio. Her father was afraid that she would fall and hurt herself while going to school. He also wanted to protect her from hurtful comments from people in the community because she walked with a limp. He did not send her to school until she was 13 years old, when she insisted on it. She went to school for five years in spite of the humiliation it caused her when people stared at her because of her gait and falls. The frequency of her falls increased as she got older and she noticed that the boys in her village would wait for her to fall to offer her help "so that they could touch me in an inappropriate manner." She stopped going to school after that.[17]

Discussion

Families' attitudes towards their daughters' educations are major factors in getting these women admitted into schools and colleges. Other factors like accessibility, community/provider attitudes, and affordability also impact the possibility of attaining an education. A positive attitude was more likely when there was a school in the neighbourhood, and going to school and getting an education was not a costly or difficult affair. Most women recalled that their teachers and friends were supportive, though not very encouraging when it came to participating in extracurricular activities. There was no outright discouragement, but a tacit implication that a physical handicap meant that disabled girls would be unable to participate in sports or physically demanding jobs, thus increasing the disparity between disabled and non-disabled girls. This semblance of a positive attitude from the environment, coupled with a lack of integration, may be explained by the lack of training and awareness with respect to disabilities (Avramidis and Norwich 2002). The provision for the education of disabled children in the PWD Act does not furnish guidelines for the same.[18]

While the extant literature and census data reveal a bleak picture with respect to the education rates of disabled girls and women across the country (as presented in the introductory section), my sample showed a high level of literacy (both in the percentage literate and the level of education), which countered my expectations. An All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) funded project (Nayak 2013) in Odisha found that disabled women with educational qualifications have greater chances at earning a living, are more confident, and are better at sensing their environments and making logical decisions. Educated, disabled women enjoy greater empowerment compared to their uneducated counterparts, even though disabled women in general are mentally and physically harassed (Nayak 2013). While this augers well for disabled women, a key observation was that the necessity of having some sort of education was ingrained in them. This is because they were always made to believe that no one would take care of them, and therefore, achieving financial independence in the future was crucial.

When I started interviewing the women, it was strange how much this particular cause was cited, which fuelled their fierce determination to get employment. Ultimately, although it resulted in higher literacy among the women, their reasons for pursuing an education triggered a lifelong pattern of doing certain things because of their disabilities, which set them apart from others. This acted as motivation for some, but this motivation also generated feelings of alienation among the women, who were at an impressionable age then. Ghosh (2014) states that "financial self-independence is projected as a virtue for these women who are deemed as unmarriageable by the gender/ability ideologies." This reinforces a negative stereotype for disabled women, although it increases the possibility of their higher education. This attitude is in complete contrast to the stories of women whose families did not insist on their education and remained neutral because of the problems associated with getting them to and from school. The fact that their sighting in the community while going to school will remind people of their family and subject them to ridicule did not help matters.

Thus, familial and communal attitudes are key drivers for the educational choices of disabled women and also for their identity formation. While many attitudes are barriers in their educational pursuits, some are supportive. However, among the supportive attitudes prevalent, most are for reasons that highlight the incapacities of disabled women and hamper their positive identity development.

Conclusions

In this study, I interview 27 women with locomotor disability from Odisha to understand the attitudes these women experience when trying to attain an education. Education is an essential requirement for these women to be gainfully employed and feel empowered enough to take autonomous decisions. However, the attitudes of their families, communities and educational institutions can enable or prevent educational attainment. Through this study, I identify the attitudes that support them in their educational endeavour and the attitudes which create barriers. This is in light of literacy disparities that still exist for disabled women based on disability and gender.

As discussed earlier, unlike expectations drawn from extant literature and census data, it was found that the majority of the women in this sample had completed secondary education, though for the majority, going to school was not a very happy experience. The study finds that a positive and encouraging community setting is integral in ensuring that disabled women are able to use the opportunities available to them. While current policy measures aim at physical integration and inclusion of the disabled by improving accessibility and increasing opportunities to help improve a disabled girl's chance at education, legislative measures may be futile at achieving connectedness and belongingness if family and community support remain absent. Ignorance of the social aspects of school experiences, such as bullying, harassment, violence and attitudinal bias may be a key reason for disability policies still being unable to pull disabled girls out of their bleak, current situation.

The PWD Act (1995) is considered to be a significant indicator of the seriousness of the government in ensuring the inclusion of disabled people in mainstream society and has provisions for health, education and employment primarily. Education policies adopted by the Indian government include providing free education for the disabled, increasing focus on establishing special schools and setting up vocational training opportunities for the disabled. Despite more than two decades of policy focus on education for the disabled (since establishing the National Policy on Education, 1986, which advocated integrated education in general schools for children with locomotor impairments and mild disability and special education for the severely disabled), the census data continues to reveal much lower educational attainment for the disabled, and even lower for disabled women.

This becomes even more relevant in the current Indian context. With the disability sector finding nothing much to rejoice about in the current budget, apart from the announcement to make 500 railway stations disabled-friendly, it remains to be seen whether the political rhetoric goes beyond mere nomenclature ("divyang") to actually creating an environment where the *viklang* are truly accepted for what they are. The policymakers should thus focus more on social acceptance than just physical integration. A key step in that direction is increasing awareness about disability in India to garner social acceptance for the disabled while forming more tangible policies.

Along with the provisions for accessibility to healthcare, education and employment, measures have to be undertaken for the rigorous counselling of family members to destigmatise the concept of disability so that nurturing of the woman happens in an environment that looks beyond the physical characteristics and encourages her potential. It is also imperative that the community is sensitised to the negative effects of the way it looks at a disabled girl from the beginning. Even though counselling is a major part of rehabilitation services, it is mostly restricted to the woman herself, bringing her to terms with her disability. Counselling services by both government agencies and NGOs should be expanded to involve the family as well as the school and the community, such as doctors and rehabilitation professionals, among others, for greater awareness so that they discard the orthodox way of looking at a disabled woman.

Also, strategic and sustained public campaigns need to be organised to increase sensitivity towards disabled people without the approach of pity towards them. Media depictions of disability are slowly undergoing a change in the way disabled people are portrayed, but these are exceptions in the sea of numerous stereotypical images of disability. Campaigns like "Beti Bachao" and "Pulse Polio" are examples of how social change can be obtained through spreading awareness. While the "Accessible India" campaign and the RPD Bill is a step in that direction, social acceptance of the disabled requires not just increased accessibility, but large-scale awareness that can help change rigid and archaic social mindsets. Incentivising education of the disabled (akin to the Dhanalakshmi cash transfer scheme) till parents and society start to recognise the capabilities of disabled girls for themselves, may also be a useful policy.

NOTES

1 See Adult Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, viewed on 22 January 2017, http://mhrd.gov.in/saakshar_bharat.
2 See Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan, Ministry of Human Resource Development, viewed on 22 January 2017, http://mhrd.gov.in/rmsa_integrated.
3 See Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), Education Department, Government of Gujarat, viewed on January 2017, http://gujarat-education.gov.in/ssa/projects/sarva_siksha_abhiyan.htm.
4 See "Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidhyalayas," Ministry of Human Resource Development, viewed on 22 January 2017, http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/lu320.pdf.
5 See RPD Bill, viewed on 10 February 2019, http://disabilityaffairs.gov.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/RPWD%20ACT%202016.pdf.
6 See Aaina, http://www.aaina.org.in/, Aaina was founded in 1998 and through 18 successful years of operation, is recognised as a front ranking NGO in Odisha today. It works in the field of disability (focusing on community based rehabilitation/CBR), with a special focus on women and children.
7 The author is a trained physiotherapist and a public health academic.
8 All names have been changed to maintain anonymity. Participants' ages are mentioned in parenthesis at first occurrence in the text.
9 Personal interview, Iravati 2014, Bhubaneswar.
10 Personal interview, Dipti 2014, Bhubaneswar.
11 Personal interview, Tini 2014, Bhubaneswar.
12 Personal interview, Shraboni 2014, Bhubaneswar.
13 Personal interview, Pramila and her mother, 2014, Dhenkanal.
14 Personal interview, Chaya 2014, Chenkanal.
15 Personal interview, Chandni 2014, Bhubaneswar outskirts.
16 Personal interview, Jogita 2014, Dhenkanal.
17 Personal interview, Bina, 2014, Bhubaneswar outskirts.
18 See "Policies and Institutions for Persons with Disabilities in India," document, World Bank, viewed on 15 February 2019, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/577801468259486686/pdf/502090WP0Peopl1Box0342042B01PUBLIC1.pdf.

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Caste-based Differentiation in Sinhalese Society

Role of Buddhism and Democracy

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This paper interrogates as to how caste-based differentiation exists among the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka despite the near absence of the economic structures that initially underpinned the caste system. It looks at the role of Buddhism and democracy, two supposedly egalitarian institutions, in encouraging the perpetuation of caste-based differentiation among the Sinhalese. Such differentiation is not always reproduced in discriminatory terms, but rather—as in the case of democracy—as a bargaining tool of group identity that secures access to patronage goods and resources. In contrast, in the case of Buddhism, caste operates behind a veil of public denial and serves as a "filtering" function in ritualistic gatherings and the organisation of the Buddhist order.

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It is hard to find scholarship on Sri Lankan politics and society that does not take caste into account in its analysis. Despite this being the case, caste among the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka "increasingly forms a 'hidden identity'" (Silva 1999: 205) that nonetheless continues to dictate social interaction to a great extent (1990). After multiple encounters with this fluid, ambiguous, elusive and yet omnipresent social institution in our research exercises, we were encouraged to inquire into caste and its prevalence in modern society, particularly in relation to the Sinhalese.

For instance, consider the case of the annual Kandy "Esala Perehara" (a procession that takes place in August). It not only epitomises the practice of caste in Sinhalese society but also, if one looks at it closely, illustrates the nature of the transformation the practice of caste is undergoing at present. The Esala Perahera in Kandy is one of the oldest and grandest (now) Buddhist festivals in Sri Lanka, featuring dancers, jugglers, musicians, fire-breathers, and lavishly decorated elephants. Hundreds of performers take part in this pageant and specific caste groups are designated to perform specific roles. The following description by a Kandyan *Govigama* (farmer caste) peasant illustrates how caste-based differentiation persists, albeit behind a veil of public denial, despite the gradual weakening of the material existence of caste practices in Sinhalese society.

> Nowadays some people of the Govigama caste also perform certain roles in the perahera that were traditionally assigned to people from lower caste groups. For example, some Govigama caste people now carry pandam (torches) in the perahera which was traditionally performed by people of a particular lower caste group. Those lower caste people are no longer willing to carry pandam in the perahera as they have achieved higher socio-economic status now. So now, poor individuals from other caste groups, including ones from the Govigama caste, have come forward to perform such duties for a fee. However, such people cover their faces with a cloth adding a new style to their dress code because of the fear that villagers would recognise them performing duties meant for lower castes.

This description illustrates how caste-based differentiation continues to prevail among the Sinhalese community despite the weakening of its economic bases (de Zoysa 2013: 96), encapsulating the transformation of caste in general. As scholars such as Ryan (1953) point out, Sinhalese caste was organised according to the occupational functions assigned to various groups in society. Hence, cultivators came to be known as Govigama, washers Dhobi, drummers Berava, goldsmiths Navandanna, and so on (Ryan 1953). During precolonial times, the specialised services of various groups were deployed to build water reservoirs, cultivate the land, and/or sustain the Buddhist order by material means (all considered meritorious activities in Sinhalese Buddhist ideology) (Gunasinghe 2007: 48). However, as to how and why caste prevails today in Sinhalese society, when labour is free to move where it wants, or in other words, occupation is no longer determined or restricted by birth (in ideal terms), is a question worth exploring. We therefore inquire in this paper as to how, when traditional occupations that denote caste status are fast disappearing, caste-based differentiation has managed to survive in present-day Sri Lanka. In doing so, our aim is to understand how group identities, social structures, and social and cultural relations, and practices continue to legitimise and reproduce differences and inequalities. To this end, we hypothesise that both culture and politics—Buddhism and democracy—in two different ways produce the same social outcome: The reproduction of caste as a structure of consciousness and differentiation that gives practical meanings to both institutions.

In building our analysis, we primarily draw from fieldwork carried out in Dedigama (in the district of Kegalle, Sabaragamuwa province) and Kelaniya (in the district of Colombo, Western province) in Sri Lanka over three years from 2009–12. The choice of field locations was encouraged by the need to capture rural and urban dynamics related to caste, since caste is more apparently manifest in rural areas whose material conditions partially warrant its prevalence, whereas in urban areas it exists mostly in the ideological terrain. For instance, ancestral settlement patterns still continue in rural areas to a degree, defined by erstwhile caste arrangements, and this in turn encourages or discourages people from buying land in areas where such concentrations are apparent (Silva 1997). We have employed an interpretive approach to capture the material and ideological existence of caste and caste politics in Sinhalese society. Therefore, methods such as in-depth interviews, observation, and collection of demographical and interpretivist data from secondary sources were used. Our observations are framed within the parameters of Bourdieu's concepts of "habitus" and "social practice" that capture the dialectic relationship between structure and agency in creating the social experience of humans.

We first argue that the "social practice" of Buddhism in Sri Lanka has created a "habitus" that feeds, and is fed by, the social consciousness of caste that finds expression in both the cognitive realm of awareness and the material realm of socio-religious customs and practices (Bourdieu 1989). Bourdieu termed this phenomenon "structure structured and structure structuring," whereby social structures help shape individual cognition and how the individual perceives and interacts with such structures has an impact on those structures in turn. We make this argument based on our field observations where existing caste stratifications are accommodated in the seating arrangements of the *bana maduwa,*[1] and different temples are set up for different caste groups, among other things. These signal not only the internalisation of caste by individuals (that leads to people identifying with their caste categories to organise themselves this way), but also the externalisation of it in outside structures that symbolise, and thereby reinforce, caste stratifications.

Second, in terms of democracy, political parties and party competition have given new impetus to the caste discourse in the country. As a consequence, caste-based differentiation has survived despite the egalitarian promise of democracy, transforming itself to a powerful tool with which to negotiate politics. We, therefore, posit that the supposed equalising effect of democracy expected through its "one person, one vote" concept has been subverted precisely by itself, whereby the aggregate ultimately comes down to how many such votes each "group" in society has. This has led to increased intensification of caste-based differentiation, encouraging patronage networks of material benefit distribution to be organised according to caste. It is ironic not only how the political system takes note of caste identity, but individual caste groups themselves demand that such identity be electorally significant. Again, therefore, we demonstrate that the "habitus" created by the interplay of cognitive grasping of caste and the material manifestation of such grasping in segregated socio-economic organisation seem to be dictating the political space of Sri Lanka.

One noteworthy finding stemming out of this study is that caste-based differentiation does not always lend itself to reinforcing hierarchy. In the case of Buddhism, the accommodation of caste in the organisation—that is, *nikayas* or fraternities—and ritualistic expressions—such as the establishment of caste-based temples, alms rituals preventing members of so-called lower caste groups from offering cooked food, and the division of labour in funeral rites—of the religion necessarily imply hierarchy. But in the political sphere, caste has acquired far greater nuance, whereby electoral choice is influenced by caste considerations, but mostly within a patronage framework and in numerical terms.

Buddhism

Buddhism informs the way of life in Sri Lanka to an extent that has well transcended the strictly cultural realm and has spilled over onto politics and the economy as well. As such, it would be useful to study the interaction between this supposedly caste-neutral religion and caste practices in the island's majority Sinhalese community. In this section, we examine both the philosophical position of Buddhism against caste and how the religion's material manifestations have nonetheless evolved to endorse this institution. In this connection, we will look at how Buddhism is practised in Sri Lanka in terms of (i) how Buddhist religious rituals reproduce caste hierarchies and thereby caste-based differentiation and (ii) how Buddhist cultural practices are shaped by, and in turn shape, their religious counterparts.

As is popularly known, Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka by Bhikku Mahinda, son of emperor Asoka. Shortly after, Bhikkuni Sanghamitta, Asoka's daughter and sister of Bhikku Mahinda, arrived in Sri Lanka, and brought along with her craftsmen belonging to 18 vocations. Since then, Buddhism has become the main religion of the Sinhalese majority of the island, thriving under the patronage first of kings and then even of elected leaders. The occupation-based system of social stratification introduced to the island by Bhikkuni Sanghamitta highlights the initial relation between Buddhism and caste. However, it would be misleading to suggest that this system is what is singularly responsible for giving rise to notions of caste in Sri Lanka. There is evidence, in fact, that the Sri Lankan caste system predates Buddhism.[2] In addition, the Buddhist doctrine does not allow space for caste.

Drawing from core Buddhist teachings on personhood, Senaratne (2017) argues that in denying a permanent soul or self, Buddhism "critiques the rationale underlying the caste system" (p 105). His observation stems from the fact that in the absence of a perpetual soul, a social system based on the "high" or "low" trans-mundane origin of that soul is rendered meaningless. In addition, he points to the Buddha's assertion that nirvana is a state that can be realised by anyone, regardless of their birth, as evidence of the anti-caste disposition of Buddhism. Drawing from the works of scholars such as Kalupahana (2009), Karunadasa (2013), Malalasekera and Jayatilleke (1958), and Harvey (2000), who reproduce many of Buddha's famous references to the logical deficit and moral repugnance of the caste system, Senaratne concludes that the Buddhist doctrine has assumed a definitive stance against the oppressive institution that is caste. Other scholars have made this point before (De Jong 1988; Weber 2001; Silva, Sivapragasam and Thanges 2009).

On the other hand, scholars such as Ryan (1953) and Chakravarti (2007: 17) observe that Buddhism is perhaps more caste-neutral than actually anti-caste (Ryan 1953; Chakravarti 2007). It tries to provide a means by which individuals—particularly of lower caste—may come to terms with caste inequalities. The Buddha used the karma theory to explain that birth in a low caste is the result of stupidity and foolishness in previous births, which has, in a sense, "enabled Buddhism to accept the world as it exists" (Chakravarti 2007: 16). Though there have been instances where the Buddha has openly criticised the caste system,[3] in using the karma theory this way "Buddhism … accepted ideological roots for the established order of social hierarchy" (Ryan 1953: 36).

This is not to deny the emancipatory function of Buddhism, especially in the rigidly casteist context of Hindu India. As Chakrawarti herself has pointed out, the Buddha's main method of handling social divisions was to "create a parallel world through the *sangha* [monastic order], a society that does not actually accept social divisions" (2007: 17). She explained that inequalities owed mainly to production and reproduction patterns, and advised opting out of both to break free of the structures of the lay world, which is the mission of a Buddhist monk (Chakravarti 2007). Buddha's intervention, then, was not meant to reform or transform the lay society, but to present an egalitarian social ontology by offering a "caste-less," egalitarian and "republicanist" alternative in the Sangha organisation. His Sangha community was an egalitarian utopia outside society, sustained by a personal ethical commitment to equality.

However, social activists like Bhimrao Ambedkar have sought an expansion of even this reading such that Buddhism was taken to have a social emancipatory function. In Ambedkar's view, Buddhism "met the complex requirements of reason and morality" (Queen and King 1996: 46) he was looking for by espousing ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and well before the French Revolution as well (Jaffrelot 2017). In this understanding, Buddhism promoted the same societal values that Ambedkar sought to further through political democracy (Jaffrelot 2017).

Though the Buddhist philosophy is largely accepted as not endorsing caste, there has been great symbiosis between how Buddhism is practised and the caste structure in Sri Lankan society. Earliest evidence of this coexistence can be traced back to the 18 vocations Bhikkuni Sanghamitta brought with her to the island. This coexistence of Buddhism with caste at present can be illustrated on two counts: (i) caste practices among the Sangha, and (ii) caste practices in lay Buddhist ritualistic and cultural expressions.

First and foremost, the institution of the Buddhist clergy itself is organised such that "at the island-wide level sangha organisation … reflected caste divisions" (Rogers 2004: 70). Though admittedly Buddhist Nikayas were originally founded upon different "schools of religious opinion" (Bandaranayake 1974: 18; Gunawardena 1993: 7), "… by the 18th century one could un-hesitantly assert that caste had become an integral element" of the institution (Liyanagamage 2008: 206). The play of caste in the Buddhist order has found expression in the formation of various Nikayas based on caste.

> The largest and the oldest is the *Siyam Nikaya* founded in mid-18th century. Its center is in the Central Province of Ceylon, in the up-country districts surrounding Kandy. By far the wealthiest sect, it has retained title to many of the lands given to its predecessors by the Sinhalese kings. It has an estimated 12,000 members or approximately 65% of the *Sangha*. Higher ordination in this sect is restricted to members of the higher levels of *Govigamas*. It has been traditionally dominated by the up-country elements who control, through family succession, title to the temples and their lands, although many of the most learned members are said to come from coastal areas. A second sect, the *Amarapura*, was founded as recently as early 19th century with the intention of purifying the *Sangha*. One of its principal targets was the caste-based differentiation of the *Siyam Nikaya*. It is open to members of the *Karawa, Salagama*, and *Durawa*. (Wriggins 1960: 191–92)

In fact, prominent members of the Sangha during the colonial period sometimes actively participated in caste debates, and non-Govigama laymen of the south-west of the island "often worshipped at temples where the monk was of their own caste" (Rogers 2004: 70). Kannangara (1988) cites Roberts (1982) in recounting one such debate in which Reverend Weligama Sri Sumangala argued for the superiority of Karawe (fisher) caste in a book named *Ithihasaya,* provoking a strong response from the renowned Hikkaduwe Sri Sumangala, a monk of Govigama origin. Divisions escalated to the point that the three fraternities now run their own temples, and have their own networks of patrons defined by caste (Perera 2018). Kannangara (1988: 149) explains that unlike Kandyan temples that enjoy rich land endowments as a result of royal patronage, low-country temples were very much dependent on the generosity of their patrons since they had no such endowments. The "rich" in the low-country areas coincided with the newly ascending castes of non-Govigama origin, and as such, the patron bases of these temples, and through them the respective nikayas to which they belonged, came to be defined by caste, particularly non-Govigama.[4]

Apart from these internal dynamics of temples, one also sees caste manifesting in the religio-cultural rituals practised by the Buddhist laity. Establishment of temples, practises of various Buddhist rituals, and maintenance of Sangha–laity relationships are also heavily coloured by caste-based differentiation in Buddhist lay society. For instance, one sees very clear caste implications in the division of labour in traditional village funeral events, where playing of drums is done by the Berava caste, digging of the grave is done by the Dhobi caste, and so on. Further, those belonging to higher castes do not as a practice dine at the funeral house, though the custom is to partake in the post-burial/cremation meal. Due to the awkwardness these divisions give rise to, people now prefer to have funerals organised by members of their own caste group. This way, everybody can participate in every activity of the funeral without segregating. In the field location of Dedigama, multiple "village funeral societies" have been formed in order to accommodate mono-caste groups. What is noticeable about these situations, and an observation that brings back the reference we made at the outset to the Kandy procession, is the muted manner in which these practices are continued. No explicit mention is ever made of caste, but differentiation—on the part of both so-called higher and lower castes—prevails nonetheless.

Uyangoda (2012) succinctly illustrates how caste hierarchies and caste-based differentiation come to define the Sangha–lay relationship. He explains how poor people of downtrodden castes in Kurunegala find it difficult to set up a temple for their village and to have a resident monk in it. Illustrating the intensity of caste influences in this regard, he states:

> The villagers do not have free access to the Buddhist temple in the village to fulfill their religious and cultural means. There are several elements in the religious cultural, and of course social deprivation experienced by villagers in Kohombakanda. Monks in the Buddhist temple do not accept cooked food offered by Kohombakanda villagers. They do not attend funerals in the village to perform Buddhist religious rituals. Monks of the temple do not visit homes of kohombakanda villagers to chant pirith, to accept alms, or for any other religious function of the families. When the villagers have a family funeral, they invite monks from a distant village or lay people to perform Buddhist rituals. (p 47)

Our field experience in Kegalle was another case in point. The chief incumbent of one of the most prominent temples in the area, one that has enjoyed royal patronage during the time of kings, noted thus:

> Nowadays we don't take caste differences that seriously, but up until 10 years ago people from certain caste groups were not allowed to bring cooked alms to the temple. Instead, those groups were asked to bring dry rations and get the temple staff to prepare the meal. (Chief incumbent of a prominent temple, personal communication, Dedigama, 25 May 2009)

Caste, then, defines the temple as an institution, and also the relationship between the temple and its patrons, as evidenced by laymen also inviting priests of their own caste to perform alms rituals in order not to have their caste sensitivities offended (Perera 2018). An ultimate expression of the accommodation of caste in the Buddhist clergy–laity relationship is how the bana maduwa in some temples has been organised. Arranged in two levels, the higher castes sit in the upper level, while the lower castes sit in the lower one. The logic is that the patrons of the temple deserve higher seating, but in villages where caste and wealth mostly coincide, the implications of these arrangements are hard to miss. Again, however, no explicit references are made to the actual line of demarcation involved here. This shift from overt to covert practising of caste-based differentiation also signals a transition from a material to more of a cognitive basis on which such practices are grounded.

Social and Cultural Practices

Traditional peraheras organised annually by temples—on both the national and local levels—constitute another example of caste-based differentiation in Sinhalese society. These processions are usually organised in celebration of either full moon (*poya*) days (considered religiously significant by Buddhists), the beginning of the rainy season when monks retreat into temples for meditation (*katina pinkama*), or, in the case of the Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic, Sri Lanka's most consecrated Buddhist temple, to pay homage to a relic of the Buddha. These processions consist of many cultural attributes like drumming, whip-dancing, fire-dancing, performing the traditional Sinhalese mode of dancing, etc, all of which are typically assigned to the relevant caste groups traditionally associated with each of these practices. Gombrich and Obeysekera (1990) have dubbed this particular variant of Buddhism "Sinhalese Buddhism," in the sense that it is a version of the philosophy that has adapted itself to the agrarian social structures of Sinhalese society.

These cases illustrate that caste-based differentiation is at once a subjective (in that it resides in the cognitive structures of the individual whose experience is defined by this knowledge), as well as an objective phenomenon that manifests in long-standing sociocultural practices. It "is a state of mind … which is experienced by the emergence, in various situations, of groups of various orders generally called 'castes'" (Dumont 1998: 34). As the above examples show, rituals related to funerals, alms giving, processions, and even seating arrangements inside Buddhist bana maduwa are manifestations of caste-based differentiation in society. Setting up of different temples for different caste groups is a particularly telling example of both the internalisation of caste (in that it shows how people have made caste part of their identity to the extent of organising—and defining—themselves according to it), as well as the externalisation of it in outside, visible objects, constituting a "social practice" as Bourdieu (1989) would have it. This process of subjective phenomena becoming objective realities over time through manifestation in social practices has defined a "habitus" of caste in Sri Lanka that continues to dictate the cultural choices and practices of Buddhists, contributing to the prevalence of caste on both the cognitive and material levels (Bourdieu 1989).

Politicisation

During the late colonial era, caste constituted the primary unit of identity that determined competition, differentiation, and rivalry (Uyangoda 1998). "The colonial power … had to use the existing structures of domination and political power" to ensure effective control (Uyangoda 1998: 19). This, on the one hand, reaffirmed the power of the Govigama caste that had enjoyed a dominant position till then, and on the other, incentivised other caste groups to also aspire for colonial favours. It was to this society that universal franchise was introduced in 1931, with the promise of an egalitarian ethos that would transform precolonial feudal hierarchies into more horizontal relations. Despite having experimented with democracy for close to a century, caste-based differentiation among the Sinhalese continues to remain important. In this section we argue that the practice of democracy, among other things, has contributed to the reproduction of caste-based differentiation. Political parties and party competition, both direct results of the introduction of democracy in 1931, gave new impetus to the caste discourse in the country. As a consequence, caste-based differentiation has survived despite the egalitarian promise of democracy, transforming itself to a powerful tool with which to negotiate politics.

In order to examine the nature of democracy's interactions with Sinhalese caste, we will discuss the expansion of democracy over the past eight decades in three phases: (i) early years of electoral competition under parties of "notables," (ii) electoral competition under two-party hegemony, and (iii) electoral competition under the proportional representation system. In these three phases, the politicisation of caste identity at national as well as local-level electoral competition contributed to the reproduction of caste-based differentiation, while at the same time renegotiating caste hierarchies in the country.

The two decades immediately following the introduction of universal adult franchise were marked by politics of "notables" (Woodward 1979), or traditional patrons at the village level. Although for the first time the masses received an opportunity to contest for leadership and become political leaders, or at least participate in selecting their leaders, the elites of the country managed to successfully manipulate the electoral process to establish and perpetuate their grip over national and local politics (Woodward 1969; Kearney 1973; Jupp 1978). During this initial stage, the majority of the rural electorate rallied around local patrons—landlords and compadre capitalists—instead of choosing candidates based on ideological and policy positions, as democratic theory ideally expected. Calvin Woodward (1969) rightly called those parties as parties of notables. As a result, Karava, Durawa, and Salagama elites of the western and southern coastal areas whose elite status was the result of colonial capitalist fortunes, and the elites of the traditionally superior Govigama and Vellala (Tamil farmer caste) castes, managed to consolidate their class gains by slicing local electorates along caste lines. During the first two decades after the expansion of the franchise, therefore, leaders of the traditional and emerging upper caste groups were able to hegemonise national politics, forming an exclusive upper class and upper caste bloc. Instead of acting as a deterrent, then, early stages of the democratisation process demonstrated a somewhat reconciliatory attitude towards existing caste-based social hierarchies. Groups situated further down in the caste hierarchy benefited out of the arrangement through patronage and economic security provided by these rich notables. Reproduction of existing caste hierarchies during these initial stages of democracy were at the discretion of the elites.

Later, however, the democratic space opened up opportunities for the lower caste groups to resist the continuation of the hegemony of notables. As already mentioned, in addition to caste superiority, these notables also belonged to rich classes that were either of the Christian faith or at least had English education in missionary schools. The first to challenge the hegemony of these political notables were the Buddhist revivalist and *swabasha* (vernacular) movements as a backlash against the cultural humiliation experienced by the locally oriented elite class at the hands of the Westernised political bloc. This long brewing agony of Sinhalese vernacular groups towards the ruling elite found expression in the 1956 coalition called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) made up of what was attractively labelled as the Pancha Maha Balavegaya (Five Great Forces) comprising monks, teachers, indigenous doctors, peasants, and labourers.

The MEP formed a government overthrowing the United National Party (UNP) that was considered the party of the rich and upper classes. Interestingly, although the MEP mobilised marginalised economic and caste groups and claimed that the 1956 victory was also one of poor and marginalised caste groups, the leadership of the MEP came neither from the poor classes nor downtrodden caste groups (Woodward 1969; Jupp 1978). Instead, and also in contrast to the UNP leadership, the MEP leadership comprised politicians from rich and intermediary classes. Even though the MEP managed to mobilise oppressed caste groups who suffered at the hands of upper-caste landlords and state officials who associated with the UNP, it was mainly peasants belonging to the traditionally "superior" Govigama caste who came to the legislature to represent both marginalised caste and class groups.

The 1956 election marked the beginning of two-party electoral competition, which changed the electoral landscape—particularly electoral mobilising—radically. Both main parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the UNP, under intense electoral competition, started to reach out to the masses irrespective of class, caste, ethnic, religious, and cultural identities of individuals in order to maximise their vote count in the election. During this second phase of electoral politics, both main parties opted for catch-all style party positions by thinning their ideological and policy differences and canvassing for multiple ideological and policy stances, sometimes even subscribing to contradictory policies. In this context, in the Sinhalese countryside that was more or less homogeneous in terms of class, religion, and ethnicity, caste appeared as a strong cleavage for parties to exploit at times of elections. The role of caste in elections has been well-documented in the Sri Lankan political party literature (Wriggins 1963; Woodward 1969; Kearney 1973; Jupp 1978; Jiggins 1979; Jayanntha 1992; Peiris 2014).

Under the two-party system, the relationship between the party and the caste of the voter became a complex but powerful one. Neither of the two main parties completely depended on the votes of one caste group, nor did they appear to represent the interests of one caste group. Instead, both parties started mobilising their voters through highly sophisticated patron–client networks spread across each electorate (Jiggins 1979; Jayanntha 1992; Peiris 2014), approaching multiple groups defined by the boundaries of caste identity (Peiris 2014). Caste received further impetus under the first-past-the-post electoral system as no political elite could win an electorate without successfully wooing the minority caste groups within the electorate. In this context, both parties maintained a second tier leadership from minority caste groups within each electorate to facilitate the process of bargaining with caste-based block votes in return for various patronage goods (Jiggins 1979; Jayanntha 1992; Peiris 2014).

Peiris (2014) illustrates how party organisers took care to include representatives from all caste and religious categories in their networks. Further, he demonstrates how in the field locations of Kelaniya and Weligama, both the leading parties (the UNP and the SLFP) had made sure to include party activists from the Bathgama (labourer) and Wahumpura (jaggery) castes in addition to the Govigama majority, because they were the second and third largest caste groups in the area (Table 1).

> This inclusion by the party organisation of grassroots leaders from each prominent caste group was not intended to reflect the interests of those caste communities, but rather to provide the assurance that they too were equal with the other caste groups (who were hierarchically superior) in an electorate, in terms of receiving patronage that the party organiser distributes. (Peiris 2017: 190)

As a result, caste interests were represented in national politics in the form of material benefit distribution. Hence, existing caste stratifications were accommodated, rather than diluted, in this system. Unlike during the early democratisation process, during this stage reaffirmation of caste not only served the political system but also the individuals within each caste group (or rather individuals of the numerically larger caste groups) (Tables 2 and 3). As a result, caste continued to assume considerable salience despite economic practices that symbolised caste structures continuing to weaken under emerging economic realities (de Zoysa 2013: 96).

With the introduction of the proportional representation system, party competition (even the intra-party variant) further intensified and attention to caste identities has grown proportionately due to the new rules of the game. Under this system, parties have to compete in geographically and population-wise much larger electoral districts. In addition, preferential voting allows three choices per voter within the selected party or coalition. This new electoral system promotes more intra-party competition than inter-party competition. As many candidates from the same party or the same coalition contest for the same electoral district, politicians have invented new cost-effective ways in reformulating the party–voter nexus (Peiris 2017). On the one hand the proportional representation system weakens the politician's accountability to any geographically-bound community. On the other, voters too have been empowered by the availability of multiple choices,

Table 1: Dedigama Party Organisers

UNP Name	Period	Caste	SLFP Name	Period	Caste
Dudley Senanayake	1947–73	Govigama	M P Herath	1953–60	Govigama
Rukman Senanayake	1973–75	Govigama	Deshapriya Senanayake	1960–65	Govigama
Nissanka Wijeratne	1975–89	Govigama	Dharmasiri Senanayake	1965–2000	Govigama
Manoda Wijeratne	1989–2006	Govigama	Athauda Seneviratne	*	Govigama
Champika Premadasa	2006–10	Govigama	Manoda Wijeratne	*	Govigama

*The period is not clear.
Source: Compiled from authors' fieldwork.

Table 2: Weligama Party Organisers

UNP Name	Period	Caste	SLFP Name	Period	Caste
Montague Jayawickrema	1947–70	Karawa	Panini Illangakoon	1952–77	Govigama
Chandra Premaratne	1970–77	Govigama	Chulapadmendra Dahanayake	1977–82	Govigama
Montague Jayawickrema	1977–88	Karawa	Jayantha Wickramasuriya	1982–90	Karawa
Madurapola Ediriweera	*	Karawa	C A Jagath	1982–90	Govigama
Ronnie De Mel	*	Karawa	Sujith Jayawickrema	1990–93	Karawa
Mahinda Wijesekera	*	Karawa	Saman Weeraman	*	Govigama
			Mahinda Yapa Abeywardana	*	Govigama

*The period is not clear.
Source: Compiled from authors' fieldwork.

Table 3: Kelaniya Party Organisers

UNP Name	Time Period	Religion/ Caste	SLFP Name	Time Period	Religion/ Caste
J R Jayawardena	1947–March 1960	Buddhist/ Govigama	Wimala Wijewardene	1952	Buddhist/ Govigama
A W A Abeygunaskara	July 1960–77	Buddhist/ Govigama	R G Senanayake	1956	Buddhist/ Govigama
K D Cyril Mathew	1977–84	Buddhist/ Wahumpura	R S Perera	1960–70	Buddhist/ Govigama
U S Perera	1989–94	Catholic/ Govigama	Erin Senanayake	1977	Buddhist/ Govigama
Pradeep Hapangama	1994–2001	Buddhist/ Govigama	M K J Nandasena	1989–2001	Buddhist/ Govigama
Athula Nimalasiri Jayasinghe	2004	Buddhist/ Wahumpura	Sripathi Sooriarachchi	2004	Buddhist/ Govigama
Suranimala Rajapakse	2010	Buddhist/ Govigama	Mervyn Silva	2007–10	Buddhist/ Govigama

Source: Compiled from authors' fieldwork.

whereby they can maximise the utility of voting. Electoral engineering has become a complicated and sophisticated affair under the proportional representation system as it has paved the way for complex yet fragile political patronage network systems within electorates where politicians and voters both act as critical agents in the making of such networks.

Under the previous first-past-the-post electoral system, caste emerged as an important factor for both the politician and the voter during the time of election. However, not all caste groups received the same attention as the electoral system favoured the numerically bigger ones. The proportional representation system has further expanded the role of caste by granting agency for even numerically smaller caste groups dispersed across the electoral district to negotiate a better deal for their group during elections (de Zoysa 2013). Under the proportional representation system, politicians of downtrodden caste groups also can exploit existing caste rivalry within the district to amass sufficient votes to get elected to Parliament. Particularly, the lower caste groups and their social mobility are dependent on capitalising on their caste identity through means such as this. Hence, even marginal groups cannot really do away with their caste identities. They are encouraged to be part of the existing system to reap the benefits. Therefore, in the realm of politics, unlike Buddhism, what seems to prevail is a comparatively more pronounced practice of caste-based differentiation.

It appears, then, that the introduction of democracy and its interaction with patron–client traditions have encouraged the retention of caste identities among a majority of the Sinhalese peasantry. While it is true that caste may no longer exercise the capacity of defining the status of individuals to the same extent it did in the past, caste certainly remains an important factor that Sinhalese voters recognise as an intrinsic part of their identity. As a result of decades of caste-based electoral and patronage distribution practices, caste-based differentiation has continued to reproduce itself in the collective Sinhalese mindset. Sri Lanka's democratisation process since the 1930s, then, has reproduced caste-based differentiation not only as external structures in electoral practices, but also as an internal cognitive structure of the voter, giving rise to a "social practice" and, thereby, a "habitus" within which they operate (Bourdieu 1989). In the current practice of democracy, not only does the political system take note of caste identity, but individual caste groups themselves demand that such identity be electorally significant. The resultant politicisation of caste and its use as a political resource base has become one instrumental way in which caste-based differentiation has been perpetuated in Sinhalese society (Uyangoda 1998).

Some parallels to this phenomenon can be found in India. As Bayly (1999) notes, the classification of "backward castes" originally intended to empower (both electorally and thereby socially) traditionally marginalised groups, and the consequent "benefits" they were accorded (most prominently quotas in representative bodies, education, jobs, and so on), encouraged more and more groups to demand that they also be classified into such categories. This finally led to a situation where parties could garner massive popular support by promising an expansion of the scope of this word!

Conclusions

In this paper, we made an effort to interrogate how caste-based differentiation persists amongst the Sinhalese community despite the near absence of the economic structures that initially warranted caste stratifications. We examined the role of two supposedly egalitarian social structures—Buddhism and democracy—in encouraging caste-based differentiation amongst members of the Sinhalese community. We argue that both institutions in their social and institutional practices, as an unintended by-product, contribute towards reproducing caste-based differentiation among Sri Lankans, particularly the Sinhalese.

Despite the philosophy of Buddhism espousing an egalitarian parallel society, the socialisation and institutionalisation of Buddhism in Sri Lanka over many centuries has produced a form of religion that one may call "Sinhalese Buddhism," which has not only been structured by feudal caste hierarchies and practices, but also become an agent of reproducing caste-based differentiation in Sinhalese society. The internalisation of caste as demonstrated in the self-organisation of the laity on occasions such as bana, funerals, and traditional processions as well as the organisational logic of the Sangha, has reproduced caste ostensibly in the realm of rituals. On the other hand, material practices such as caste-based hierarchical seating arrangements in some temples, division of labour in rituals, and sometimes the setting up of caste-designated temples also continue to structure the perceptions of devotees, resulting in what can be termed as "difference-producing mechanisms" in the guise of cultural and ritualistic practices. Thus, we argue that these practices of Sinhala Buddhism make silent but significant contributions to the reproduction of caste-based differentiation by transforming its means of sustenance from an economic to more of a cognitive basis.

Even though as a modern concept democracy promises equality, fraternity, and liberty, caste and caste-based differentiation have received new impetus especially in the practice of elections. We demonstrated how political parties, especially the two main parties, capitalise on caste divisions within Sinhalese electorates to expand their electoral bases. The patron-–client relationship, which has been the main electoral mobilising strategy since the introduction of universal adult franchise, has encouraged not only political parties but also voters to recognise caste as a powerful social cleavage. As such, one's caste identity no longer only signifies recognition or stigma, but rather has become a means by which one could gain access to state resources through patronage networks. In that sense, caste-based differentiation has become a more "overt" practice in politics, as compared to the realm of Buddhism. This leads to the conclusion that caste-based differentiation not only implies reinforcing hierarchy but also countering hierarchy as well. As in Buddhism, however, in politics too caste is reproduced not only as external structures in electoral practices, but also as an internal cognitive structure of the voter, giving rise to a "social practice" within which votes make their electoral rationale.

Despite their ideological commitment to egalitarianism, therefore, these two powerful religio-cultural and political instruments—either as cognitive or material structures—structure and are structured by caste-based differentiation, thereby contributing to the latter's reproduction in the Sinhalese community. As is true in the case of any "habitus," these intersecting subjective and objective conditions continue to dictate the choices, practices, and judgments of those who belong in that system, to the effect that caste-based differentiation is reproduced despite the absence of its initial economic rationale.

NOTES

1 Gatherings of laymen under a hut on the compound of a temple to listen to sermons delivered by a Buddhist monk.

2 According to *Mahavamsa,* the island's chief historical chronicle, prince Vijaya who is considered the father of the Sinhalese race, got down a Kshatriya princess from Madurai in South India to wed, and requested along with her 1,000 families of 18 service groups (Geiger 1912: 56–57). It is said that Vijaya refused to have his coronation without first marrying a Kshatriya princess, which would in due course ensure a royal bloodline (Geiger 1912: 56–57).
Along with Kshatriya came from India the trader caste of Vaishyas who eventually started exerting a considerable amount of influence in the island. Their influence owed largely to lucrative trade ties as well as their success in agriculture, a new avenue they had ventured into, inspired no doubt by the fact that the expansive flat lands in Sri Lanka's dry zone and the weather conditions had inevitably made rice the staple meal. Naturally to be in control of these lands and thereby the staple grain was to be in control of significant influence. Hence, it could be that the initial strength of the Govigama caste was derived from being in control of most of the arable lands in a society where sustenance was mainly drawn from rice.
"In the twelfth century, notably in the epigraphic records of Nissaṇkamalla … there is information giving the impression that the Vaiśyas, referred to therein as *Govikula* [Agricultural Caste], had emerged as an important social group" (Liyanagamage 2008: 176). Their ascendance in the social ladder resulted in them being "figured among the several factions which strove to capture the throne at the time" (Liyanagamage 2008: 176).

3 Such as the oft-quoted saying of the Buddha: "Not by birth does one become a *Vasala* (outcaste); Not by birth does one become a *Brāhmaṇa*; by deed (alone) does one become a *Vasala*; by deed (alone) does one become a *Brāhmaṇa*" (*Suttanipāta*: verse 136).

4 It should also be noted here that the *nikaya* stratifications within the Sri Lankan Buddhist order initially emerged not as a result of caste considerations, but rather of ideological disputes. The first of such divisions was between the Mahavihara and Abhayagirivihara, with the former "representing the more orthodox, conservative traditions and [the latter] the newer, more progressive tendencies" (Bandaranayake 1974: 18). In fact, the word *nikaya* is translated as "schools of religious opinion" (Bandaranayake 1974: 18; Gunawardena 1993: 7), which has no caste connotations whatsoever.

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Indian Society of 2047
What Hope Progress?

Jyoti Raina

This article assesses the central arguments made in "Envisioning the India of 2047" by Shyam Menon (*EPW*, 8 February 2020).

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The article "Envisioning the India of 2047" by Shyam Menon (*EPW*, 8 February 2020) raises some polemics around two foundational processes of our world: first, envisioning a future, and second, the social reproduction function of institutionalised education, in an imagination of 2047's Indian society. In his disturbing argumentative analysis, the author highlights the precariousness of the former and status quo-ist nature of the latter.

In speaking of the first, that is, the caprice of envisioning a future, the author's contention is chillingly appropriate. He points out that, at the current juncture, we are farther than ever before in history to what is arguably "the most read vision statement ever written" (*Manifesto of the Communist Party* [1848]) that dreamed of a classless society, which would emerge by the collapse of capitalism under its own weight. Not only did capitalism not collapse but its sharper version, neoliberalism, has established itself as the dominant global policy framework, seeking to cast human actions towards a possessive individualism. The hopelessness of envisioning such an egalitarian Indian society, that M K Gandhi too dreamed of, hammers the reader as the author writes "India is one of the most unequal societies in the world today."

Inequality has continued to increase exponentially as 57 Indian billionaires possess as much wealth as the poorest 70%, while a whopping 270 million of our people are estimated to live in poverty (Oxfam 2017). Internationally, 42 people hold as much wealth as 3.7 billion of the world's poorest. The year 2017 witnessed 82% of the wealth generated globally being appropriated by the world's 1% rich (Oxfam 2018). The "class war from above" has indeed resulted in the neoliberal capitalists wresting greater and greater share of national incomes across the world, decimating the 172-year-old vision of a classless society (Hill 2013).

Our national pledge was to redeem 1947's post-independence challenges of poverty, backwardness, underdevelopment, sectarianism and illiteracy (85% of Indians could not read or write) in a graded structurally inegalitarian society with overlapping social difference(s) of caste, class and gender. This redemption was through constitutional values of equality, socialism and an ethos of care for the marginalised, hoping to build a democratic, inclusive and egalitarian India. In 1989, the citizenry did not foresee that the Government of India's signing of the Washington Consensus was a (mis)step in the pledge's direction. It paved the way for the neo-liberalisation of political economy, social life, school education and dismantling of social justice agenda, with devastating consequences for our already unequal society.

Celebrating Inequality

The cumulative fading in our national consciousness of the pledge in 1947 makes the constitutional dream look almost surreal today. The author points out that we did not envision in 1947 that inequality would not just be legitimised but almost celebrated, with the dystopic outcome that there is an impending "secession of the rich and the upper middle class from the rest of India." The place of the post-independence challenges is presently occupied by "economic distress, ecological disasters, joblessness, displacement, homelessness and even disenfranchisement threatening to strike a majority of our citizenry that risks turning into a 'useless class'" by 2047.

An autobiographical interjection from my own personal teaching ambitions on "extrapolating the past and the present to an unknown future" without considering how "unexpected disruptions" can "alter drastically the course ahead" is insightful in elucidating the factitiousness of future visions. I became a teacher educator at a university-affiliated college on completing my master's degree in education. I was brimming with intellectual excitement to share my recently acquired knowledge of learning, curriculum and pedagogy as also several other ideas with young student–teachers in an idealistic commitment to nation-building. In less than a decade, my knowledge-centred approach overturned completely to a student-centred focus. It was evident that the process of education needed to be based on what concerns the learner the most. I (un) learned that the accommodation of students' concerns about their own life realities came before viewing education as the acquisition of a given body of knowledge.

Reproduction of Inequality

The author's second contention that our education system mirrors graded social inequality as the "institutional differentiations reflects class differentiations" sorting/selecting the students but continuing to remain only *within* the given social strata through institutions that are exclusive to given class, caste, religion and community. This is a status quo-ist, social reproduction through education, true of most other countries too (perhaps barring Cuba and Venezuela). Sociologists of education have since the 1970s examined these ways, whereby education systems reproduce, legitimise and exacerbate social inequality the world over by "subtle inculcation of power relations upon the bodies and dispositions of individuals" (Bourdieu 1992).

In such a framework, education becomes about training an individual to remain unconcerned about oppression, inequality and violence prevailing around them or keeping such concerns at the level of intellectual disturbance, as the author argues without actualising any action upon them. There is consensualised reproduction for/of the existing order of things in a fascisation of society, a phenomenon for which the author uses the term "thought control" (Kumar 2020). It is therefore not surprising that he further laments that we produce teachers, professionals and others who are unable to contest the consensus, the status quo and existing structures, notwithstanding their unease with their exploitativeness rather than become revolutionaries, for whom the point is not simply to understand the world but "to change it" (Marx 1845).

Even higher education hardly offers real emancipatory possibilities, even though there is expanding enrolment, particularly in central and state universities, from the historically marginalised sections of society. The subversive edge of social sciences aimed at cultivating an egalitarian humanism is, as the author writes, already "under the siege" of a market-driven instrumentality. Moreover, universities and higher education institutions are regimented spaces organised as disciplinary "departments," often lacking a holism, where young men and women pursue fragmented, narrow specialisations in a knowledge hierarchy in which natural sciences are above the social sciences and humanities because of the former's lucrative market prospects. This leads to divisiveness or almost a binary between textual knowledge and real-world knowledge, idealism and pragmatism, what you study about and what you do with that acquired knowledge, and fragmenting the unity of thought and action. Textual knowledge of critical social sciences particularly remains an individual construct rather than a lived reality to form the basis of action.

An informal interaction with engineering students of technology institutions will reflect their condescending attitude to compulsory courses from the departments of humanities and social sciences. The students get educated (tacitly consensualised), yet remain unconcerned to oppressive social realities.

Common and Painful Reality

It is insightful to consider the professional trajectory of elementary education teachers from the innovative pre-service teacher education initiative Bachelor of Elementary Education (BElEd) programme on both the counts: fallacy of a vision for the future and co-opting university graduates into reproducing a stratified school system. The programme was launched by the University of Delhi in its women's colleges more than two decades ago and has been regarded as an exemplar in the teacher education practice. The BElEd aimed to prepare elementary school teachers not to fit into the existing school education system but as future transformative intellectuals who would be the agents of social change and transformation. The rationale for its introduction was that elementary teachers who were prepared "differently" would transform the system with their teacher agency that was responsive to social realities.

The young women teachers are educated in a curricular framework located in critical social science orientation in their preparation as radical educators. Endowed with criticality on passing out of the programme, there is no utopia or alternative universe for them to go into. They seek employment in the existing differentiated school education system with its multilayered structural hierarchies. This multilayer hierarchy consists of various kinds of schools, ranging from exclusive, high-fee charging international schools, private fee-charging schools, low-fee private schools, special government schools like the Kendriya Vidyalayas and the local government schools. Their pre-service teacher education fosters the dreams of a common school system for all, which they are educated to believe is the tool to the creation of an inclusive, socially just and democratic society; but the future that beckons is not in this common school system, as no such system exists in reality but remains existent only in the young women teachers' educational imagination.

The very act of induction into the profession, read "into social positions as solid citizens," firms up the social divisions that correspond with the differentiated schools. There is gradual consensualisation about the graded schooling hierarchies, consequent social divisions as also the wider underlying educational inequality. While they are prepared for a future in which they are educated to challenge the status quo, they become a part of social reproduction processes, dreaming like the sailor who sails on towards the star, knowing fully well that they will never reach it.

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Digital Activism and Cultural Resistance

Mapping the Online Kashmir

The communication void created in the Kashmir valley in August 2019 ironically became the medium for Kashmiris to reclaim their history and memorialise their suffering.

ONAIZA DRABU

On the midnight of 4 August 2019, the Indian government enforced a complete information blackout in Kashmir. As phone lines were snapped and the internet disconnected, Kashmiris outside the region gathered on social media for solace amidst snatches of information. In the dystopian weeks and months that followed, letters were written to families and dispatches from the ground carried to Delhi on USB devices. Slowly, the means of communication were restored—landlines first, then cell phones, and finally 2G internet, a full eight months later. High-speed internet has still not been restored. In a populace raised on paranoia, the hush that spread has left severe trauma in its wake, which many continue to recount a year since.

On the morning of 5 August, Twitter users showed how the life, sanity and dignity of millions in Kashmir was just a game: #KashmirHamarahai, #KashmirParFinalFight, #KashmirOperations, and #KashmirFinalSolution were trending. By mid-morning, Article 370 of the Constitution was abrogated and the state bifurcated into union territories. Although, arguably, an empty shell at this point, the token constitutional provision that remained had carried emotional associations. Many Kashmiris felt a sense of personal hurt as right-wing groups in India took to rejoicing the abrogation. The act signalled yet another betrayal by the Indian government. Its execution stripped Kashmiris of their agency. It took away consent and silenced a population with lies, forcing them into psychological, communication, and economic perdition. Television channels continued what can only be termed a charade and mockery. Kashmiri newspapers printed a few leaflets—silenced, they most usefully announced cancelled weddings.

At a moment when Kashmiris were faced with not just the loss of symbols of identity but also of agency, processes of memorialising and self-making became important

Dealing with questions of Indian identity is complicated in the context of Kashmir. Lakhs of Kashmiris hold government jobs, work under the purview of Indian laws, in institutions and within frameworks that function under the Indian government. Still, resistance against the state's political and cultural hegemony has widely been acknowledged. Passive resistance and disguised ideological insubordination have been operating pervasively yet distinctly from the active resistance of those on the streets. There is some cognitive dissonance in working for the state, while in private spaces acting in ways or holding beliefs that could be termed seditious. The veil of quiescence has only existed for those who have not wished to probe. The betrayal of 5 August 2019, however, was a radical moment for many. Those who were "pro-accession" all their lives now proclaimed that their country had let them down. Many changed ideologies and allegiances. Pro-independence groups were now behind bars along with "pro-accession" groups. It seemed like, for a change, almost all of Kashmir was on one side. Opposition to India had not needed to be articulated anymore. Viral videos of Kashmiri men tied to jeeps by the army or blinded by pellets were not needed as evidence of the oppression. The state had made itself heard through its actions.

Internet clampdowns have been a feature of all protests and moments of crisis in Kashmir since 2008. Social media has redefined the rules of protest. Post 2010, social media has been the space of articulations of resistance for Kashmiris. Ironically, this time too, the one space that the state prohibited Kashmiris from accessing is the one where voices against the very move have been the loudest. Besides resistance, social media has also been the site for the diaspora's recreations of home. For months before the military lockdown of August 2019, Twitter saw a warming phenomenon of Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims coming together after decades of hostility. Circumventing conversations around politics, they nostalgically reconstructed home. A performative space to preserve Kashmiri culture—a community or a *mahla* (neighbourhood)—was created online. Every morning, Twitter user @rainamk1 would quiz Kashmiris on vocabulary, encouraging the group to share photos, stories, and memories. Post August 2019, however, this morphed into a mahla where people often found comfort and solidarity—reading, writing, sharing, memorialising—and reaching out to others to find out about their loved ones. Conversations with family, through one or the other connection, floated online, giving people reassurances that were otherwise hard to come by.

The internet clampdown and the nature of the move naturally caused this space to become the cornerstone of resistance, albeit one of a different character than usual. For a decade since the 2008 clashes, bloggers, "influencers," cultural commentators, and meme makers have been working to preserve history and recording memory in their own voice. The resistance did not end with the kind of tokenism that urged all supporters to change their social media profile pictures to red, but rather resulted in a unique moment of blurring and complicating identities and ideologies, giving space to look inward, evaluate and realign. The protests of 2019 were the first major moment of online resistance where the voice moved from awareness building to reclamation. All this, while millions of Kashmiris in Kashmir were under curfew, incommunicado.

Given the personal nature of the injury to all, Kashmiris outside sought more than expressions of solidarity. At a moment when Kashmiris were faced with not just the loss of symbols of identity but also of agency, processes of memorialising and self-making became important.

Invocations of the "struggle of memory against forgetting" and of Agha Shahid Ali's verse populated social media. His words of crying out—into a curfewed land with no post office—resonated.

Let me cry out in that void, say it as I can.
I write on that void: Kashmir

In popular discourse, Kashmiris were spoken for, but not allowed to speak. Stealthy laws of domicile, ecology under threat, a journalistic gag, an inattentive judiciary, representatives incarcerated, and homes destroyed, all sought to deface a culture, but in turn spurred memorialisation. And so, social media became their site of reclamation, despite eventual policing. A digital counter-public rose in solidarity, one that turned to its ethnicity and culture to find rootedness in an increasingly deracinated world. This counter-public bathed the internet with the colour red, the red of Kashmir's history.

In a context where redrafting the curriculum was not possible, a new alternative was created—emergency reading groups were convened around the world. Kashmiris transitioned from lived history to informed, learned history—doing right by it. While political activism continued, this historic investigation amplified the message, and intensified the sentiment by looking inwards rather than in opposition. While resources are being stolen, bodies marked and humiliation inflicted, Kashmiris are listening, remembering and reading—more than ever before.

For a language already under threat by Urdu and now doubly threatened by the imposition of Hindi, language learning groups for Kashmiri were being formed, Kashmiri keyboards deployed more than ever before. The Instagram account @kashmirdictionary was started to unearth lost vocabulary. It now splashed itself in red, and shared word after word, as if sending messages in code. *Wazul*, meant red, it explained. *Rath* is blood. *Branth* is hope. *Pyaaraan* is waiting. And *doh ganzravun* is counting the days in *tsopt*, the silence that engulfed the valley. For remembrance, to fight the erasure of important dates from the official calendar, alternate calendars were recreated. Social media tags and handles all dug out snippets from Kashmir's history with their "on this day" features. The erasure of days of significance led to reclaiming the dates of commemoration from before the Indian nation existed.

The Indian finance minister quoting Kashmiri poetry while presenting the budget irked many, but for months before, social media accounts like @madeinkashmir_ and @zanaanwanaan, especially on Instagram, had begun to reclaim Kashmiri poetry, finding new translations and crafting new anthems for our times. Through the words of Kashmiris poets, hope flooded social media.

In this city of sad decay, even a fluttering heart is a treasure
— Amin Kamil

As did calls for remembrance.

Kariv kutah zulm asse seeth mandachev
Magar temi pate te dyun asse haq panun chuv
Tyranny that you dispense on us will shame you
Despite everything, you will have to give us our right
— Zareef Ahmed Zareef

However, once 2G internet was restored in the valley, this movement led by the diaspora faced criticism, and was called out for its privileged insulation, romanticisation of history and pandering to clichés. Nonetheless, this process set the stage for informed international solidarity that went beyond sympathy. This performative digital activism engaged and continues to engage in a process of identity creation and reclaiming a history wronged. The protest also reimagined the binaries of allyship and complicity, and of silence and solidarity. It was unifying, not dividing. At a time when unprecedented disconnect existed (similar to the world today), it helped deal with the loss of connection by creating a space for allyship. Individual identities were remade by these performative actions. Kashmiris who found themselves simultaneously insulated and affected, yet guilty of passive complicity, found a space for themselves within a discourse they'd so far felt alienated from.

With a flag, a constitution, a language, dates, and names, all systematically erased, 5 August 2019 was a watershed moment, and caused a paradigmatic shift where the fight moved from being a protest against the state to one against erasure. The efforts that followed from groups of people who were otherwise not politically active, turning to pedagogies and methods not popularly used, took a study of history and put the lens far beyond the last 30 years. These efforts manifested as informed opinions on Kashmir in global conversations. It would also do well to remember that while this is happening, the protest is not just a passive reading group. Arrests and detentions have been made based on social media posts; armies of trolls unleashed to dismiss voices. The space isn't safe, but it is one that continues to be strong and vocal.

Writing this just before 15 August, it would do us well to pause and think about how it is now just another day when Kashmiris are restricted indoors; for them, it is just another minor inconvenience in a year of inconveniences.

[Images accompanying this article are available on the *EPW* website.]

An anthropologist and semiotician, Onaiza Drabu (onaizadrabu@gmail.com) studies identity and digital culture, and co-curates a newsletter on South Asian literature and art called Daak. *The Legend of Himal and Nagrai: Greatest Kashmiri Folk Tales* (2019), an anthology of Kashmiri folklore, is her first book.

A Handloom Weaver's Call

CHARUMATHI SUPRAJA

I'm the skin over your skin
the layer that first meets
every danger that life puts you in.
I've shielded you from the sun
kept winter's teeth off you
been by you every milestone.
When you were born
I wrapped you tightly in my arms
and never let you miss the womb.
When your mother had to eat
her mother ensured I was nearby
so you could hold me and still smile in your sleep.
When you went to play, I took the first hit if you fell.
I breathed so you could run—light as the wind.
I absorbed your sweat and tears.
I wiped up your every mess.
I hugged you when you slept and
didn't complain when you drooled.
When you met your sweetheart
I decked you up differently each day
until one day, in your best, you proposed.
On your wedding day, when you looked in the mirror
I was with you—adding colour to your cheeks
and more than a sparkle to your laughter.
In the canopy that you married under, I was there.
The tent of love that was your home
had many imprints of my touch.
From the kitchen to the bathroom
from the bedroom to the storeroom
I was there—unobtrusive but indispensable.
I had your back against the cold floor.
I blocked out the harsh noonday heat.
I soothed summer's rage off your baby's skin.
I brought that sudden smile to your father's face
When you gifted me to him and he hugged you.
I was there when your grandmother was returned
to the earth with her pickle smells, wrinkles,
magical remedies and recipes.
Not just today but from an ancient past
that you cannot remember
I've stood between you and nakedness.
I'm the skin over your skin—the layer that
first meets every danger that life puts you in.
Today, as I stand on the brink, will you hold me
or simply turn away and let me sink?

[The handloom sector, the country's second largest employment sector, is severely affected by the pandemic and its effects. The abrupt abolition of the handloom board, the financial depression and the absence of proactive measures are worsening the situation. This poem is a call towards investing thought, understanding and affirmative action in the handloom sector.]

Charumathi Supraja (charumathisupraja@gmail.com) is a poet, writer and "treeveller" (one who travels to meet trees and revels in them). When she's not curating people's tree stories or tree gazing, she takes delight in all things handcrafted.

What Happens to a Revolution Deferred?

With safe spaces for dissent shrinking, a very public revolution was brewing—only to be upended by a pandemic that forced us back into our homes.

MUBARAKA ZAVERI

Last year, at the end of a friend's wedding (when it was still possible to hang out with a few hundred strangers), with a belly full of food and my legs a little shaky from all the dancing, I went up to congratulate her parents. We were a group of friends, and after confirming that we had indeed sampled all the deserts, and no, we couldn't eat another gulab jamun, the conversation petered off. Her father caught my eye and asked, "Oh aren't you Mubaraka—isn't that a … erm … tum Parsi ho [are you Parsi]?" I knew this was just a polite way to ask me if I'm Muslim, and I quickly went through a list of pre-planned responses I'd filed away in my brain for a moment such as this one. You see, this was not the first time I had been asked this question—people have asked me on trains, in meetings, when I was looking to rent a flat, or ordered takeaway. Usually, I can sense it coming, honed by years of practice being a member of a minority community in India. I often break it gently to my audience that I'm Muslim and, based on the context, throw in a personal anecdote or explanation so they can relate to me, to alleviate the discomfort that the conversation would have caused us both. But these were unusual times, protests against the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) were brewing, and the Supreme Court verdict on Ayodhya was still fresh, and I wasn't in the mood to cosset his prejudice. I steeled myself and said, "No, uncle, main Musalman hoon [I'm Muslim]." I just let the words hang in the air for a second and after an awkward pause, he patted my hand and said, "Chalo, koi baat nahi [Oh, that's okay]."

I gave my friends the side-eye, and they mercifully took over the conversation. I slunk away feeling queasy. "It's all the gulab jamuns," I told myself. But on the ride home, I couldn't shake the feeling off. I turned to my friends, looking for signs that the conversation had been egregious, but except for a few sympathetic murmurs, I got nothing. That's when it hit me like a ton of bricks. I had hollered at my echo chamber, my closest friends—whom I had known for the last 10 years—and this time they hadn't hollered back. My echo chamber was shrinking, and it was mirroring every other space I occupy as a Muslim in India.

Of course, I am aware that I belong to a minority within a minority. I have the luxury of engaging in discussions about the changing tide against secularism in India (and it has changed quickly and drastically in the last few years) with other people who share my opinion and, like me, are never really directly affected by what is happening. But, in the last few months, something has changed for all of us. Our fear may be minor compared to the fear felt by students who had their hostel rooms broken into by a mob, activists who were imprisoned for raising their voices, and the women of Shaheen Bagh who spent the entire biting winter of 2019 out on the street protesting against the CAA and NRC, demanding justice but, our safe echo chambers have been broken into.

My echo chamber was shrinking, and it was mirroring every other space I occupy as a Muslim in India

Friends have been disappearing from WhatsApp and moving to other, more secure, messaging apps to share news and opinion pieces, and others have upped the privacy and security settings on their social media profiles after having received rape threats in response to their videos and photos of the protests. Yet others have had strict gag orders from the organisations they work at about making their political views public, in the fear that they will go down and drag their organisation down with them. Most of us have learned to self-censor at a party, meeting, or dinner conversation when someone makes a casual remark about "those Muslims." Speaking up at best wins you the not-again-with-your-liberal-bull**** eye roll, and at worst ends up severing ties altogether.

However, as these safe and comfortable spaces to voice dissent have disappeared, another space has opened up for all of us—it is on the streets, and in universities and buildings that have historically upheld our freedom. Within the country and outside it, in nearly every big city in the world that has sizeable numbers of the Indian diaspora, people across class, faith, gender and age have filled these spaces. They turned up despite the great personal cost of being arrested or imprisoned for attempting to engage critically with the government's policies. On the eve of Republic Day, hundreds of people demanded "azadi" (freedom) from the CAA and NRC around the Mahatma Gandhi statue in the Parliament Square in London, ironically in the same country that had once colonised us. On the same day, students and members of the diaspora participated in a 24-hour-long protest in Boston at the Harvard Square. Similar demonstrations spread from Australia to the Netherlands. Even in Mumbai, the city I grew up in, and one that is infamously apathetic to most political movements, people showed up to protest the CAA and NRC. And we held this space for four months, and probably would have continued to own it, if it weren't for a pandemic that forced us back into our homes and upended all our lives.

While our lives and this movement have paused, the fear hasn't disappeared. During the lockdown, the police in Delhi first mopped up the sites of protests, quickly whitewashing over any protest art and signs that activists had left behind, and then began to arrest the activists who supported this revolution, strong-arming them in a series of arrest–bail–re-arrest, in what I imagine is a clear message for anyone entertaining the notion of dissent: fall in line, or else … Speaking up about the ongoing violence against Muslims only invites more violence.

When this pandemic does abate, and when we can finally hit play once again, I'm curious to see if we will pick up where we left off, or if this space and our freedom to exercise our constitutional right to dissent will disappear altogether. I cannot help but think about the ongoing revolutions in cities across the United States in response to the death of George Floyd and in support of the Black Lives Matter movement, in Beirut where fresh protests have emerged against the government in response to the devastating blast earlier this month, and in Hong Kong despite the newly enforced national security law. All of these movements were born during and have continued despite the pandemic. Will our own struggle be different? This August, even if we celebrate another year of being independent from colonial rule, can we really congratulate ourselves? We do not have the liberty to express our thoughts, beliefs, and faith, and are uncertain about what our future holds. What will happen to a revolution deferred?

Mubaraka Zaveri (zaverimubaraka@gmail.com) is an analyst currently working in health and education policy research based in London.

LAST LINES

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT

To

The Country Manager,
Bank of Ceylon, Chennai Branch

Report on the Standalone Financial Statements

Opinion

We have audited the accompanying standalone financial statements (also referred as financial statements) of Bank of Ceylon, Chennai Branch ('the Bank'), which comprise the Balance Sheet as at March 31, 2020, the Profit and Loss Account, the Cash Flow Statement for the year then ended, and notes to the financial statements, including a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory information.

In our opinion and to the best of our information and according to the explanations given to us, the aforesaid standalone financial statements together with the accounting policies and notes thereon give the information required by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 as well as well as the Companies Act, 2013 ('the Act') in the manner so required for the Banking Companies and give a true and fair view in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in India on the state of affairs of the Bank as at March 31, 2020 and its profit and its cash flows for the year then ended on that date.

Basis for Opinion

We conducted our audit in accordance with the Standards on Auditing (SAs) specified under Section 143(10) if the Act. Our responsibilities under those Standards are further described in the Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Standalone Financial Statements section of our report. We are independent of the Bank in accordance with the code of ethics issued by the ICAI together with ethical requirements that are relevant to our audit of the Standalone Financial Statements under the provisions of the Act, and we have fulfilled our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with these requirements and the code of ethics. We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

Emphasis of Matter

We draw attention to the following Notes to the Financial Statement;

1. Schedule 18 – Notes 5.5(a) to the financial statements which describes the uncertainties due to outbreak of novel coronavirus (COVID-19). In view of these uncertainties, the impact on the Bank's financial statements is significantly dependent on future developments.
2. Schedule 18 – Notes 5.6 with regard to the pending process of registering as branch office under the Companies Act, 2013 ('The Act') results in the non-compliance of provision of Corporate Social Responsibility under section 135 and Other Provision to the extent applicable to the bank as per the Act.

Our opinion is not modified in respect of this matter.

Key Audit Matters

Key audit matters are those matters that, in our professional judgment, were of most significance in our audit of the financial statements of the current period. These matters were addressed in the context of our audit of the financial statements as a whole, and in forming our opinion thereon, and we do not provide a separate opinion on these matters.

Reporting of Key audit matters as per SA 701, Key Audit Matters are not applicable to the bank.

Information Other than the Standalone Financial Statements and Auditor's Report thereon;

The Bank's Management are responsible for the other information. The other information comprises the information included in the Annual Report including Pillar 3 Disclosure under the New Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel III disclosures), but does not include the standalone financial statements and our auditor's report thereon. The Annual Report is expected to be made available to us after the date of this auditor's report.

Our opinion on the standalone financial statements does not cover the other information and we will not express any form of assurance conclusion thereon.

In connection with our audit of the standalone financial statements, our responsibility is to read the other information identified above when it becomes available and, in doing so, consider whether the other information is materially inconsistent with the standalone financial statements or our knowledge obtained in the audit or otherwise appears to be materially misstated.

When we read the Annual Report, if we conclude that there is a material misstatement therein, we are required to communicate the matter to those charged with governance. We have nothing to report in this regard.

Responsibilities of the Management and Those Charged with Governance for the Standalone Financial Statements

Management of the Bank is responsible for the matters stated in section 134(5) with respect to the preparation of these standalone financial statements that give a true and fair view of the financial position, financial performance and cash flows of the Bank in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in India, including the Accounting Standards specified under Section 133 of the Act, read with rule 7 of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014 (as amended) and the provisions of Section 29 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and circulars and guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India ('RBI') from time to time as applicable to Banks.

This responsibility also includes maintenance of adequate accounting records in accordance with the provisions of the Act for safeguarding of the assets of the Bank and for preventing and detecting frauds and other irregularities; selection and application of appropriate accounting policies; making judgments and estimates that are reasonable and prudent; and design, implementation and maintenance of adequate internal financial controls, that were operating effectively for ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the accounting records, relevant to the preparation and presentation of the financial statements that give a true and fair view and are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

In preparing the Standalone Financial Statements, management is responsible for assessing the Bank's ability to continue as a going concern, disclosing, as applicable, matters related to going concern and using the going concern basis of accounting unless management either intends to liquidate the Bank or to cease operations, or has no realistic alternative but to do so.

The Bank's management is also responsible for overseeing the Bank's financial reporting process.

Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Financial Statements

Our objectives are to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the Standalone Financial Statements as a whole are free from material misstatement whether due to fraud or error and to issue an auditor's report that includes our opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an audit conducted in accordance with SAs will always detect a material misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of these Standalone Financial Statements.

As part of an audit in accordance with SAs, we exercise professional judgment and maintain professional scepticism throughout the audit. We also:

- Identify and assess the risks of material misstatement of the Standalone Financial Statements, whether due to fraud or error, design and perform audit procedures responsive to those risks and obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion. The risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than for one resulting from error, as fraud may involve collusion, forgery, intentional omissions, misrepresentations or the override of internal control.

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- Obtain an understanding of internal control relevant to the audit in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances. Under Section 143(3)(i) of the Act, we are also responsible for expressing our opinion on whether the Bank has internal financial controls with reference to financial statements in place and the operating effectiveness of such controls.
- Evaluate the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates and related disclosures made by management.
- Conclude on the appropriateness of management's use of the going concern basis of accounting and, based on the audit evidence obtained, whether a material uncertainty exists related to events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the Bank's ability to continue as a going concern. If we conclude that a material uncertainty exists, we are required to draw attention in our auditors' report to the related disclosures in the Standalone Financial Statements or, if such disclosures are inadequate, to modify our opinion. Our conclusions are based on the audit evidence obtained up to the date of our auditors' report. However, future events or conditions may cause the Bank to cease to continue as a going concern.
- Evaluate the overall presentation, structure and content of the Standalone Financial Statements, including the disclosures and whether the Standalone Financial Statements represent the underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation.

Materiality is the magnitude of misstatements in the Standalone Financial Statements that, individually or in aggregate, makes it probable that the economic decisions of a reasonably knowledgeable user of the financial statements may be influenced. We consider quantitative materiality and qualitative factors in (i) planning the scope of our audit work and in evaluating the results of our work; and (ii) to evaluate the effect of any identified misstatements in the Standalone financial statements.

We communicate with those charged with governance regarding, among other matters, the planned scope and timing of the audit and significant audit findings, including any significant deficiencies in internal control that we identify during our audit.

We also provide those charged with governance with a statement that we have complied with relevant ethical requirements regarding independence, and to communicate with them all relationships and other matters that may reasonably be thought to bear on our independence, and where applicable, related safeguards.

From the matters communicated with those charged with governance, we determine those matters that were of most significance in the audit of the Standalone Financial Statements of the current period and are therefore the Key Audit Matters.

We describe these matters in our auditors' report unless law or regulation precludes public disclosure about the matter or when, in extremely rare circumstances, we determine that a matter should not be communicated in our report because the adverse consequences of doing so would reasonably be expected to outweigh the public interest benefits of such communication.

Report on Other Legal and Regulatory Requirements

1. The Balance Sheet and the Profit and Loss Account have been drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Section 29 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Section 133 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 7 of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014;

2. Subject to the limitations of the audit indicated above and as required by sub section (3) of section 30 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, we report that:
   a) we have obtained all the information and explanations which, to the best of our knowledge and belief, were necessary for the purpose of our audit and have found them to be satisfactory;
   b) the transactions of the Bank, which have come to our notice, have been within the powers of the Bank.

3. Further, as required by section 143(3) of the Act, we report that;
   a) We have sought and obtained all the information and explanations which to the best of our knowledge and belief were necessary for the purposes of our audit;
   b) In our opinion, proper books of account as required by law have been kept by the Bank so far as it appears from our examination of those books;
   c) The Balance Sheet, the Profit and Loss Account and the Cash Flow Statement dealt with by this Report are in agreement with the books of account;
   d) In our opinion, the aforesaid financial statements comply with the Accounting Standards specified under Section 133 of the Act, read with Rule 7 of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014 to the extent they are not inconsistent with the accounting policies prescribed by the RBI;
   e) The requirements of Section 164(2) of the Act is not applicable to the Bank considering it is a branch of Bank of Ceylon, headquartered in Srilanka was formed under the Bank of Ceylon Ordinance No.53 of 1938 as a body Corporate with perpetual succession;
   f) With respect to the adequacy of the internal financial controls with reference to financial statements of the Bank and the operating effectiveness of such controls, refer to our separate Report in "Annexure A"; Our Report expresses Disclaimer of Opinion on the Bank's Internal financial controls over financial reporting for the reasons stated therein.
   g) With respect to the other matters to be included in the Auditor's Report in accordance with the requirements of section 197(16) of the Act, as amended;
   The Bank is a Banking Company as defined under Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Accordingly, the requirements prescribed under section 197 of the Companies Act, 2013 do not apply; and
   h) With respect to the other matters to be included in the Auditor's Report in accordance with Rule 11 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014, in our opinion and to the best of our knowledge and belief and according to the information and explanations given to us:
      i. The Bank has disclosed the impact of pending litigations as at March 31, 2020 on its financial position in its financial statements – Refer Schedule 12 and Note 3.12 of Schedule 18 to the financial statements;
      ii. The Bank has made provision as at March 31, 2020, as required under the applicable law or accounting standards, for material foreseeable losses, if any, on long-term contracts including derivative contracts – Refer Note 2.3.3, Note 2.4.1, Note 4.1 and Note 4.2 of Schedule 18 to the financial statements; and
      iii. There were no amounts which were required to be transferred to the Investor Education and Protection Fund by the Bank during the year ended March 31, 2020.

For **B.P.Rao and Co.**
Chartered Accountants
FRN: 003116S

Sd/-
B Prasanna Achar
Partner
M.N.: 202100
UDIN: 20202100AAAACF5607
Place: Chennai
Date: 30th July, 2020

BANK OF CEYLON

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ANNEXURE A TO THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT OF EVEN DATE ON THE STANDALONE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BANK OF CEYLON, CHENNAI BRANCH

Report on the Internal Financial Controls under Clause (i) of Sub-section 3 of Section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 ("the Act")

We were engaged to audit the internal financial controls with reference to financial statements of Bank of Ceylon, Chennai Branch ('the Bank') as of 31st March 2020, in conjunction with our audit of the financial statements of the Bank for the year ended on that date.

Management's Responsibility for Internal Financial Controls

The Bank's management is responsible for establishing and maintaining internal financial controls based on the internal control over financial reporting criteria established by the Bank considering the essential components of internal control stated in the Guidance Note on Audit of Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India ("ICAI"). These responsibilities include the design, implementation and maintenance of adequate internal financial controls that were operating effectively for ensuring the orderly and efficient conduct of its business, including adherence to Bank's policies, the safeguarding of its assets, the prevention and detection of frauds and errors, the accuracy and completeness of the accounting records, and the timely preparation of reliable financial information, as required under the Companies Act, 2013.

Auditors' Responsibility

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Bank's internal financial controls over financial reporting based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with the Guidance Note on Audit of Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting (the "Guidance Note") issued by ICAI and the Standards on Auditing, issued by ICAI and deemed to be prescribed under section 143(10) of the Companies Act, 2013, to the extent applicable to an audit of internal financial controls, both issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. Those Standards and the Guidance Note require that we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether adequate internal financial controls over financial reporting was established and maintained and if such controls operated effectively in all material respects.

Because of the matter described in Disclaimer of Opinion paragraph below, we were not able to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a basis for an audit opinion on internal financial controls system over financial reporting of the Company.

Meaning of Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting

The Banks's internal financial control over financial reporting is a process designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. A Bank's internal financial control over financial reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the Bank; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the Bank are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management of the Bank; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the Bank's assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.

Basis for Disclaimer of Opinion

According to the information and explanation given to us, the Bank is in process of establishing its internal financial control over financial reporting on criteria based on or considering the essential components of internal control stated in the Guidance Note on Audit of Internal Financial Controls Over Financial Reporting issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

Disclaimer of Opinion

Because of the significance of the matter described in the Basis for Disclaimer of Opinion paragraph above, we are unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a basis for our opinion whether the Bank had adequate internal financial controls over financial reporting and whether such internal financial controls were operating effectively as at March 31, 2020. Accordingly, we do not express an Opinion on the Company's Internal Financial Control over financial reporting.

We have considered the disclaimer reported above in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests applied in our audit of the standalone financial statements of the Bank, and the disclaimer does not affect our opinion on the standalone financial statements of the Bank.

For **B.P. Rao & Co.,**
Chartered Accountants
Reg No: 003116S

Sd/-
B. Prasanna Achar
Partner
M.No. 202100
UDIN : 20202100AAAACF5607

Chennai
30th July, 2020

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

Balance Sheet as at 31st March 2020

	Schedule	31.03.2020 (In Rs)	31.03.2019 (In Rs)
CAPITAL & LIABILITIES			
Capital	1	1,350,005,270	1,350,005,270
Reserves and Surplus	2	1,118,817,062	1,041,398,848
Deposits	3	2,430,666,129	2,156,165,444
Borrowings	4	–	–
Other liabilities and provisions	5	188,042,277	164,477,780
Total		**5,087,530,738**	**4,712,047,342**
ASSETS			
Cash and Balances with Reserve Bank of India	6	91,211,009	104,385,448
Balances with banks and money at call and short notice	7	846,095,523	908,995,702
Investments	8	551,773,668	598,577,713
Advances	9	3,413,679,387	3,023,555,804
Fixed Assets	10	15,088,666	887,605
Other Assets	11	169,682,485	75,645,070
Total		**5,087,530,738**	**4,712,047,342**
Contingent liabilities	12	1,439,423,917	1,682,577,697
Bill for Collection		536,097,389	666,452,001

Profit & Loss Account for the Year Ended 31st March 2020

		Schedule	Year ended 31.03.2020 (In Rs)	Year ended 31.03.2019 (In Rs)
I	**INCOME**			
	Interest earned	13	420,965,468	416,944,649
	Other Income	14	67,172,044	73,323,848
	Total		**488,137,512**	**490,268,497**
II	**EXPENDITURES**			
	Interest expended	15	122,266,710	121,761,601
	Operating expenses	16	78,362,315	71,217,154
	Provisions and Contingencies		98,645,610	142,996,041
	Total		**299,274,635**	**335,974,796**
III	**PROFIT**			
	Net profit for the year		188,862,877	154,293,701
	Profit brought forward		645,570,826	529,850,550
			834,433,703	**684,144,251**
IV	**APPROPRIATIONS**			
	Transfer to statutory reserves		47,215,719	38,573,425
	Transfer to investment Fluctuation reserve		–	–
	Balance of profit carried forward		787,217,984	645,570,826
	Total		**834,433,703**	**684,144,251**

The accompanying schedules are an integral part of the financial statements

As per our report of even date

For B.P.Rao & Co.,
Chartered Accountants
FRN : 003116S

Sd/-
B Prasanna Achar
Partner
Membership No.: 202100

Sd/-
D.S. MUTHUKUDAARACHCHI
Country Manager

Place : Chennai
Date : 30th July 2020

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

SCHEDULES FORMING PART OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH 2020

Particulars	As on 31.03.2020 (in Rs)	As on 31.03.2019 (in Rs)
SCHEDULE 1 – ASSIGNED CAPITAL		
I The amount brought in by bank by way of start-up capital including the amount of deposit kept in cash/approved Securities with the RBI under section 11(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.	1,193,715,270	1,193,715,270
Capital infused During the year	–	–
Amount retained in India for CRAR purpose	156,290,000	156,290,000
	1,350,005,270	**1,350,005,270**
SCHEDULE 2–RESERVES AND SURPLUS		
I Statutory Reserves in terms of Section 17 of the Banking Regulation Act 1949		
Balance	395,828,023	357,254,597
ADD: Transfer During the Year	47,215,719	38,573,425
Total	**443,043,742**	**395,828,022**
II Investment Fluctuation Reserve		
Opening Balance	–	–
Less: Transfer During the Year	–	–
Total	**–**	**–**
III Balance in Profit and Loss Account	787,217,984	645,570,826
Deduct: Amount Receivable from Head Office		
Amount Transferred to Head Office	(111,444,664)	–
Total	**675,773,320**	**645,570,826**
Total (I, II & III)	**1,118,817,062**	**1,041,398,848**
SCHEDULE 3–DEPOSITS		
A I DEMAND DEPOSITS:		
1) From Banks	515,796,124	242,204,283
2) From Others	202,143,208	188,843,139
II SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS	147,522,850	144,867,366
III TERM DEPOSITS:		
1) From Banks	–	–
2) From Others	1,565,203,947	1,580,250,656
Total (I, II & III)	**2,430,666,129**	**2,156,165,444**
B (i) Deposits of branches in India	2,430,666,129	2,156,165,444
(ii) Deposits of branches outside India	–	–
Total (I & II)	**2,430,666,129**	**2,156,165,444**

Particulars	As on 31.03.2020 (in Rs)	As on 31.03.2019 (in Rs)
SCHEDULE 4 – BORROWINGS		
I BORROWINGS IN INDIA:		
1) Reserve Bank of India	–	–
2) Other Banks	–	–
3) Other institutions and agencies	–	–
II BORROWINGS OUTSIDE INDIA	–	–
Total (I & II)	**–**	**–**
Secured Borrowings included in I & II above	**–**	**–**
SCHEDULE 5–OTHER LIABILITIES AND PROVISIONS		
I Bills payable	509,849	118,690
II Inter-Office adjustments (Net)	–	8,922,430
III Interest accrued	15,915,169	14,537,649
IV Others (including provisions)	171,617,259	140,899,011
Total	**188,042,277**	**164,477,780**
SCHEDULE 6–CASH AND BALANCES WITH RESERVE BANK OF INDIA		
I Cash in Hand (including foreign currencies)	7,581,742	4,188,684
II BALANCES WITH RESERVE BANK OF INDIA:		
a) In Current Accounts	83,629,267	100,196,764
Total (I & II)	**91,211,009**	**104,385,448**
SCHEDULE 7–BALANCES WITH BANKS AND MONEY AT CALL AND SHORT NOTICE		
I IN INDIA		
(i) BALANCE WITH BANKS:		
(a) In Current Accounts	1,460,246	5,365,164
(b) In other Deposit Accounts	370,000,000	490,000,000
(ii) MONEY AT CALL AND SHORT NOTICE:		
(a) With Banks	–	–
(b) With other Institutions	169,741,678	279,870,122
Total ((i) & (ii))	**541,201,924**	**775,235,286**
II OUTSIDE INDIA		
(i) In Current Accounts	77,898,599	20,346,216
(ii) In other Deposit Accounts	226,995,000	113,414,200
(iii) Money at call and short notice	–	–
Total ((i), (ii) & (iii))	**304,893,599**	**133,760,416**
Grand Total (I & II)	**846,095,523**	**908,995,702**

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

SCHEDULES FORMING PART OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH 2020

Particulars	As on 31.03.2020 (in Rs)	As on 31.03.2019 (in Rs)
SCHEDULE 8 – INVESTMENTS		
I INVESTMENTS IN INDIA		
(i) Government Securities	551,773,668	598,577,713
LESS: Provision for depreciation	–	–
	551,773,668	598,577,713
(ii) Other approved securities	–	–
(iii) Shares	–	–
(iv) Debentures and Bonds	–	–
(v) Subsidiaries and/or Joint Ventures abroad	–	–
(vi) Others	–	–
Total	**551,773,668**	**598,577,713**
II INVESTMENTS OUTSIDE INDIA IN		
(i) Govt. securities (including local authorities)	–	–
(ii) Subsidiaries and/or joint venture abroad	–	–
(iii) Other Investments (to be specified)	–	–
Total	–	–
GRAND TOTAL (I & II)	**551,773,668**	**598,577,713**
SCHEDULE 9 – ADVANCES		
A (i) Bills purchased and discounted	100,931,525	12,214,025
(ii) Cash credits, overdrafts and loans repayable on demand	2,210,907,182	2,067,938,240
(iii) Term Loans	1,101,840,680	943,403,539
Total	**3,413,679,387**	**3,023,555,804**
B (i) Secured by tangible assets	3,249,552,470	2,991,645,468
(ii) Covered by Bank/ Govt. Guarantees	156,636,574	25,778,602
(iii) Unsecured	7,490,343	6,131,734
Total	**3,413,679,387**	**3,023,555,804**
C I Advances in India		
(i) Priority Sectors	1,440,010,773	1,018,511,431
(ii) Public Sectors	–	–
(iii) Banks	–	–
(iv) Others	1,973,668,614	2,005,044,373
Total	**3,413,679,387**	**3,023,555,804**
II Advances outside India		
(i) Due from banks	–	–
(ii) Due from others		
(a) Bills purchased and discounted	–	–
(b) Syndicate Loans	–	–
(c) Others	–	–
Total	**–**	**–**
GRAND TOTAL (CI & CII)	**3,413,679,387**	**3,023,555,804**

Particulars	As on 31.03.2020 (in Rs)	As on 31.03.2019 (in Rs)
SCHEDULE 10 – FIXED ASSETS		
I Premises	–	–
II Other Fixed Assets (including Furniture and Fixtures)		
At cost as on 31st March of the preceding year	55,141,840	54,050,898
Additions during the year	16,362,762	1,090,942
Less: Deduction	–	–
Depreciation to date	56,415,936	54,254,235
Total (I+II)	**15,088,666**	**887,605**
SCHEDULE 11 – OTHER ASSETS		
I Inter-Office adjustment (net)	4,147,265	–
II Int accrued	35,030,843	29,078,919
III Advance Income Tax (net)	10,604,869	6,188,574
IV Deferred Tax	80,942,705	9,520,462
V Stationery and stamps	49,145	49,910
VI Non-banking assets acquired in satisfaction of claims	–	–
VII Others	38,907,658	30,807,205
Total	**169,682,485**	**75,645,070**
SCHEDULE 12 – CONTINGENT LIABILITIES		
I Claims against the bank not acknowledged as debts	–	–
II Liability for partly paid investments	–	–
III Liability on account of outstanding forward exchange contracts	703,980,927	636,296,454
IV Guarantees given on behalf of constituents		
(a) In India	330,451,368	450,863,516
(b) Outside India	–	–
V Acceptances, endorsements and other obligations	388,864,989	590,004,259
VI Other items for which the bank is contingently liable	16,126,633	5,413,468
Total	**1,439,423,917**	**1,682,577,697**

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

SCHEDULES FORMING PART OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH, 2020

Particulars	For the year ended 31.03.2020 (in Rs)	For the year ended 31.03.2019 (in Rs)
SCHEDULE 13 – INTEREST EARNED		
I Interest/discount on advances/bills	317,744,817	316,583,294
II Interest on investments	54,639,633	67,183,926
III Interest on balances with Reserve Bank of India and other inter-bank funds	48,581,018	33,177,429
IV Others	–	–
Total	**420,965,468**	**416,944,649**
SCHEDULE 14 – OTHER INCOME		
I Commission, exchange and brokerage	30,077,166	32,158,065
II Profit on sale of investments	–	–
Less: Loss on sale of investments	–	(3,125,000)
III Profit on revaluation of investments	–	–
Less: Loss on revaluation of investments		
IV Profit on sale of land, buildings and other assets		
Less: Loss on sale of land, buildings and other assets	–	–
V Profit on exchange transactions	16,635,250	22,514,648
Less: Loss on exchange transactions		
VI Income earned by way of dividends etc. from subsidiaries/ companies and/or joint ventures abroad/in India	–	–
VII Miscellaneous Income	20,459,628	21,776,135
Total	**67,172,044**	**73,323,848**

Particulars	For the year ended 31.03.2020 (in Rs)	For the year ended 31.03.2019 (in Rs)
SCHEDULE 15 – INTEREST EXPENDED		
I Interest on deposits	122,193,328	121,669,383
II Interest on Reserve Bank of India/Inter-bank Borrowings	73,382	92,219
III Others	–	–
Total	**122,266,710**	**121,761,602**
SCHEDULE 16 – OPERATING EXPENSES		
I Payments to and provisions for employees	33,393,920	30,614,855
II Rent, taxes and lighting	10,732,975	13,250,699
III Printing and stationery	452,889	589,934
IV Advertisement and publicity	502,340	165,748
V Depreciation on bank's property	2,161,701	3,965,410
VI Auditors fees	265,500	225,000
VII Law charges	50,000	79,750
VIII Postages, Telegrams, Telephones etc.	4,146,594	4,174,701
IX Repairs and maintenance	10,966,816	7,340,210
X Insurance	2,382,798	2,206,069
XI Other expenditures	13,306,782	8,604,778
Total	**78,362,315**	**71,217,154**

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

CASH FLOW STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH, 2020

	Year Ended 31.3.2020 (Rs. Cr)	Year Ended 31.3.2019 (Rs. Cr)
Cash flow from operating Activities		
Net profit for the year Tax	188,862,877	154,293,701
Adjustments for:		
Provision for Income Tax	54,161,464	123,857,965
Depreciation charge for the year	2,161,701	3,965,410
Depreciation on Investment	–	(3,175,625)
Profit on sale of Investment	–	3,125,000
Adjustment for provision for NPAs	28,215,180	7,309,944
Provision for Floating Provision	16,268,967	15,117,779
Adjustment for other provisions	624,250	(114,022)
Adjustment for provision for standard assets	–	–
Adjustments for:		
(Increase)/Decrease in Investments	46,804,044	59,412,912
(Increase)/Decrease in Advances	(390,123,583)	427,655,905
(Increase)/Decrease in Other Assets	(18,198,878)	(6,760,239)
Increase/(Decrease) in Borrowings	–	–
Increase/(Decrease) in Deposits	274,500,685	(19,372,708)
Increase/(Decrease) in other liabilities and provisions	(21,543,900)	(11,569,325)
Direct Taxes paid	(130,000,000)	(133,000,000)
Net cash flow from operating Activities	51,732,807	620,746,697
Cash Flow from Investing Activities		
Purchase of fixed Assets	(16,362,762)	(1,090,942)
Net cash used in Investing Activities	(16,362,762)	(1,090,942)
Cash flow from Financing Activities		
Head Office	(111,444,664)	–
Net Cash generated from financing activities	(111,444,664)	–
Net increase/decrease in cash and cash equivalents	(76,074,618)	619,655,755
Cash and Cash equivalents as at 1st April 2019	1,013,381,150	393,725,395
Cash and Cash equivalents as at 31st March 2020*	937,306,532	1,013,381,150

*Cash and cash equivalent comprises of cash on hand, Balance with Reserve Bank of India, Balance with banks and Money at call short notice

For B.P.Rao & Co.,
Chartered Accountants
FRN : 003116S

Sd/-
D.S. MUTHUKUDAARACHCHI
Country Manager

Sd/-
B Prasanna Achar
Partner
Membership No.: 202100

Place : Chennai
Date : 30th July 2020

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

SCHEDULE FORMING PART OF BALANCE SHEET AND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st MARCH, 2020

SCHEDULE - 17- SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES

1. GENERAL

The financial statements are prepared following the going concern concept, on historical cost basis unless otherwise stated and conform to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in India which encompasses applicable statutory provisions, regulatory norms prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) from time to time, Accounting Standards (AS) specified under Section 133 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 7 of the Companies (Accounts) Rules, 2014 to the extent applicable and current practices prevailing in the banking industry in India.

2. TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING FOREIGN EXCHANGE

a) Monetary assets and liabilities in foreign currencies, including Forward Exchange Contracts, are translated into Indian Rupees at the year-end rates of exchange advised by the Foreign Exchange Dealers Association of India (FEDAI) and the resultant gain or loss is taken to revenue.

b) Income and Expenditure items are translated at the exchange rates prevailing on the date of transaction.

3. INVESTMENTS

Classification

a) Basis of classification

In compliance with the Reserve Bank of India guidelines, the investment portfolio of the Bank is classified into

a) "Held to Maturity" (HTM) comprising Investments acquired with the intention to hold them till maturity.

b) "Held for Trading" (HFT) comprising Investments acquired with the intention to trade. Securities that are held principally for resale within 90 days from the date of purchase are classified under the HFT category.

c) "Available for Sale" (AFS) comprising Investments not covered by (a) and (b) above i.e. those which are acquired neither for trading purposes nor for being held till maturity.

Valuation:

a) Investments are classified as per RBI guidelines into "Held to Maturity", "Available for Sale" and "Held for Trading" categories. "Held to Maturity" Investments are stated at acquisition cost net of amortization. The excess of acquisition cost over the face value, if any is amortized over the remaining period of maturity.

b) Investments in "Available for Sale" and "Held for Trading" categories are marked to market, as per the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India.

c) Treasury bills are valued at carrying cost.

4. ADVANCES

All the advances have been classified as per the asset classification norms prescribed by Reserve Bank of India. The total of advances disclosed in the Balance sheet is Net of Provisions on NPAs. Provision on Standard Assets is made as per the guidelines prescribed by RBI. 0.50% of standard advances is set apart every year as floating provision to be utilized under exceptional circumstances.

5. FIXED ASSETS

a) All the fixed assets are stated at historical cost net of depreciation.

b) Computers including computer software are depreciated at 33.33% p.a and all other fixed assets are depreciated at 20% on Straight-line method proportionately from the month of purchase.

6. STATUTORY RESERVE

At the close of every fiscal, profit at a percentage not less than 25% that prescribed by the regulator, is transferred and held as statutory reserve.

7. REVENUE/ EXPENDITURE RECOGNITION

a) Income and Expenditure are generally accounted for on accrual basis, unless otherwise stated.

b) Income on Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) is recognized to the extent realized as per the prudential norms prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India. Income accounted for in the preceding year and remaining unrealized is derecognized in respect of assets classified as Non-Performing during the year.

c) Interest on overdue bills and LC Commission are accounted on realization basis.

d) Items of income/expenditure are considered not material for revenue recognition, if the amount is less than one percent of the total income/expenditure.

8. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

Provision for gratuity in accordance with the provisions of The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is made on the basis of Actuarial valuation

9. TAXES ON INCOME

a) Provisions for taxes are made for both Current Taxes and Deferred Tax. Current Tax is measured at the amount expected to be paid to the taxation authorities, using the applicable tax rates, tax laws and favorable judicial pronouncements/legal opinions.

b) Deferred tax Assets and liabilities arising on account of timing differences and which are capable of reversing in subsequent periods are recognized using the tax rates and tax laws that have been enacted or substantively enacted by the date of the Balance sheet. Deferred tax assets are not recognized unless there is "Virtual Certainty" that there will be sufficient future taxable income available against which such deferred tax assets will be realized.

10. SEGMENT REPORTING:

a) The Bank recognises the Business Segment as the Primary Reporting Segment and Geographical Segment as the Secondary Reporting Segment, in accordance with the RBI guidelines and in compliance with the Accounting Standard 17.

b) Business Segment is classified into (a) Treasury, (b) Corporate and Wholesale Banking, (c) Retail Banking, and (d) Other Banking Operations.

c) Geographical Segment consists only of the Domestic Segment since the Bank does not have any foreign branches.

11. EARNING PER SHARE

BOC Chennai is a branch of BOC Colombo which is 100% owned by the Government of Srilanka, hence AS- 20 Earning Per Share provision is not applicable.

12. IMPAIRMENT OF ASSETS

The Bank assesses at each balance sheet date whether there is any indication that an asset may be impaired. Impairment loss, if any, is provided in the Profit and Loss Account to the extent the carrying amount of assets exceeds their estimated recoverable amount.

13. PROVISIONS, CONTINGENT LIABILITIES AND CONTINGENT ASSETS:

As per the Accounting Standard 29 "Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets", the Bank recognises provisions only when it has a present obligation as a result of a past event and it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation and when a reliable estimate of the amount of the obligation can be made.

Contingent Assets are not recognized in the financial statements since this may result in the recognition of income that may never be realised.

14. NET PROFIT:

The net profit as per the Profit & Loss account is arrived at after necessary provisions towards: –

Taxation.

Advances and other assets.

Shortfall in the value of investments.

Staff Retirement benefits.

Other usual and necessary provisions.

15. CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS:

Cash and cash equivalents include cash in hand, Balance with RBI, Balance with other Banks and money at Call and Short Notice.

For **B.P Rao & Co.,**
Chartered Accountants
Firm Regn. No.003116S

Sd/-
D.S. MUTHUKUDAARACHCHI
Country Manager

Sd/-
B Prasanna Achar
Partner
Membership No.202100

Place : Chennai
Date : 30th July, 2020

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

SCHEDULE 18

NOTES ON ACCOUNTS

1. The reconciliation of inter branch transactions has been completed up to 31.03.2020 and tallying of balances is ensured on an ongoing basis.

2. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

2.1. Capital

(₹ in Crore)

	Items	**2019-20**	**2018-19**
i)	Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) – (Basel-III)	32.11	31.68
ii)	Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%)	32.11	31.68
iii)	Tier 2 Capital Ratio (%)	1.25	1.25
iv)	Total Capital Ratio (CRAR) (%)	33.36	32.93
v)	Percentage of the shareholding of the Government of India in public sector bank	NIL	NIL
vi)	Amount of equity capital raised	NIL	NIL
vii)	Amount of Additional Tier 1 capital raised, of which		
	PNCPS :	NIL	NIL
	PDI :	NIL	NIL
viii)	Amount of Tier II Capital raised, of which		
	Debt capital instruments	NIL	NIL
	Preference Share Capital instruments	NIL	NIL

2.2 INVESTMENTS

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	**2019-20**	**2018-19**
(1) Value of Investments		
(i) Gross Value of Investments		
(a) In India	55.18	59.86
(b) Outside India.	NIL	NIL
(ii) Provisions for Depreciation		
(a) In India	NIL	NIL
(b) Outside India	NIL	NIL
(iii) Net Value of Investments		
(a) In India	55.18	59.86
(b) Outside India.	NIL	NIL
(2) Movement of provisions held towards		
Depreciation on investments.	NIL	NIL
(i) Opening balance	NIL	1.37
(ii) Add: Provisions made during the year	NIL	NIL
(iii) Less: Write-off/write-back of excess provisions during the year	NIL	1.37
(iv) Closing Balance	NIL	NIL

In respect of securities held under HTM category, premium paid of ₹8.23 Lakhs has been amortized during the year and debited under "Interest received on Investments".

2.2.1 Repo Transactions (in face value terms)

(₹ in Crore)

	Minimum outstanding during the year	**Maximum outstanding during the year**	**Daily Average outstanding during the year**	**Outstanding as on March 31, 2020**
Securities sold under repo I. Government securities II. Corporate debt securities	3.00	3.00	0.01	NIL
Securities purchased under reverse repo I. Government securities II. Corporate debt securities	1.00	68.00	29.11	2.00

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

2.2.2. Non-SLR Investment Portfolio

i) Issuer composition of Non-SLR investments:

(₹ in Crore)

No.	Issuer	Amount	Extent of Private Placement	Extent of 'Below Investment Grade' Securities	Extent of 'Unrated' Securities	Extent of 'Unlisted' Securities
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1	PSUs	NIL				
2	FIs					
3	Banks					
4	Private Corporates					
5	Subsidiaries/ Joint Ventures					
6	Others					
7	Less: Provision held towards depreciation					
	Total					

Amounts reported under Columns 4, 5, 6 and 7 above may not be mutually exclusive

ii) Non-performing Non-SLR investments

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
Opening balance	NIL	NIL
Additions during the year since 1st April 2019	NIL	NIL
Reductions during the above period	NIL	NIL
Closing balance 31st March 2020	NIL	NIL
Total Provisions held	NIL	NIL

2.2.3 Sale from HTM category

The bank has not sold any securities during the year under HTM category.

2.2.4 The percentage of SLR investment under HTM category as on 31/3/2020 is 7.70 % (PY 10.95%) of the Net Demand and Time Liabilities of the bank, which is within the permissible limit as per RBI guidelines.

2.3 Derivatives

2.3.1 Forward Rate Agreement/ Interest Rate Swap

(₹ in Crore)

	Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
I.	The notional principal of swap agreements	NIL	
II.	Losses which would be incurred if counterparties failed to fulfill their obligations under the agreements		
III.	Collateral required by the bank upon entering into swaps		
IV.	Concentration of credit risk arising from the swaps		
V.	The fair value of the swap book		

2.3.2 Exchange Traded Interest Rate Derivatives:

(₹ in Crore)

SI. No	Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
(i)	Notional principal amount of exchange traded interest rate derivatives undertaken during the year (instrument-wise)	NIL	NIL
(ii)	Notional principal amount of exchange traded interest rate derivatives outstanding as on 31st March 2020 (instrument-wise)	NIL	NIL
(iii)	Notional principal amount of exchange traded interest rate derivatives outstanding and not "highly effective" (instrument-wise)	NIL	NIL
(iv)	Mark-to-market value of exchange traded interest rate derivatives outstanding and not "highly effective" (instrument-wise)	NIL	NIL

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

2.3.3. Disclosures on risk exposure in derivatives

Qualitative Disclosure:

The only derivatives dealt by the bank in the foreign exchange market are Forward Contracts. Forward contracts are being used to hedge/ cover the exposure in foreign exchange arising out of merchant transaction and trading positions.

To cover the risk arising out of the above derivatives, various limits like IGL, AGL and Stop Loss Limits have been prescribed in the Treasury Policy of the Bank, which are monitored by mid-office. The mark-to-market values are monitored on monthly basis for Foreign Exchange Forward Contracts. The operations are conducted in terms of the policy guidelines issued by RBI from time to time.

Quantitative Disclosures

(₹ in Crore)

Sl. No	Particular	Currency Derivatives		Interest Rate Derivatives	
		2019-20	2018-19	2019-20	2018-19
(i)	Derivatives (Notional Principal Amount)				
	a) For hedging	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
	b) For trading	Nil	Nil	Nil	NIl
(ii)	Marked to Market Positions	NIL			
	a) Asset (+)				
	b) Liability (-)				
(iii)	Credit Exposure				
(iv)	Likely impact of one percentage change in interest rate (100*PV01)				
	a) On hedging derivatives				
	b) On trading derivatives				
(v)	Maximum and Minimum of 100*PV01 observed during the year				
	a) On hedging				
	b) On trading				

2.3.4 Shifting of securities:

Bank has not shifted any securities from one category to another during the Financial Year 2019-20.

2.3.5 SLR Securities

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	As at 31.03.2020		As at 31.03.2019	
	Book Value	Market Value	Book Value	Market Value
Government Securities SLR (CG, SG, TB)	55.18	56.99	59.86	60.20
Approved securities - SLR	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL

2.4 Asset Quality

2.4.1 Non-Performing Assets

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
(i) Net NPAs to Net Advances (%)		
(ii) Movement of NPAs (Gross)		
(a) Opening balance	3.45	0.97
(b) Additions during the year	18.81	3.04
(c) Reductions during the year	2.13	0.56
(d) Closing balance	20.13	3.45
(iii) Movement of Net NPAs		
(a) Opening balance	2.13	NIL
(b) Additions during the year	15.99	2.13
(c) Reductions during the year	2.13	NIL
(d) Closing balance	15.99	2.13
(iv) Movement of provisions for NPAs (excluding provisions on standard assets)		
(a) Opening balance	1.32	1.40
(b) Provisions made during the year	2.82	NIL
(c) Write-off/ write-back of excess provisions	0.00	0.08
(d) Closing balance	4.14	1.32

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

2.4.2 Particulars of Accounts Restructured

Disclosure of Restructured Accounts

(₹ in Crore)

Sl No	Type of Restructuring		Under CDR Mechanism					Under SME Debt Restructuring Mechanism					Others					Total				
	Asset Classification Details		Standard	Sub-Standard	Doubtful	Loss	Total	Standard	Sub-Standard	Doubtful	Loss	Total	Standard	Sub-Standard	Doubtful	Loss	Total	Standard	Sub-Standard	Doubtful	Loss	Total
1	Restructured Accounts as on 1 April of the FY (opening figures)	No. of borrowers																				
		Amount outstanding																				
		Provision thereon																				
2	Fresh restructuring Additional facilities during the year	No. of borrowers																				
		Amount outstanding																				
		Provision thereon																				
3	Upgradations to restructured standard category during the FY	No. of borrowers																				
		Amount outstanding																				
		Provision thereon																				
4	Restructured standard advances which cease to attract higher provisioning and/or additional risk weight at the end of the FY and hence need not be shown as restructured standard advances at the beginning of the next FY	No. of borrowers																				
		Amount outstanding																				
		Provision thereon																				
5	Downgradations of restructured accounts during the FY	No. of borrowers																				
		Amount outstanding																				
		Provision thereon																				
6	Write-offs recovery restructured accounts during the FY	No. of borrowers																				
		Amount outstanding																				
7	Restructured Accounts as on 31 March of the FY (closing figures)	No. of borrowers																				
		Amount outstanding																				
		Provision thereon																				

NIL

BANK OF CEYLON

CHENNAI BRANCH

2.4.3 Details of financial assets sold to Securitization/Reconstruction Company for Asset Reconstruction

(A) Details of Sales: (₹ in Crore)

Particulars	**2019-20**	**2018-19**
i. No. of accounts	NIL	NIL
ii. Aggregate value (net of provisions) of accounts sold to SC/RC	NIL	NIL
iii. Aggregate consideration	NIL	NIL
iv. Additional consideration realized in respect of accounts transferred in earlier years	NIL	NIL
v. Aggregate profit/ (loss) over net book value.	NIL	NIL

(B) NPA Assets Sold to ARC: (₹ in Crore)

Particulars	**Backed by NPAs sold by the bank as underlying**		**Backed by NPAs sold by other banks/financial institutions/non-banking financial companies as underlying**		**Total**	
	2019-20	**2018-19**	**2019-20**	**2018-19**	**2019-20**	**2018-19**
Book value of investments in security Receipts as at 31st March 2020	NIL					

2.4.4 Details of non-performing financial assets purchased/sold

A. Details of non-performing financial assets purchased:

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars			**2019-20**	**2018-19**
1	(a)	No. of accounts purchased during the year	NIL	NIL
	(b)	Aggregate outstanding	NIL	NIL
2	(a)	Of these, number of accounts restructured during the year	NIL	NIL
	(b)	Aggregate outstanding	NIL	NIL

B. Details of non-performing financial assets sold:

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	**2019-20**	**2018-19**
1. No. of accounts sold	NIL	NIL
2. Aggregate outstanding	NIL	NIL
3. Aggregate consideration received	NIL	NIL

C. Disclosure regarding amortization of Loss on sale of assets to ARCs

NIL

2.4.5 Provisions on Standard Assets

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	**2019-20**	**2018-19**
Provisions towards Standard Assets	2.18	2.18

2.5 Business Ratios

Particulars	**2019-20**	**2018-19**
(i) Interest Income as a percentage to Working Funds	7.90	8.04
(ii) Non-interest income as a percentage to Working Funds	1.26	1.14
(iii) Operating Profit as a percentage to Working Funds	5.39	5.74
(iv) Return on Assets	3.54	2.98
(v) Business (Deposits plus advances) per employee (₹ in Crore)	20.88	19.94
(vi) Profit per employee (₹ in Crore)	0.67	0.59

2.6 Asset Liability Management

Maturity pattern of certain items of assets and liabilities (₹ in Crore)

Items	1 day	2 to 7 days	8 to 14 days	15 to 28 days	29 days to 3 months	Over 3 months & upto 6 months	Over 6 months & up to 1 year	Over 1 year & up to 3 years	Over 3 years & up to 5 years	Over 5 years	Total
Deposits (Incl Foreign currency	8.71	6.60	4.22	4.65	12.88	7.35	14.99	142.15	41.51	0.00	243.06
Liabilites)	(5.82)	(4.83)	(3.31)	(7.89)	(15.46)	(14.65)	(51.99)	(93.70)	(17.97)	(0.00)	(215.62)
Advances (Incl Foreign currency	2.44	3.03	0.39	14.31	96.68	84.06	52.83	27.53	9.03	51.18	341.48
assets)	(3.20)	(2.40)	(0.47)	(9.85)	(79.59)	(69.78)	(45.03)	(39.25)	(18.37)	(36.07)	(304.01)
Investments	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	14.43	5.28	10.20	15.14	10.13	55.18
	(NIL)	(NIL)	NIL	(NIL)	(4.67)	(4.65)	(9.74)	(10.40)	(15.21)	(15.18)	(59.85)
Borrowings	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Foreign Currency assets (excluding	30.90	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Foreign Currency Loan)	(67.84)	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Foreign Currency liabilities	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL

The above data has been compiled by the management on the basis of the guidelines of RBI which have been relied upon by Auditors. Amount in brackets represents previous year figure.

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2.7 Exposures

2.7.1 Exposure to Real Estate Sector

(₹ in Crore)

Category	2019-20	2018-19
a) Direct Exposure		
(i) Residential Mortgages – Lending fully secured by mortgages on residential property that is or will be occupied by the borrower or that is rented; (Individual housing loans eligible for inclusion in priority sector advances may be shown separately).	1.58	0.65
(ii) Commercial Real Estate – Lending secured by mortgages on commercial real estates (office buildings, retail space, multi-purpose commercial premises, multi-family residential buildings, multi-tenanted commercial premises, industrial or warehouse space, hotels, land acquisition, development and construction, etc.). Exposure would also include non-fund based (NFB) limits;	76.88	66.70
(iii) Investments in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and other securitized exposures –		
a. Residential,	NIL	NIL
b. Commercial Real Estate.	NIL	NIL
b) Indirect Exposure Fund based and non-fund based exposures on National Housing Bank (NHB) and Housing Finance Companies (HFCs).	NIL	NIL
Total Exposure to Real Estate Sector	78.46	67.35

2.7.2 Exposure to Capital Market

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
(i) Direct investment in equity shares, convertible bonds, convertible debentures and units of equity-oriented mutual funds the corpus of which is not exclusively invested in corporate debt;	NIL	NIL
(ii) Advances against shares/bonds/debentures or other securities or on clean basis to individuals for investment in shares (including IPOs/ESOPs), convertible bonds, convertible debentures, and units of equity-oriented mutual funds;	NIL	NIL
(iii) Advances for any other purposes where shares or convertible bonds or convertible debentures or units of equity oriented mutual funds are taken as primary security;	NIL	NIL
(iv) Advances for any other purposes to the extent secured by the collateral security of shares or convertible bonds or convertible debentures or units of equity oriented mutual funds i.e. where the primary security other than shares/convertible bonds/convertible debentures/units of equity oriented mutual funds does not fully cover the advances;	NIL	NIL
(v) Secured and unsecured advances to stockbrokers and guarantees issued on behalf of stockbrokers and market makers;	NIL	NIL
(vi) Loans sanctioned to corporates against the security of shares/bonds/debentures or other securities or on clean basis for meeting promoter's contribution to the equity of new companies in anticipation of raising resources;	NIL	NIL
(vii) Bridge loans to companies against expected equity flows/issues;	NIL	NIL
(viii) Underwriting commitments taken up by the banks in respect of primary issue of shares or convertible bonds or convertible debentures or units of equity oriented mutual funds;	NIL	NIL
(ix) Financing to stockbrokers for margin trading;	NIL	NIL
(x) All exposures to Venture Capital Funds (both registered and unregistered)	NIL	NIL
Total Exposure to Capital Market	**NIL**	**NIL**

2.7.3 Risk Category wise Country Exposure

(₹ in Crore)

Risk Category	Exposure (net) as at 31/3/2020	Provision held as at 31/3/2020	Exposure (net) as at 31/3/2019	Provision held as at 31/3/2019
Insignificant	10.95	0.01	15.28	0.06
Low	31.65	0.05	NIL	NIL
Moderate	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
High	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Very High	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Restricted	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Off-credit	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Total	**42.60**	**0.06**	**15.28**	**0.06**

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2.7.4 Details of Single Borrower Limit (SBL)/ Group Borrower Limit (GBL) exceeded by the bank.

A. SBL exceeded by the Bank for the period 01/04/2019 to 31/03/2020 ----- NIL (PY NIL)

B. GBL exceeded by the Bank for the period 01/04/2019 to 31/03/2020 ----- NIL (PY NIL)

2.7.5 Unsecured Advances (Amount of Advances for which, intangible securities has been taken)

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	As on 31.03.2020	As on 31.03.2019
The total amount of Advances for which intangible Securities such as charge over the rights, licenses, Authority, etc. has been taken.	NIL	NIL
Estimated value of such intangible collaterals	NIL	NIL

2.8 Miscellaneous

2.8.1 Disclosure of Penalties imposed by RBI: NIL

Disclosure in terms of Accounting Standards:

3.1 Accounting Standard 5: Net Profit or Loss for the period, prior period items and changes in Accounting Policies:

There are no material prior period income and expenditure included in the Profit & Loss account, which requires a disclosure as per Accounting Standard 5

There has been no change in the Accounting policies followed by the bank during the year ended 31.03.2020 as compared to those in the preceding financial year ended 31.03.2019.

3.2 Accounting Standard 9: Revenue Recognition:

Revenue is recognized on accrual basis as per Accounting policy schedule 17 to the financial statements. Certain items of income are recognized on cash basis and same is not material.

3.3 Disclosure in terms of AS 10 – Fixed Assets

In accordance with banks accounting policy.

Fixed Assets as on 31 March 2020

Fixed Assets	Gross Block				Accumulated Depreciation				Net Block	
	Balance as at 1 April 2019 ₹	Additions ₹	Disposals ₹	Balance as at 31 March 2020 ₹	Balance as at 1 April 2019 ₹	Depreciation charge for the year ₹	On disposals ₹	Balance as at 31 March 2020 ₹	Balance as at 31 March 2019 ₹	Balance as at 31 March 2020 ₹
Vehicles	18,52,287	–	–	18,52,287	18,52,287	–	–	18,52,287	–	–
Furniture and Other Equipment	36,06,243	3,80,166	–	39,86,409	27,63,025	3,03,097	–	30,66,122	8,43,218	9,20,287
Computer & Computer Softwares	4,96,83,310	1,59,82,597	–	6,56,65,907	4,96,38,924	18,58,604	–	5,14,97,528	44,386	1,41,68,379
Grand total	**5,51,41,840**	**1,63,62,762**	**–**	**7,15,04,602**	**5,42,54,235**	**21,61,701**	**–**	**5,64,15,936**	**8,87,605**	**1,50,88,666**

3.4 Accounting Standard 15 – Employee Benefits

3.4.1 The bank is following Accounting Standard 15 (Revised 2005) "Employee Benefits" as under:

In respect of contributory plans viz.– Provident Fund, the bank pays fixed contribution at pre-determined rates to a separate entity, which invests in permitted securities. The obligation of the bank is limited to such fixed contribution.

In respect of Defined Benefit Plans, viz. Gratuity, provision has been made based on actuarial valuation as per the guidelines.

The summarized position of Post-employment benefits and long term employee benefits recognized in the profit and loss account and balance sheet as required in accordance with the Accounting Standard -15 (Revised) are as under:

I. Principal Actuarial Assumptions at the Balance Sheet Date

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Discount Rate	6.66%	7.68%
Expected Rate of return on Plan Assets	NIL	NIL

II. Change in the Present value of obligations:

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Present Value of obligations as at the beginning of the year	0.48	0.62
Interest Cost	0.04	0.05
Current Service Cost	0.06	0.06
Past service cost (non-vested benefits)	NIL	NIL
Past service cost (vested benefits)	NIL	NIL
Benefits Paid	NIL	NIL
Actuarial loss/(gain) on obligation (balancing figure)	0.03	(0.25)
Present Value of obligations as at the year end	0.61	0.48

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III. Change in Fair Value of Plan Asset

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Fair value of Plan Assets at the beginning of the year	NIL	NIL
Expected return on Plan Assets	NIL	NIL
Employer's Contribution	NIL	NIL
Benefits Paid	NIL	NIL
Actuarial loss/(gain) on plan assets (balancing figure)	NIL	NIL
Fair Value of Plan Asset at the end of the year	NIL	NIL

IV. Actual Return on Plan Assets

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Expected return on plan assets	NIL	NIL
Actuarial gain/(loss) on plan assets	NIL	NIL
Actual return on plan assets	NIL	NIL

V. Actuarial Gain/Loss recognized

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Actuarial gain/(loss) for the Period - Obligation	0.03	(0.25)
Actuarial gain/(loss) for the Period - Plan Assets	NIL	NIL
Total (gain)/loss for the period	0.03	(0.25)
Actuarial (gain)/loss recognized in the period	0.03	(0.25)
Unrecognized actuarial (gain)/loss at the end of the year	NIL	NIL

VI. Amount recognized in Balance Sheet

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Present value of the Obligation	0.61	0.48
Fair value of plan assets	NIL	NIL
Difference	0.61	0.48
Unrecognized Transitional liability	NIL	NIL
Unrecognized past service cost (non-vested benefits)	NIL	NIL
Liability recognized in the Balance Sheet	0.61	0.48

VII. Expenses Recognized in Profit & Loss Account

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Current Service Cost	0.06	0.06
Interest Cost	0.04	0.04
Expected return on Plan assets	NIL	NIL
Net actuarial (gain)/loss recognised in the year	0.03	(0.25)
Transitional Liability recognized in the year	NIL	NIL
Past service cost (non-vested benefits)	NIL	NIL
Past service cost (vested benefits)	NIL	NIL
Expenses Recognized in Profit & Loss Account	0.13	(0.14)

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VIII. Movements in the Liability Recognized in the Balance Sheet

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Opening net Liability	0.48	0.62
Opening amount determined under para 55 of AS15R	0.48	0.62
Expense as Above	0.13	(0.14)
Contribution paid	NIL	NIL
Closing Net Liability	0.61	0.48

IX. Amount for the Current Period

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Gratuity (unfunded) 2020	Gratuity (unfunded) 2019
Present value of Obligation	0.61	0.48
Plan Assets	NIL	NIL
Surplus/(Deficit)	0.61	0.48
Experience adjustments on Plan Liabilities - (loss)/gain	NIL	NIL
Experience adjustments on Plan Assets - (loss)/gain	NIL	NIL

3.5 Employee Stock Option Scheme - NIL

3.6 Accounting Standard 17 – Segment Reporting

SEGMENT REPORTING (₹ in Crore)

PART A: BUSINESS SEGMENTS	YEAR ENDED	
PARTICULARS	**31/03/2020**	**31/03/2019**
1. SEGMENT REVENUE :	(Audited)	(Audited)
a. Treasury operations	11.99	11.98
b. Corporate/wholesale banking operations	33.15	33.13
c. Retail banking operations	0.20	0.29
d. Other banking operations	3.47	3.62
TOTAL	**48.81**	**49.02**
2. SEGMENT RESULTS (Operating Profit)		
a. Treasury operations	5.00	5.14
b. Corporate/wholesale Banking operations	20.31	20.84
c. Retail banking operations	0.02	0.13
d. Other banking operations	3.42	3.62
TOTAL	**28.75**	**29.73**
OPERATING PROFIT	**28.75**	**29.73**
PROVISIONS OTHER THAN TAX	**(2.69)**	**1.31**
PROFIT BEFORE TAX	**31.44**	**28.42**
Less : Tax expenses	12.55	13.00
NET PROFIT	**18.89**	**15.42**
CAPITAL EMPLOYED :		
a. Treasury operations	75.82	75.39
b. Corporate/wholesale banking operations	169.90	154.35
c. Retail banking operations	1.15	2.38
d. Unallocated Assets	2.47	7.01
TOTAL	**246.88**	**239.13**

PARTB – GEOGRAPHICAL SEGMENTS: Since the Bank is having domestic operations only hence no reporting is made under international segment.

3.7 Accounting Standard 18 – Related Party Disclosures

Related Parties and their relationship;

Name	Relationship
Bank of Ceylon-Head office	Parent
Bank of Ceylon-London	Associates
Bank of Ceylon-Male	Branch

S. No.	Name	Designation
1	D S Muthukudaarachchi	COUNTRY MANAGER

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The Bank's related party balances and transactions for the year ended March 31, 2020 are summarised as follows;

(₹ in Crore)

Items/ Related Party	Parent (as per ownership or control)	Subsidiaries	Associates/ Joint Ventures	Key Management Personnel	Relatives of key Management Personnel	Total
Borrowings	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Deposits o/s						
Vostro	26.72	NIL	0.00	NIL	NIL	26.72
Nostro	0.11	NIL	0.30	NIL	NIL	0.41
Max outstanding during the year						
Vostro	45.64	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	45.64
Nostro	0.10	NIL	3.35	NIL	NIL	3.45
Placement of Deposits	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Advances	15.07	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	15.07
Investments	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Non-Funded Commitments	19.39	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	19.39
Leasing/HP arrangements provided	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Leasing/HP arrangements availed	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Purchase of Fixed Assets	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Sale of Fixed Assets	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Interest Paid	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Interest Received	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Rendering of Services	NIL	NIL	NIL	0.75	NIL	0.75
Receiving of Services	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Management Contracts	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL

The Bank's related party balances and transactions for the year ended March 31, 2019 are summarised as follows;

Items/ Related Party	Parent (as per ownership or control)	Subsidiaries	Associates/ Joint Ventures	Key Management Personnel	Relatives of key Management Personnel	Total
Borrowings	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Deposits o/s						
Vostro	6.55	NIL	0.00	NIL	NIL	6.55
Nostro	0.10	NIL	0.53	NIL	NIL	0.63
Max outstanding during the year						
Vostro	65.32	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	65.32
Nostro	0.10	NIL	2.90	NIL	NIL	3.00
Placement of Deposits	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Advances	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Investments	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Non-Funded Commitments	19.39	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	19.39
Leasing/HP arrangements provided	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Leasing/HP arrangements availed	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Purchase of Fixed Assets	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Sale of Fixed Assets	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Interest Paid	0.01	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	0.01
Interest Received	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Rendering of Services	NIL	NIL	NIL	0.68	NIL	0.68
Receiving of Services	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Management Contracts	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL

Accounting Standard 19 – "Leases"

Premises taken on operating lease are given below: Operating leases primarily comprise office premises and staff residences, which are renewable at the option of the Bank.

Amount of lease payments recognised in the P&L Account for operating leases is ₹ 0.91 Crs

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3.8 Accounting Standard 22 – Accounting for Taxes on Income

The bank has accounted for Income Tax in compliance with AS 22. Accordingly, Deferred Tax Assets & Liabilities are recognized. The major components of DTA/DTL are furnished as under:

(₹ in Crore)

Deferred Tax Components	Deferred Tax Assets		Deferred Tax Liabilities	
	2019-20	2018-19	2019-20	2018-19
Depreciation on fixed assets	0.01	0.16	NIL	NIL
Employee Benefits	0.26	0.21	NIL	NIL
Others	7.82	0.58	NIL	NIL
CLOSING BALANCE	**8.09**	**0.95**	**NIL**	**NIL**
Net DTA	**8.09**	**0.95**	**NIL**	**NIL**

3.9 Intangible Assets AS 26:

The Bank has followed AS 26 – Intangible asset issued by ICAI and the guidelines issued by the RBI in this regard.

3.10 Accounting Standard 28 – Impairment of Assets:

A substantial portion of the bank's assets comprises financial assets to which Accounting Standard 28 is not applicable. In the opinion of the bank management, there is no impairment of other assets as at 31st March 2020 requiring recognition in terms of the said standard.

3.11 Details of movement in provisions in accordance with Accounting Standard 29:

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Opening as on 01.04.2019	Provision made during the year	Provisions reversed/ adjusted	Closing as on 31.03.2020
Prov. for Standard Assets including Provision for Foreign Currency Unhedged	2.18	0.00	0.00	2.18
Prov. for Bad and Doubtful debts	1.32	2.82	0.00	4.14
Prov. for Income Tax (incl DTA)	27.47	5.41	3.25	29.63
Prov. for depreciation in market value of Investments	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Prov. for Other assets	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Counter cyclical buffer	9.90	1.63	0.00	11.53
Prov. for Restructured Advances & FITL	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Liability on account of outstanding forward exchange contracts

The Bank enters into foreign exchange contracts in its normal course of business to exchange currencies at a pre-fixed price at a future date. Forward exchange contracts are commitments to buy or sell foreign currency at a future date at the contracted rate. The notional amounts are recorded as Contingent Liabilities. With respect to the transactions entered into with its customers, the Bank generally enters into off-setting transactions in the interbank market. This results in generation of a higher number of outstanding transactions, and hence a large value of gross notional principal of the portfolio, while the net market risk is lower.

Guarantees given on behalf of constituents, acceptances, endorsements and other obligations

As a part of its commercial Banking activities, the Bank issues documentary credits and guarantees on behalf of its customers. Documentary credits enhance the credit standing of the customers of the Bank. Guarantees generally represent irrevocable assurances that the Bank will make payment in the event of the customer failing to fulfil its financial or performance obligations.

4 Additional Disclosures

4.1 Provisions and Contingencies:

Break up of 'Provisions & Contingencies' shown under the head Expenditure in Profit & Loss Account

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
Provision towards Standard Asset	NIL	NIL
Provision towards NPA	2.82	0.73
Provision for MAT Credit	0.00	NIL
Provision for depreciation in market value of Investments	0.00	(0.32)
Provision for Restructured Advances (Economic sacrifice) & FITL	0.00	NIL
Provision for Foreign Currency Unhedged	0.00	NIL
Floating Provision on advances	1.63	1.51
Provision for Other Assets	0.00	NIL
Sub Total	**4.45**	**1.92**
Provision for Income Tax (Incl of deferred tax)	5.41	12.38
Total	**9.86**	**14.30**

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4.2 Movement of Counter Cyclical Provisioning Buffer

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
(a) Opening balance in the account	9.90	8.39
(b) Provision made in the accounting year	1.63	1.51
(c) Amount of drawdown made during the accounting year	0.00	NIL
(d) Closing balance in the account	11.53	9.90

4.3 Draw Down from Reserves

The bank has not utilized/drawn any amount from any of the reserve during the year under review.

4.4 Disclosure of complaints (As compiled by Management)

A. Customer Complaints:

(a) No. of complaints pending at the beginning of the year	NIL
(b) No. of complaints received during the year	NIL
(c) No. of complaints redressed during the year	NIL
(d) No. of complaints pending at the end of the year	NIL

ATM complaints through Dispute Management Systems (DMS)- NPCI

(a) No. of complaints pending at the beginning of the year	NIL
(b) No. of complaints received during the year	NIL
(c) No. of complaints redressed during the year	NIL
(d) No. of complaints pending at the end of the year	NIL

B. Awards passed by the Banking Ombudsman.

(a) No. of unimplemented Awards at the beginning of the year	NIL
(b) No. of Awards Passed by the Banking Ombudsmen during the year	NIL
(c) No. of Awards implemented during the year	NIL
(d) No. of unimplemented Awards at the end of the year	NIL

4.5 Disclosure of Letters of Comfort (LOCs) issued by Banks

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	Amount
Letters of comfort issued in earlier years and outstanding as on 01-04-2019	NIL
Add: Letters of Comfort issued during FY 2019-20	NIL
Less: Letters of Comfort expired during FY 2019-20	NIL
Letters of Comfort Outstanding as on 31-03-2020	NIL

4.6 Provisioning Coverage ratio

The provision coverage ratio of the Bank as on 31.03.2020 is 100%.

4.7 Bancassurance Business:

Fees, remuneration received from Banc assurance business:

NIL

4.8 Concentration of Deposits, Advances, Exposures and NPAs

4.8.1 Concentration of Deposits

(₹ in Crore)

Total Deposits of twenty largest depositors	130.81
Percentage of Deposits of twenty largest depositors to Total Deposits of the bank	53.82%

4.8.2 Concentration of Advances

(₹ in Crore)

Total Advances to twenty largest borrowers	287.77
Percentage of Advances to twenty largest borrowers to Total Advances of the bank (%)	83.30

4.8.3 Concentration of Exposures

(₹ in Crore)

Total Exposure to twenty largest borrowers/customers	387.38
Percentage of Exposures to twenty largest borrowers/customers to Total Exposure of the bank on borrowers/customers (%)	79.66

4.8.4 Concentration of NPAs

(₹ in Crore)

Total Exposure to top four NPA accounts	20.13

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Sector-wise Advances

(₹ in Crore)

Sl. No	Sector	2019-2020			2018-2019		
		O/s Total Advances	Gross NPA	% of Gross NPAs to Total Advances in that Sector	O/s Total Advances	Gross NPA	% of Gross NPAs to Total Advances in that Sector
(A)	**Priority Sector**						
1.	Agriculture and allied activities	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
2.	Industries	114.80	1.26	0.87	101.07	3.46	3.39
3.	Services	30.05	0.06	0.04	0.34	0.06	0.06
4.	Personal & other Loans	0.47	NIL	0.00	0.70	NIL	NIL
	Sub Total (A)	**145.32**	**1.32**	**0.91**	**102.11**	**3.52**	**3.45**
(B)	**Non Priority Sector**						
1.	Agriculture and allied activities	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
2.	Industries	33.46	NIL	NIL	30.83	NIL	NIL
3.	Services	23.55	NIL	NIL	27.85	NIL	NIL
4.	Personal Loans	0.70	NIL	NIL	0.67	NIL	NIL
5.	Others	142.40	18.81	9.40	141.43	NIL	NIL
	Sub Total (B)	**200.11**	**18.81**	**9.40**	**200.78**	**NIL**	**NIL**
	Total (A+B)	**345.43**	**20.13**	**5.83**	**302.89**	**3.52**	**1.16**

4.10 Movement of NPAs

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	2019-2020	2018-2019
Gross NPAs as on 1st April 2019 (Opening Balance)	3.45	0.97
Additions (Fresh NPAs) during the year	18.81	3.04
Sub-total (A)	**22.26**	**4.01**
Less:-		
(i) Upgradations	NIL	Nil
(ii) Recoveries (excluding recoveries made from upgraded accounts)	2.13	0.18
(iii) Technical/Prudential write offs	0.00	0.38
(iv) Write-offs other than those under (iii) above	0.00	NIL
Sub-total (B)	**2.13**	**0.56**
Gross NPAs as on 31st March 2020 (closing balance) (A-B)	**20.13**	**3.45**

4.10.1 Details of Technical write-offs and recoveries made:

(₹ in Crore)

Particulars	2019-2020	2018-2019
Opening balance of Technical/Prudential written off accounts as at 1st April 2019	0.38	NIL
Add: Technical/Prudential write offs during the year	0.00	0.38
Sub Total (A)	**0.38**	**0.38**
Less: Recoveries/ Reduction made from previously technical/prudential written-off accounts during the year (B)	0.00	NIL
Closing balance as on 31st March 2020 (A-B)	**0.38**	**0.38**

4.11 Disclosures on Flexible Structuring of Existing Loans

Period	No. of borrowers taken up for flexibly structuring	Amount of loans taken up for flexible structuring		Exposure weighted average duration of loans taken up for flexible structuring	
		Classified as Standard	Classified as NPA	Before applying flexible structuring	After applying flexible structuring
2018-19	NIL				
2019-20					

4.12 Disclosures on Strategic Debt Restructuring Scheme (accounts which are currently under the stand-still period):

(₹ in Crore)

No. of accounts where SDR has been invoked	Amount outstanding as on the reporting date 31.3.2020		Amount outstanding as on the reporting date with respect to accounts where conversion of debt to equity is pending		Amount outstanding as on the reporting date with respect to accounts where conversion of debt to equity has taken place	
	Classified as standard	Classified as NPA	Classified as standard	Classified as NPA	Classified as standard	Classified as NPA
NIL						

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4.13 Disclosures on Change in Ownership outside SDR Scheme (accounts which are currently under the stand-still period):

(₹ in Crore)

No. of accounts where banks have decided to effect change in ownership	Amount outstanding as on the reporting date 31.3.2020		Amount outstanding as on the reporting date with respect to accounts where conversion of debt to equity/invocation of pledge of equity shares is pending		Amount outstanding as on the reporting date with respect to accounts where conversion of debt to equity/invocation of pledge of equity shares has taken place		Amount outstanding as on the reporting date with respect to accounts where change in ownership is envisaged by issuance of fresh shares or sale of promoters equity	
	Classified as Standard	Classified as NPA	Classified as Standard	Classified as NPA	Classified as Standard	Classified as NPA	Classified as Standard	Classified as NPA
NIL								

4.14 Disclosures on Change in Ownership of Projects Under Implementation (accounts which are currently under the stand-still period):

No. of project loan accounts where banks have decided to effect change in ownership	Amount outstanding as on the reporting date		
	Classified as standard	Classified as standard restructured	Classified as NPA
NIL			

4.15 Disclosures on the scheme for Sustainable Structuring of Stressed assets (S4A), as on 31.3.2020.

(₹ in Crore)

No. of accounts where S4A has been applied	Aggregate amount outstanding	Amount outstanding		Provision Held
		Part A	Part B	
Classified as Standard		NIL		
Classified as NPA		NIL		

4.16 Disclosure in the "Notes to Accounts" to the Financial Statements – Divergence in the asset classification and provisioning

There was no provisioning requirement due to divergence observed by RBI for the financial year 2019-20 in respect of bank's asset classification and provisioning under extant prudential norms on income recognition, asset classification and provisioning (IRACP). Hence, no disclosure is required to be made under DBR.BP.BC.No.63/21.04.018/2016-17 dated April 18, 2017.

4.17 Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning pertaining to Advances – Spread Over of Shortfall on Sale of NPAs to SCs/RCs

NIL

4.18 Overseas Assets, NPAs and Revenue

Particulars	(₹ in Crore)
Total Assets	Nil
Total NPAs	Nil
Total Revenue	Nil

4.19 Off-balance Sheet SPVs sponsored

Name of the SPV sponsored	
Domestic	Overseas
Nil	Nil

4.20 Disclosure on Remuneration:

a. Qualitative disclosures:

<table>
<tr><td>(a)</td><td>Information relating to the composition and mandate of the Remuneration Committee.</td><td>The committee is set up at Head office level and no such committee in India</td></tr>
<tr><td>(b)</td><td>Information relating to the design and structure of remuneration processes and the key features and objectives of remuneration policy</td><td rowspan="3">Key Features:
Compensation packages are approved by Head office based on the performance, responsibility and accountability of key personnel</td></tr>
<tr><td>(c)</td><td>Description of the ways in which current and future risks are taken into account in the remuneration processes. It should include the nature and type of the key measures used to take account of these risks</td></tr>
<tr><td>(d)</td><td>Description of the ways in which the bank seeks to link performance during a performance measurement period with level of remuneration</td></tr>
<tr><td>(e)</td><td>A discussion of the bank's policy on deferral and vesting of variable remuneration and a discussion of the bank's policy and criteria for adjusting deferred remuneration before vesting and after vesting</td><td>Performance allowance based on level achievement of approved targets fixed by Head Office</td></tr>
<tr><td>(f)</td><td>Description of the different forms of variable remuneration (i.e. cash, shares, ESOPs and other forms) that the bank utilizes and the rationale for using these different forms.</td><td>Performance incentive and ex gratia</td></tr>
</table>

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b. Quantitative disclosures:

	Particulars	2019-20	2018-19
(g)	Number of meeting held by the remuneration committee during the financial year and remuneration paid its members	1	1
(h)	(i) Number of employees having received a variable remuneration award during the financial year.	1	1
	(ii) Number and total amount sign-on awards made during the financial year.	Nil	Nil
	(iii) a. Details of guaranteed bonus, if any, paid as joining/Sign on bonus.	Nil	Nil
	b. Details of performance Bonus/Allowance (in crs)	Nil	Nil
	(iv) Details of severance pay, in addition to accrued benefits, if any.	Nil	Nil
(i)	(i) Total amount of outstanding deferred remuneration, split into cash, shares and shares–linked instruments and other forms.	Nil	Nil
	(ii) Total amount of deferred remuneration paid out in the financial year.	Nil	Nil
(j)	Breakdown of amount remuneration awards for the financial year to show fixed and variable, deferred and non-deferred.	0.74	0.68
(k)	(i) Total amount of outstanding deferred remuneration and retained remuneration exposed to ex-post explicit and/or implicit adjustments.	Nil	Nil
	(ii) Total amount of reductions during the financial year due to ex-post explicit adjustments.	Nil	Nil
	(iii) Total amount of reductions during the financial year due to ex-post implicit adjustments.	Nil	Nil

4.22 Disclosures relating to securitization: NA

4.23 Credit Default Swaps: NIL

4.24 Intra-Group Exposure:

	Particulars	FY 2019-20
(a)	Total amount of intra-group exposures	34.44
(b)	Total amount of top-20 intra-group exposures	34.44
(c)	Percentage of intra-group exposures to total exposure of the bank on borrowers/customers	7.09
(d)	Details of breach of limits on intra-group exposures and regulatory action thereon, if any.	NIL

4.25 Transfers to Depositors Education and Awareness Fund (DEAF): (₹ in Crore)

Particulars	FY2019-20	FY2018-19
Opening balance of amounts transferred to DEAF	0.54	0.53
Add: Amounts Transferred to DEAF during the year	1.24	0.01
Less: Amounts reimbursed by DEAF towards claims	0.17	NIL
Closing balance of amounts transferred to DEAF	1.61	0.54

4.26 Unhedged Foreign Currency Exposure:

The bank has estimated and provided towards the liability for Unhedged Foreign Currency Exposure (UFCE) of their constituents in terms of RBI Circular No. DBOD.NO.BP.BC.85/21.06.200/2013-14 dated 15th January 2014 and the total provision held as of 31st March 2020 is 0.51 Crs.(PY 0.51 Crs) furnished:

4.27 Details of Frauds occurred and Provision made during the year:

As per RBI Circular No.DBR. No. BP.BC.92/21.04.048/2015-16 dated April 18, 2016 required details are furnished:

(a)	Number of Fraud cases reported during the year	Nil
(b)	Amount involved (₹ in Crore)	Nil
(c)	Quantum of Provision made	Nil
(d)	Quantum of unamortized Provision debited from 'Other Reserves' (₹ in Crore)	Nil

5.1 Liquidity Coverage Ratio: (₹ in Crore)

		2019-20		2018-19	
		Total Weighted Value (Average)	Total Unweighted Value (Average)	Total Weighted Value (Average)	Total Unweighted Value (Average)
	High Quality Liquid Assets				
1	**Total High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA)**	**15.65**	**15.65**	**22.85**	**22.85**
	Cash Outflows				
2	**Retail deposits and deposits from small business customers, of which**	**12.85**	**129.06**	**12.07**	**121.70**
	(i) Stable Deposits	0.06	1.15	0.09	1.82
	(ii) Less stable Deposits	12.79	127.90	11.98	119.88
3	**Unsecured wholesale funding, of which:**	**23.26**	**74.47**	**8.03**	**41.81**
	(i) Operational deposits (all counterparties)	12.89	51.58	1.62	16.18
	(ii) Non-operational deposits (all counterparties)	10.37	22.89	6.41	25.63
	(iii) Unsecured debt	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
4	**Secured Wholesale funding**				

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		2019-20		2018-19	
		Total Weighted Value (Average)	Total Unweighted Value (Average)	Total Weighted Value (Average)	Total Unweighted Value (Average)
5.	**Additional requirements, of which**	**NIL**	**NIL**	**NIL**	**NIL**
	(i) Outflows related to derivative exposures and other collateral requirements	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
	(ii) Outflows related to loss of funding on debt products	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
	(iii) Credit and Liquidity facilities	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
6	Other contractual funding obligations	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
7	Other contingent funding obligations	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
8	**Total Cash Outflows**	**36.11**	**203.53**	**20.10**	**163.51**
Cash Inflows					
9	Secured lending (e.g. reverse repos)	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
10	Inflows from fully performing exposures	46.97	51.97	NIL	NIL
11	Other cash inflows	0.11	0.11	NIL	NIL
12	**Total Cash Inflows**	**47.08**	**52.08**	**NIL**	**NIL**
13	**TOTAL HQLA**	**15.65**		**22.85**	
14	**Total Net Cash Outflows**	**-10.97**		**163.51**	
15	**% of Total Cash Outflow**	**9.02**		**5.02**	
16	**Liquidity Coverage Ratio (%)**	**173.40**		**113.68**	

5.2 Qualitative disclosure around LCR

Based on RBI guidelines issued during June, 2014 and also other circulars subsequently thereon, the Bank has been computing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio with effect from 01st January, 2015. As per these guidelines, the Bank has high quality liquid assets (HQLA) in Level 1 and Level 2A/2B. As on 31.03.2020, the Bank has Rs. 15.65 Cr of HQLAs, consisting fully of Level – 1 type of assets in the form of surplus SLR investments/Excess CRR and Cash in Hand.

As on 31.03.2020, after applying the respective haircuts as mentioned by RBI guidelines on LCR, the Bank has total amount of Rs. 35.67 Cr of cash outflows in the form of retail and unsecured wholesale funding.

5.3 Exposure to ILFS

The bank is not having any exposure towards Infrastructure Leasing Finance Company.

5.4 Implementation of Resolution Plan

As per RBI directive revised framework for resolution of stressed assets vide the RBI circular DBR.NO.BP.BC.101/21.4.048/2017-2018 dated February 12, 2018, bank does not have any borrower who has aggregate exposure of Rs 20 Billion and is classified as NIL.

5.5 Impact of COVID-19

a) The SARS-CoV-2 virus responsible for COVID-19 continues to spread across the globe and India which has resulted in a significant volatility in global and Indian financial markets and a significant decline in global and domestic economic activities. On March 11, 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak was declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization. The Government of India had announced a series of lockdown measures from 24th March 2020 onwards which have been extended from time to time up to 31st July 2020. Govt of India has directed a calibrated and gradual withdrawal of lockdown and partial resumption of economic activity in spite of some of the major economic centres still continuing under strict lockdown. The revival of economic activities largely depends upon the intensity and spread of the disease, Govt stimulus packages and regulatory relief measures. The Bank has satisfactory capital and adequate liquidity to support its business growth which has already been moderated having regard to effects of COVID-19.

The extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic will impact the Bank's result will depend on future development which are highly uncertain including among other things any new information concerning the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and action to contain its spread or mitigate impact including stimulus and regulatory packages.

b) In accordance with the 'COVID-19 Regulatory packages - Asset Classification and Provisioning.' announced by the RBI on 27th March 2020, 17th April 2020 and May 23 2020, with regard to providing relief to borrowers on account of COVID-19 pandemic whose accounts were standard as on 29th February 2020, the Bank, in accordance with the Board approved policy had offered moratorium on repayment of loan instalments and/or deferment of interest due between 1st March 2020 to 31st August 2020 including relaxation in certain parameters, to all the eligible borrowers, without considering the same as restructuring.

In accordance with the RBI guidelines, the Bank is required to make provision @ 10% of outstanding advances over two quarters beginning with quarter ended 31st March 2020 in respect of such borrower accounts where asset classification benefit has been taken as per the RBI guidelines, However offering of moratorium on repayment of loan instalments and/or deferment of interest due between 1st March 2020 to 31st August 2020 to borrowers had not resulted in any change in asset classification. Hence Nil provision will be required as per RBI Circular on COVID-19 Regulatory packages – Asset Classification and Provisioning.

5.6 The branch has initiated steps to register as a branch office under the Companies Act 2013 based on the expert opinion taken with regard to the applicability of Provision of Chapter XXII of the Companies Act 2013 with effect from February 2018. As the Board was reconstituted in Srilanka, the documentation in this regard in still under process. Meanwhile, due to the lockdown on account of COVID-19, the process got further delayed and expected to be completed in the financial year 2020-21.

5.7 The Bank is in the process of registering as a branch office under the Companies Act, as referred in above Note 5.6. Accordingly, the Bank has initiated the process of evaluating and assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of the Bank's internal financial controls to ensure the compliance of Internal financial controls over financial reporting.

6. Previous year's figures have been regrouped/reclassified wherever considered necessary to conform to the current year's classification.

For **B.P.Rao & Co.,**
Chartered Accountants
FRN. 003116S

Sd/-
B Prasanna Achar
Partner
Membership No.202100

Sd/
D.S. MUTHUKUDAARACHCHI
Country Manager
Place : Chennai
Date : 30th July, 2020

BANK OF CEYLON

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DISCLOSURE UNDER THE NEW CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK (Basel III GUIDELINES) – Pillar 3 Disclosures BASEL –March 2020

Scope of Application

Disclosures in this report pertaining to Bank of Ceylon, Chennai Branch. The Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR) of the branch is as under:

	Basel III
CRAR %	**33.66**
CRAR- Tier 1 Capital %	**32.11**
CRAR- Tier II Capital %	**1.25**

Table DF-1

1.1 Qualitative Disclosures:

Bank of Ceylon, Chennai is a branch of Sri Lankan State owned Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

1.2 Quantitative Disclosures:

The Bank's shares are entirely owned by the Government of Sri Lanka. The Chennai

Branch has no associates or subsidiaries in India.

List of group entities considered for consolidation – **NA**

The aggregate amount of capital deficiencies in subsidiaries – **NA**

The aggregate amount of the bank's total interest in insurance entities –**NA**

Restriction or impediments on transfer of funds or regulatory capital within the banking group – **NA**

Table DF-2

2.1 Qualitative Disclosures:

Interest free funds from Head Office are kept in a separate account in books, specifically for the purpose of meeting the Capital Adequacy norms, form the core of the Tier I Capital. Statutory Reserve built up over a period of years in the books of the branch, supplements the funds from Head Office. The branch has capitalized its retained profit to the extent of ₹15,62,90,000/- which has been treated as Tier I capital.

2.2 Quantitative Disclosures:

The Tier I capital of the Branch comprises of:

Particulars	**₹ in Crs**
Interest Free Funds from Head Office-Capital	119.37
Retained profit capitalization	15.63
Statutory Reserve	44.30
Total	**179.30**
Amount deducted from Tier I capital	8.09
Total Tier I Capital	**171.20**

The Tier II Capital of the Branch Comprises of:

Particulars	**₹ in Crs**
General Provision for Standard Assets	2.18
General Reserve for Floating Provision	11.62
Total	**13.80**

* Tier II capital restricted to 1.25% of overall Risk ₹ **7.00** Crs

The total eligible capital comprises:

Particulars	**₹ in Crs**
Tier-I Capital	171.21
Tier-II Capital	7.00
Total Capital	**178.21**

Table DF-3

3. Capital Adequacy

3.1 Qualitative Disclosures:

The Branch maintains funds from Head Office and Statutory Reserves as per Indian Regulations as a cushion towards the risk of loss in value of exposure and businesses etc., to protect the interest of the stake holders, more particularly, the depositors.

The Branch assesses periodically capital requirements and suitably designs its policy, strategy, business level and composition of business. Towards this, bank has evolved an Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) framework with the and the same has been approved by Head office.

In line with RBI guidelines, the bank has adopted following approaches for implementation of New Capital Adequacy Framework- Basel III

- Standardised Approach for Credit Risk
- Basic indicator Approach for Operational Risk
- Standardised Duration Approach for Market Risk

3.2 Quantitative Disclosures

A summary of the bank's capital requirements for Credit, Market and Operational Risk and the capital adequacy ratio as on 31st March, 2020 is given as hereunder:

(₹ in Crs)

	RWA*	**Min. Cap. Required**
Capital requirements for Credit Risk	456.00	41.04
Capital Requirements for Market Risk	49.45	4.45
Capital Requirements for Operational Risk	53.07	4.78
Total	**554.61**	**50.27**
Tier I capital in (₹ in Crs)		**171.14**
Tier II capital (₹ in Crs)		**8.00**
Total		**179.14**
CRAR		**33.36**

* RWA = Risk Weighted Assets

General Qualitative Disclosures:

The branch has a risk policy taking in to account the risk dimensions of the local economy and the bank's risk appetite.

The Branch has an Asset & Liability Management Committee, Credit Committee, Risk management committee & other Committee headed by the Country Manager and others and the minutes of the meeting are tabled before the Local Advisory Board.

Credit Risk:

Credit Risk covers the inability of a borrower or counter party to honour commitments on due date in respect of the payment of interest and installments.

The branch is exposed to Credit Risk through lending and investment activities. The Branch has a credit policy which strives to cover credit risk measurement, monitoring and controlling mechanisms to the required extent, given its manpower and financial resources. Local Advisory Board advises for the functioning of the branch. The credit appraisal made during the year is placed before LAB for review.

Credit Granting Process

The Policy of the bank covers

- Due Diligence criteria
- KYC norms
- Method of assessment of finance
- Minimum credit Standards
- Internal rating System

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Credit Monitoring System

Credit monitoring is an ongoing continuous process. The process includes-

– Periodical review of borrowed accounts
– Periodical direct visits to the borrowed units
– Different hierarchical level of monitoring

Credit Rating Framework

The Branch applies an internal rating model which is fine tuned as and when required. Migration analysis of rating is placed before LAB at quarterly intervals.

Credit Concentration Risk

The Branch periodically reviews its loan portfolio so as to reduce concentration in any area. Credit Risk appetite is defined through annual budget process. The ICAAP of the bank for the year clearly spell out the credit concentration risk and the residual risk.

Risk Profiling

Bank profiles the risk by constantly reviewing

– Exposure to Single/ Group borrowers
– Exposure to sensitive Sectors
– Exposure to unsecured advances and guarantees

Market Risk

Market Risk management covers Treasury and ALM policy. There is a clear demarcation between front, mid and back offices. Various limits to Forex operations are prescribed. The branch does not deal in Equity market. The branch has set up a Mid office to monitor the Var, Pv01 AGL, IGL and stop loss limit.

Operational Risk:

Operational risk is managed through internal control system, the process of Concurrent Audit, Credit Audit conducted by Head Office and Statutory Audit by an External Auditor. The bank has a separate Internal Control Department to monitor day to day transaction on regular basis.

Table DF-4

4.1 Qualitative Disclosures

Credit Risk

Over Due:- Any amount due to the bank under any credit facility is “Over Due” if it is not paid on the due date fixed by the branch.

Impaired assets are identified as per the prudential norms prescribed by the Regulator. The bank also generates report on daily basis to monitor special mention accounts and the report is submitted to the Country Manger for perusal.

4.2 Quantitative Disclosures

The total gross credit risk exposures are:

Particulars	₹ in Cr
Fund Based	442.34
Non Fund Based	58.44
Total	500.78
Gross NPA	20.05
Net NPA	**15.98**

The NPA ratios are:

Particulars	In %
Gross NPA to Gross advance	5.80%
Net NPA’s to Net Advance	**4.68%**

The Movement of Gross NPA is as under

(₹ in Cr)

Particulars	Amount
Opening Balance as at 01.04.2019	3.45
Additions	18.81
Reductions	2.13
Closing balance as at 31.03.2020	20.13

The Movement of Provision for Net NPA is as under

(₹ in Cr)

Particulars	Amount
Opening Balance as at 01.04.2019	1.32
Provision made during the year	2.82
Reductions	0.00
Closing Balance as at 31.03.2020	4.14

The amount of Non-Performing Investments is NIL

The movement of provision for depreciation on Investments as under:

(₹ in Cr)

Particulars	Amount
Opening Balance as on 01.04.2019	0.00
Add: Provision made during the year	0.00
Less: Write-off/Write back of excess provision during the year	0.00
Closing balance as on 31.03.2020	0.00

Industry Type Distribution of Credit

Industry Type Distribution of Credit	Fund Based (₹ in Cr)	Non-Fund Based (₹ in Cr)
Real Estate (incl.Hotels and Resorts)	72.47	0.00
Trading	114.84	36.38
Non-Banking Finance	0.00	0.00
Iron & Steel	26.46	0.43
Textiles	12.05	0.00
Leather & Leather Products	6.67	0.27
Gems & Jewellery	0.00	0.00
Others	112.94	35.14
Total	**345.43**	**72.22**

Table DF-5

5.1 Qualitative Disclosures:

Large Corporates are encouraged to seek ratings from approved external rating agencies. The Internal rating system supports the branch in identifying credit risk.

5.2 Quantitative Disclosures:

The exposure amounts after risk mitigation in different risk buckets are:

S No	Particulars	Amount ₹ in lakhs
a)	Below 100 % risk weight exposure outstanding	24,265.42
b)	100% risk weight exposure outstanding	42,126.26
c)	More than 100 % risk weight exposure outstanding	809.42
	Total	**67,201.10**

Table DF-6

Credit Risk Mitigation

6.1 Qualitative Disclosures:

The Branch seeks different collaterals and guarantee as risk mitigants.

Eligible collaterals include

– cash or cash equivalents (bank deposits)/NSCs/LIC Policy
– movable and immovable assets
– corporate guarantees, bank and personal guarantees
– ECGC guarantees wherever applicable

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6.2 Quantitative Disclosures

Under the standardized approach for credit risk, the total credit exposure after giving effect to eligible risk mitigants amounting to ₹ 35.67 Crs.

Table DF-7

Securitisation:

At present the branch does not have any securitisation exposure.

Table DF-8

Market risk in Trading Book

8.1 Qualitative Disclosures

Market Risk covers both "On" and "Off" Balance Sheet items when they are affected by movements in interest rates and equity markets, caused by exchange rates, commodity and asset prices.

The portfolios covered by the standardized approach for computation of market risk are as under:

(₹ in Crs)

Securities under Held-For-Trading	Nil
Securities held under Available-for-sale	35.47
Open Foreign exchange position Limit	32.50

The rest of the assets in investments held under Held-For-Maturity portfolio and advances are treated as banking book.

Market Risk management Strategies and Processes

Policies

Bank has a Treasury policy covering Investments, Foreign Exchange Operations and Asset Liability Management. The policies ensure that operations in securities and foreign exchange are conducted in accordance with sound and acceptable business practices and are as per the extant regulatory guidelines. The policies are reviewed periodically to incorporate changes that come about in the business environment including the rules and regulations of the regulatory authorities.

Liquidity Risk

The Branch tracks the liquidity risk through maturity or cash flow mismatches captured under selected maturity dates termed as 'time buckets'.

Interest Rate Risk

The branch applies Traditional Gap Analysis (TGA) and Duration Gap Analysis (DGA) to assess the impact on the Net Interest income and impact on bank equity.

Foreign Exchange Risk

The branch has various exposure limits which are being monitored on a daily basis. The branch has a cap on open position as well.

Equity Price Risk

As of now the bank has no equity holding. In the event the bank decides to deal in equity, limit will be fixed in Trading Book, Deal Size, Holding Period and Stop Loss.

Structure and Organization of Risk Management Function

The Branch has policies approved by the Board of Directors. The following bodies assist in ensuring the compliance of the policies

- Local Advisory Board
- Asset and Liability Management Committee
- Head Office Audit Committee
- Risk management Committee

8.2 Quantitative Disclosures

Bank has adopted the Standardised Duration approach as prescribed by RBI for computation of capital charge for market risk. The capital requirements for market risk are as under:

(₹ in Lakhs)

Risk category	Capital charge
Interest Rate Risk	107.18
Equity Position Risk	0.00
Foreign Exchange Risk	288.45
Total Capital Charge	395.63

Table DF-9

Operational Risk

9.1 Qualitative Disclosures

Operational risk is the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external factors. Operational risk exists at all levels and at all business lines. A board approved Operational Risk management Policy is being followed.

The Branch has put in place the following measures to control/mitigate operational risks.

- System of delegated authority covering all credit and expenditure
- Issuance of instructions and circulars
- Training programmes

Bank has an Organizational structure suitable to its size which identifies, assesses, monitors and controls operational risks. The Concurrent audit & Head Office internal audit system supplements the oversight mechanism.

The Branch measures the operational risk under the Basic Indicator Approach.

9.2 Quantitative Disclosures:

As per RBI directives, the bank has adopted the Basic Indicator Approach and the capital charge under the same is ₹ 424.56 lakhs.

Table DF-10

Interest Rate Risk in Banking Book

10.1 Qualitative disclosures

Interest Rate Risk is the risk where changes in market interest rates might affect adversely the financial condition of the branch resulting in the Net Interest Income being impacted along with the net worth. Bank holds assets, liabilities and off-balance Sheet items with different maturity dates and linked to different benchmark rates. This creates exposure to unexpected changes in level of interest rates.

Framework

Bank has an Asset –Liability Management Committee which is responsible for identifying liquidity and market risks. The top management periodically reviews the observations /recommendations of the ALCO desk. Interest rate sensitivity is also done. Being a small outfit with limited resources and with about 70 % of its deposits remaining core, the bank on day to day basis is aware of the market trends and responds suitably to changing situations. Thus the behavioral pattern of the depositors is factored during this direct monitoring. This is true when the working capital facilities extended by the bank are considered. The Branch carries out Duration Gap Analysis as well.

10.2 Quantitative Disclosures

The economic value, that is the impact on Capital Fund due to change in interest rate would be assessed through Modified Duration Gap method. The bank is in the process of fixing the limits for net duration gap of the assets and liabilities so as to monitor the same at regular intervals. As mentioned earlier, with the volume being low the bank carries on with the monitoring aspect using the "Hands On" approach.

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Table DF-11: Composition of Capital
Part II: Template to be used before March 31, 2020
(i.e. during the transition period of Basel III regulatory adjustments)

(₹ in Crs)

	Basel III common disclosure template to be used during the transition of regulatory adjustments		**Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment**	**Ref No.**
Common Equity Tier 1 capital: instruments and reserves				
1	Directly issued qualifying common share capital plus related stock surplus (share premium) (funds from Head office)	119.37		
2	Retained earnings (Not repatriable)	15.63		
3	Accumulated other comprehensive income (and other reserves)	44.30		
4	*Directly issued capital subject to phase out from CET1 (only applicable to non-joint stock companies)*	----		
	Public sector capital injections grandfathered until January 1, 2019	----		
5	Common share capital issued by subsidiaries and held by third parties (amount allowed in group CET1)	-----		
6	**Common Equity Tier 1 capital before regulatory adjustments**	179.30		
	Common Equity Tier 1 capital: regulatory adjustments			
7	Prudential valuation adjustments	---		
8	Goodwill (net of related tax liability)	---		
9	Intangibles other than mortgage-servicing rights (net of related tax liability)	---		
10	Deferred tax assets	---		
11	Cash-flow hedge reserve	--		
12	Shortfall of provisions to expected losses	---		
13	Securitisation gain on sale	--		
14	Gains and losses due to changes in own credit risk on fair valued liabilities	---		
15	Defined-benefit pension fund net assets			
16	Investments in own shares (if not already netted off paid-in capital on reported balance sheet)	--		
17	Reciprocal cross-holdings in common equity	---		
18	Investments in the capital of banking, financial and insurance entities that are outside the scope of regulatory consolidation, net of eligible short positions, where the bank does not own more than 10% of the issued share capital (amount above 10% threshold)	---		
19	Significant investments in the common stock of banking, financial and insurance entities that are outside the scope of regulatory consolidation, net of eligible short positions (amount above 10% threshold)	---		
20	Mortgage servicing rights (amount above 10% threshold)	---		
21	Deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences (amount above 10% threshold, net of related tax liability)			
22	Amount exceeding the 15% threshold	---		
23	of which: significant investments in the common stock of financial entities	---		
24	of which: mortgage servicing rights	---		
25	of which: deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences	8.09		
26	National specific regulatory adjustments (26a+26b+26c+26d)	---		
26a	*of which:* Investments in the equity capital of the unconsolidated insurance subsidiaries	---		
26b	*of which:* Investments in the equity capital of unconsolidated non-financial subsidiaries	---		
26c	*of which:* Shortfall in the equity capital of majority owned financial entities which have not been consolidated with the bank	---		
26d	*of which:* Unamortised pension funds expenditures	---		
	Regulatory Adjustments Applied to Common Equity Tier 1 in respect of Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment	---	---	
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT] For example: filtering out of unrealised losses on AFS debt securities (not relevant in Indian context)	-----		
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT]	----		
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT]			

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(₹ in Crs)

	Basel III common disclosure template to be used during the transition of regulatory adjustments		Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment	Ref No.
27	Regulatory adjustments applied to Common Equity Tier 1 due to insufficient Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 to cover deductions			
28	**Total regulatory adjustments to Common equity Tier 1**			
29	**Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1)**			171.21
	Additional Tier 1 capital: instruments			
30	Directly issued qualifying Additional Tier 1 instruments plus related stock surplus (31+32)	------		
31	of which: classified as equity under applicable accounting standards (Perpetual Non-Cumulative Preference Shares)	-------		
32	of which: classified as liabilities under applicable accounting standards (Perpetual debt Instruments)	--------		
33	*Directly issued capital instruments subject to phase out from Additional Tier 1*	-------		
34	Additional Tier 1 instruments (and CET1 instruments not included in row 5) issued by subsidiaries and held by third parties (amount allowed in group AT1)	--------		
35	*of which: instruments issued by subsidiaries subject to phase out*	-------		
36	**Additional Tier 1 capital before regulatory adjustments**	----		
	Additional Tier 1 capital: regulatory adjustments			
37	Investments in own Additional Tier 1 instruments	---		
38	Reciprocal cross-holdings in Additional Tier 1 instruments	----		
39	Investments in the capital of banking, financial and insurance entities that are outside the scope of regulatory consolidation, net of eligible short positions, where the bank does not own more than 10% of the issued common share capital of the entity (amount above 10% threshold)	-----		
40	Significant investments in the capital of banking, financial and insurance entities that are outside the scope of regulatory consolidation (net of eligible short positions)	------		
41	National specific regulatory adjustments (41a+41b)	------		
41a	Investments in the Additional Tier 1 capital of unconsolidated insurance subsidiaries	-----		
41b	Shortfall in the Additional Tier 1 capital of majority owned financial entities which have not been consolidated with the bank	-----		
	Regulatory Adjustments Applied to Additional Tier 1 in respect of Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment	----		
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT e.g. DTAs]	------		
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT e.g. existing adjustments which are deducted from Tier 1 at 50%]	---		
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT]	-----		
42	Regulatory adjustments applied to Additional Tier 1 due to insufficient Tier 2 to cover deductions	-----		
43	**Total regulatory adjustments to Additional Tier 1 capital**	----		
44	**Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1)**	-----		
44a	**Additional Tier 1 capital reckoned for capital adequacy**	-----		
45	**Tier 1 capital (T1 = CET1 + AT1) (29 + 44a)**	171.21		
	Tier 2 capital: instruments and provisions			
46	Directly issued qualifying Tier 2 instruments plus related stock surplus	----		
47	Directly issued capital instruments subject to phase out from Tier 2	----		
48	Tier 2 instruments (and CET1 and AT1 instruments not included in rows 5 or 34) issued by subsidiaries and held by third parties (amount allowed in group Tier 2)	-----		
49	*of which: instruments issued by subsidiaries subject to phase out*	------		
50	Provisions			
51	**Tier 2 capital before regulatory adjustments**	13.80		
	Tier 2 capital: regulatory adjustments			
52	Investments in own Tier 2 instruments	------		
53	Reciprocal cross-holdings in Tier 2 instruments	------		
54	Investments in the capital of banking, financial and insurance entities that are outside the scope of regulatory consolidation, net of eligible short positions, where the bank does not own more than 10% of the issued common share capital of the entity (amount above the 10% threshold)	------		

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(₹ in Crs)

Basel III common disclosure template to be used during the transition of regulatory adjustments			Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment	Ref No.
55	Significant investments in the capital banking, financial and insurance entities that are outside the scope of regulatory consolidation (net of eligible short positions)	-----		
56	National specific regulatory adjustments (56a+56b)	-----		
56a	*of which:* Investments in the Tier 2 capital of unconsolidated subsidiaries	-----		
56b	*of which:* Shortfall in the Tier 2 capital of majority owned financial entities which have not been consolidated with the bank	------		
	Regulatory Adjustments Applied To Tier 2 in respect of Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment	------		
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT e.g. existing adjustments which are deducted from Tier 2 at 50%]	-----		
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT			
57	**Total regulatory adjustments to Tier 2 capital**	13.80		
58	**Tier 2 capital (T2)**	13.80		
58a	**Tier 2 capital reckoned for capital adequacy**	7.00		
58b	**Excess Additional Tier 1 capital reckoned as Tier 2 capital**	0.00		
58c	**Total Tier 2 capital admissible for capital adequacy (58a + 58b)**	7.00		
59	**Total capital (TC = T1 + T2) (45 + 58c)**			
	Risk Weighted Assets in respect of Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment			
	of which: [INSERT TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT]			
	of which: …			
60	**Total risk weighted assets (60a + 60b + 60c)**	558.53		
60a	*of which: total credit risk weighted assets*	456.01		
60b	*of which: total market risk weighted assets*	49.45		
60c	*of which: total operational risk weighted assets*	53.07		
	Capital ratios			
61	Common Equity Tier 1 (as a percentage of risk weighted assets)			
62	Tier 1 (as a percentage of risk weighted assets)			
63	Total capital (as a percentage of risk weighted assets)			
64	Institution specific buffer requirement (minimum CET1 requirement plus capital conservation and countercyclical buffer requirements, expressed as a percentage of risk weighted assets)	----		
65	of which: capital conservation buffer requirement	------		
66	of which: bank specific countercyclical buffer requirement	-------		
67	of which: G-SIB buffer requirement	------		
68	Common Equity Tier 1 available to meet buffers (as a percentage of risk weighted assets)	-----		
	National minima (if different from Basel III)			
69	National Common Equity Tier 1 minimum ratio (if different from Basel III minimum)	5.50%		
70	National Tier 1 minimum ratio (if different from Basel III minimum)	7.00%		
71	National total capital minimum ratio (if different from Basel III minimum)	9.00%		
	Amounts below the thresholds for deduction (before risk weighting)			
72	Non-significant investments in the capital of other financial entities			
73	Significant investments in the common stock of financial entities			
74	Mortgage servicing rights (net of related tax liability)			
75	Deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences (net of related tax liability)			
	Applicable caps on the inclusion of provisions in Tier 2			
76	Provisions eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 in respect of exposures subject to standardised approach (prior to application of cap)	--		
77	Cap on inclusion of provisions in Tier 2 under standardised approach	---		
78	Provisions eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 in respect of exposures subject to internal ratings-based approach (prior to application of cap)	----		
79	Cap for inclusion of provisions in Tier 2 under internal ratings-based approach	----		
	Capital instruments subject to phase-out arrangements (only applicable between March 31, 2018 and March 31, 2022)			

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(₹ in Crs)

	Basel III common disclosure template to be used during the transition of regulatory adjustments		Amounts Subject to Pre-Basel III Treatment	Ref No.
80	*Current cap on CET1 instruments subject to phase out arrangements*	-----		
81	*Amount excluded from CET1 due to cap (excess over cap after redemptions and maturities)*	------		
82	*Current cap on AT1 instruments subject to phase out arrangements*	-----		
83	*Amount excluded from AT1 due to cap (excess over cap after redemptions and maturities)*	----		
84	*Current cap on T2 instruments subject to phase out arrangements*	---		
85	*Amount excluded from T2 due to cap (excess over cap after redemptions and maturities)*	----		

Notes to the Template

Row No. of the template	Particular	₹ in Crs
10	Deferred tax assets associated with accumulated losses	
	Deferred tax assets (excluding those associated with accumulated losses) net of Deferred tax liability	8.09
	Total as indicated in row 10	8.09
19	If investments in insurance subsidiaries are not deducted fully from capital and instead considered under 10% threshold for deduction, the resultant increase in the capital of bank	---
	of which: Increase in Common Equity Tier 1 capital	----
	of which: Increase in Additional Tier 1 capital	----
	of which: Increase in Tier 2 capital	-----
26b	If investments in the equity capital of unconsolidated non-financial subsidiaries are not deducted and hence, risk weighted then:	-----
	(i) Increase in Common Equity Tier 1 capital	-----
	(ii) Increase in risk weighted assets	----
44a	Excess Additional Tier 1 capital not reckoned for capital adequacy (difference between Additional Tier 1 capital as reported in row 44 and admissible Additional Tier 1 capital as reported in 44a)	----
	of which: Excess Additional Tier 1 capital which is considered as Tier 2 capital under row 58b	-----
50	Eligible Provisions included in Tier 2 capital	
	Eligible Revaluation Reserves included in Tier 2 capital	
	Total of row 50	
58a	Excess Tier 2 capital not reckoned for capital adequacy (difference between Tier 2 capital as reported in row 58 and T2 as reported in 58a)	

Table DF-12: Composition of Capital- Reconciliation Requirements

₹ in Crs

			Balance sheet as in financial statements	Balance sheet under regulatory scope of consolidation
			As on 31st March 2020	**As on 31st March 2020**
A	**Capital & Liabilities**			
	i	Paid-up Capital	135.00	
		Reserves & Surplus	111.82	
		Minority Interest		
		Total Capital	246.88	
	ii	Deposits	243.07	
		of which: Deposits from banks	51.58	
		of which: Customer deposits	191.48	
		of which: Other deposits (pl. specify)	0.00	
	iii	Borrowings	0.00	
		of which: From RBI	0.00	
		of which: From banks	0.00	
		of which: From other institutions & agencies	0.00	
		of which: Others (pl. specify)	0.00	
		of which: Capital instruments	0.00	
	iv	Other liabilities & provisions	18.80	
		Total	508.75	

BANK OF CEYLON

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₹ in Crs

			Balance sheet as in financial statements As on 31st March 2020	Balance sheet under regulatory scope of consolidation As on 31st March 2020
B				
	i	Cash and balances with Reserve Bank of India	9.12	
		Balance with banks and money at call and short notice	84.61	
	ii	Investments:	55.17	
		of which: Government securities	55.17	
		of which: Other approved securities		
		of which: Shares		
		of which: Debentures & Bonds		
		of which: Subsidiaries/Joint Ventures/Associates		
		of which: Others (Commercial Papers, Mutual Funds etc.)		
	iii	Loans and advances	341.38	
		of which: Loans and advances to banks	10.09	
		of which: Loans and advances to customers	331.29	
	iv	Fixed assets	1.51	
	v	Other assets	16.96	
		of which: Goodwill and intangible assets	0.00	
		of which: Deferred tax assets	8.09	
	vi	Goodwill on consolidation	0.00	
	vii	Debit balance in Profit & Loss account	0.00	
		Total Assets	508.75	

Extract of Basel III common disclosure template (with added column) – Table DF-11 (Part I / Part II whichever, applicable)

	Common Equity Tier 1 capital: instruments and reserves		
		Component of regulatory capital reported by bank	Source based on reference numbers/letters of the balance sheet under the regulatory scope of consolidation from step 2
1	Directly issued qualifying common share (and equivalent for non-joint stock companies) capital plus related stock surplus	171.21	
2	Retained earnings		
3	Accumulated other comprehensive income (and other reserves)		
4	Directly issued capital subject to phase out from CET1 (only applicable to non-joint stock companies)		
5	Common share capital issued by subsidiaries and held by third parties (amount allowed in group CET1)		
6	**Common Equity Tier 1 capital before regulatory adjustments**	171.21	
7	Prudential valuation adjustments		
8	Goodwill (net of related tax liability)		
9	Deferred tax asset		
	Common Equity Tier I capital		

Wholesale Price Index

The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate declined to -1.8% in June 2020 from 2.0% reported a year ago, but was lower than -3.2% a month ago. The index of primary articles fell by (-)1.2% against 6.4% registered a year ago, but was lower than -2.9% a month ago. The index for food articles decreased by 2.0% compared to 7.3% recorded a year ago, but was higher than 1.1% a month ago. The index for fuel and power declined by (-)13.6% against (-)2.1% reported a year ago. The index for manufactured products decreased by 0.1% compared to 1.0% registered a year ago.

Consumer Price Index

The CPI inflation rate increased to 6.18% in June 2020 from 3.1% reported last year, but was lower than 6.3% a month ago. The CPI-rural inflation rate rose to 6.20% from 2.2% registered last year and 6.18% a month ago, and the urban inflation rate increased to 5.9% from 4.3% a year ago, but was lower than 6.4% recorded a month ago. As per Labour Bureau data, the CPI-inflation rate of agricultural labourers (CPI–AL) increased to 7.2% in June 2020 from 6.3% registered a year ago, and that of industrial workers (CPI–IW) decreased to 5.1% from 8.6% reported a year ago.

Movement of WPI-Inflation Rate January 2018–June 2020



* Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12 = 100.

Trends in WPI and Its Components June 2020* (%)

	Weights	Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year (Averages) 2017–18	2018–19	2019–20
All commodities	100	1.4	-1.8	2.9	4.3	1.7
Primary articles	22.6	2.3	-1.2	1.4	2.7	6.8
Food articles	15.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	0.3	8.4
Fuel and power	13.2	5.5	-13.6	8.2	11.5	-1.8
Manufactured products	64.2	0.4	0.1	2.7	3.7	0.3

*Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12=100; Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Movement of CPI Inflation January 2018–June 2020



* Data is provisional; Source: National Statistical Office (NSO); Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Base: 2012=100.

CPI: Rural and Urban June 2020* (%)

	Latest Month Index	Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year (Avgs) 2018–19	2019–20
CPI combined	151.6	0.5	6.1	3.4	4.3
Rural (2012=100)	152.5	0.9	6.2	3.0	5.4
Urban (2012=100)	150.5	-0.1	5.9	3.9	4.8
CPI: Occupation-wise					
Industrial workers (2001=100)	332.0	0.6	5.1	5.4	7.5
Agricultural labourers (1986–87=100)	1018.0	-0.1	7.2	2.1	8.0

* Provisional; #May 2020; Source: NSO (rural and urban); Labour Bureau (IW and AL).

Foreign Trade

The trade balance reported a surplus of $0.8 billion in June 2020 compared to the deficit of $15.3 bn reported a year ago. Exports decreased by (-)12.4% to $21.9 bn and imports by (-)47.6% to $21.1 bn from $25.0 bn and $40.3 bn, respectively. Oil imports went down by (-)55.3% to $4.9 bn, and non-oil by (-)44.7% to $16.2 bn from their respective values of $11.0 bn and $29.3 bn. During April–June 2020–21, the cumulative exports declined by (-)36.7% to $51.3 bn and imports by (-)52.4% to $60.4 bn from $81.1 bn and $127.0 bn, respectively, during the same period last year.

Index of Eight Core Industries

The index declined by (-)15.0% in June 2020 against 1.2% registered a year ago. Growth in coal production declined by -15.5%, and natural gas by -12.0% compared to 2.9% and -2.1%, respectively. Production of refinery products reported a growth rate of (-)8.9% and crude oil of (-)6.0% compared to -9.3% and -6.8%, respectively. Growth in steel production decreased by (-)33.8%, cement by (-)6.9% and electricity generation by (-)11.0% against 10.8%, -1.9% and 8.6%, respectively. Production of fertilisers increased by 4.2% compared to 1.5%.

Merchandise Trade June 2020

	June 2020 ($ bn)	Over Month (%)	Over Year (%)	April–June (2020–21 over 2019–20) (%)
Exports	21.9	15.0	-12.4	-36.7
Imports	21.1	-4.9	-47.6	-52.4
Trade surplus	0.8	-125.4	-105.2	-80.2

Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Trade Balance January 2018–June 2020



Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while Non-oil refers to all other commodities.

Movement of Index Values of Components of IIP January 2018–June 2020



* June 2020 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100.

Growth in Eight Core Industries June 2020* (%)

	Weights	Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year (Avgs) 2018–19	2019–20
Infrastructure industries	40.27@	5.6	-15.0	0.4	4.4
Coal	10.3	-4.7	-15.5	-0.4	7.4
Crude oil	9.0	-2.9	-6.0	-5.9	-4.1
Natural gas	6.9	1.7	-12.0	-5.6	0.8
Petroleum refinery products	28.0	8.4	-8.9	0.2	3.1
Fertilisers	2.6	1.0	4.2	2.7	0.3
Steel	17.9	14.4	-33.8	3.4	5.1
Cement	5.4	17.4	-6.9	-0.9	13.3
Electricity	19.9	2.6	-11.0	0.9	5.2

(Base: 2011–12=100) ; *Data is provisional. @ The revised Eight Core Industries have a combined weight of 40.27% in the IIP. Source: National Statistical Office and Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

India's Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP

₹ Crore | At 2011–12 Prices	2017–18 Q1	2017–18 Q2	2017–18 Q3	2017–18 Q4	2018–19 Q1	2018–19 Q2	2018–19 Q3	2018–19 Q4	2019–20 Q1	2019–20 Q2	2019–20 Q3	2019–20 Q4
Private final consumption expenditure	1769688 (9.3)	1750056 (5.5)	1911901 (5.3)	1948175 (7.7)	1889008 (6.7)	1903853 (8.8)	2046415 (7.0)	2068782 (6.2)	1992967 (5.5)	2025488 (6.4)	2182352 (6.6)	2125099 (2.7)
Government final consumption expenditure	362769 (21.6)	367882 (7.4)	319547 (10.5)	293024 (8.9)	393709 (8.5)	407780 (10.8)	341988 (7.0)	335089 (14.4)	418249 (6.2)	465643 (14.2)	387729 (13.4)	380747 (13.6)
Gross fixed capital formation	958859 (0.7)	967190 (5.9)	1014300 (8.8)	1120847 (13.7)	1082670 (12.9)	1077942 (11.5)	1130201 (11.4)	1170154 (4.4)	1132195 (4.6)	1035736 (-3.9)	1071838 (-5.2)	1094323 (-6.5)
Change in stocks	49996 (61.7)	54050 (75.8)	52497 (78.3)	59252 (79.6)	64131 (28.3)	66159 (22.4)	63999 (21.9)	70126 (18.4)	67328 (5.0)	66999 (1.3)	64718 (1.1)	70445 (0.5)
Valuables	62905 (80.1)	46317 (25.0)	39512 (11.2)	43928 (1.5)	41080 (-34.7)	44629 (-3.6)	39252 (-0.7)	44772 (1.9)	51347 (25.0)	51761 (16.0)	43368 (10.5)	46153 (3.1)
Net trade (Export–import)	-137041	-85422	-128661	-125231	-122238	-141491	-104580	-51926	-117242	-76355	-44444	-59686
Exports	627176 (3.9)	639543 (4.5)	646620 (4.4)	688438 (5.0)	686695 (9.5)	719352 (12.5)	748505 (15.8)	767991 (11.6)	708546 (3.2)	703282 (-2.2)	703023 (-6.1)	702809 (-8.5)
Less imports	764217 (21.8)	724965 (10.5)	775281 (14.1)	813669 (23.6)	808933 (5.9)	860843 (18.7)	853085 (10.0)	819917 (0.8)	825788 (2.1)	779637 (-9.4)	747467 (-12.4)	762495 (-7.0)
Discrepancies	69397	132000	105705	151725	10803	73679	-17242	52683	-9576	15062	-62812	146521
Gross domestic product (GDP)	3136572 (5.1)	3232072 (7.3)	3314801 (8.7)	3491719 (7.4)	3359162 (7.1)	3432553 (6.2)	3500033 (5.6)	3689678 (5.7)	3535267 (5.2)	3584335 (4.4)	3642748 (4.1)	3803601 (3.1)

India's Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

Item	2018–19 ($ mn) Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	2019–20 ($ mn) Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	2018–19 (₹ bn) Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	2019–20 (₹ bn) Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Current account	-15803	-19054	-17752	-4647	-15004	-7579	-2630	558	-1059 [-2.3]	-1337 [-2.9]	-1279 [-2.7]	-328 [-0.7]	-1044 [-2.1]	-534 [-1.1]	-187 [-0.4]	40 [0.1]
Merchandise	-45751	-50037	-49281	-35214	-46774	-39650	-36040	-35042	-3065	-3510	-3552	-2482	-3253	-2793	-2567	-2536
Invisibles	29947	30984	31529	30567	31769	32070	33410	35600	2006	2174	2272	2154	2209	2259	2380	2577
Services	18676	20256	21678	21331	20075	20941	21879	22027	1251	1421	1562	1503	1396	1475	1558	1594
of which: Software services	18605	19286	19895	19868	20998	21064	21455	21125	1246	1353	1434	1400	1460	1484	1528	1529
Transfers	17031	19331	17424	16160	17964	19952	18893	18400	1141	1356	1256	1139	1249	1405	1346	1332
of which: Private	17216	19511	17558	16317	18224	20188	19132	18673	1153	1369	1265	1150	1267	1422	1363	1352
Income	-5760	-8603	-7573	-6925	-6270	-8822	-7361	-4827	-386	-604	-546	-488	-436	-621	-524	-349
Capital account	4787	16604	13770	19241	28624	13580	23626	17350	321 [0.7]	1165 [2.5]	992 [12.1]	1356 [2.7]	1991 [4.0]	956 [1.9]	1683 [3.3]	1256 [2.4]
of which: Foreign investment	1427	7612	5199	15856	18835	9791	17572	-1782	96	534	375	1117	1310	690	1252	-129
Overall balance	-11338	-1868	-4296	14162	13984	5118	21601	18794	-760 [-1.7]	-131 [-0.3]	-310 [-0.6]	998 [2.0]	973 [2.0]	360 [0.7]	1539 [3.0]	1360 [2.6]

Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves

Excluding gold but including revaluation effects	31 July 2020	2 August 2019	31 March 2020	Variation: Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year So Far 2019–20	2020–21	Financial Year 2015–16	2016–17	2017–18	2018–19	2019–20
₹ crore	3682828	492304	400159	3344616	17593	92146	13345	218620	25300	353270	68050	668976
$ mn	492304	76431	17940	443645	81694	83458	170400	16297	10160	53217	-14168	56831

Monetary Aggregates

₹ Crore	Outstanding 2020	Variation: Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year So Far 2019–20	2020–21	Financial Year 2017–18	2018–19	2019–20
Money supply (M_3) as on 17 July	17490673	175309 (1.0)	1922891 (12.4)	135715 (0.9)	690742 (4.1)	1170657 (9.2)	1469480 (10.5)	1367864 (8.9)
Components								
Currency with public	2580271	17304 (0.7)	481566 (22.9)	46495 (2.3)	230556 (9.8)	495583 (39.2)	292497 (16.6)	297505 (14.5)
Demand deposits	1612933	39976 (2.5)	173083 (12.0)	-186662 (-11.5)	-124759 (-7.2)	86962 (6.2)	142800 (9.6)	111180 (6.8)
Time deposits	13258193	117469 (0.9)	1264975 (10.5)	271614 (2.3)	584177 (4.6)	585266 (5.8)	1026348 (9.6)	952412 (8.1)
Other deposits with RBI	39276	560 (1.4)	3267 (9.1)	4267 (13.4)	768 (2.0)	2817 (13.4)	7835 (32.8)	6766 (21.3)
Sources								
Net bank credit to government	5499197	-392 (-0.0)	752425 (15.9)	358282 (8.2)	592614 (12.1)	144799 (3.8)	387091 (9.7)	518093 (11.8)
Bank credit to commercial sector	10878066	-21574 (-0.2)	607410 (5.9)	-112063 (-1.1)	-160579 (-1.5)	802225 (9.5)	1169004 (12.7)	655926 (6.3)
Net foreign exchange assets	4079636	38288 (0.9)	918553 (29.1)	90242 (2.9)	278599 (7.3)	364065 (14.2)	148546 (5.1)	730196 (23.8)
Banking sector's net non-monetary liabilities	2992540	-158988 (-5.0)	355827 (13.5)	200843 (8.2)	19892 (0.7)	140995 (6.8)	235395 (10.7)	536778 (22.0)
Reserve money as on 31 July	3181239	1453 (0.0)	424200 (15.4)	-13442 (-0.5)	151565 (5.0)	518300 (27.3)	351701 (14.5)	259193 (9.4)
Components								
Currency in circulation	2672446	7117 (0.3)	501502 (23.1)	34173 (1.6)	225167 (9.2)	494078 (37.0)	307423 (16.8)	310508 (14.5)
Bankers' deposits with RBI	469087	-5192 (-1.1)	-86540 (-15.6)	-46342 (-7.7)	-74801 (-13.8)	21405 (3.9)	36444 (6.4)	-58081 (-9.6)
Other deposits with RBI	39707	-471 (-1.2)	9238 (30.3)	-1273 (-4.0)	1199 (3.1)	2817 (13.4)	7835 (32.8)	6766 (21.3)
Sources								
Net RBI credit to government	1078662	-102355 (-8.7)	-39721 (-3.6)	316432 (39.5)	86470 (8.7)	-144836 (-23.3)	325987 (68.5)	190241 (23.7)
of which: Centre	1073847	-100209 (-8.5)	-41748 (-3.7)	315122 (39.4)	84106 (8.5)	-145304 (-23.5)	326187 (68.8)	189268 (23.6)
RBI credit to banks & commercial sector	-359983	25783 (-6.7)	-147048 (69.1)	-365786 (-239.3)	-159090 (79.2)	372643 (-120.5)	89478 (0.0)	-353744 (0.0)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI	3983510	170169 (4.5)	1012735 (34.1)	122188 (4.3)	393107 (10.9)	363571 (15.2)	87806 (3.2)	741816 (26.0)
Govt's currency liabilities to the public	26315	0 (0.0)	314 (1.2)	113 (0.4)	0 (0.0)	572 (2.3)	236 (0.9)	427 (1.6)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI	1547264	92143 (6.3)	402080 (35.1)	86389 (8.2)	168922 (12.3)	73650 (8.8)	151805 (16.7)	319547 (30.2)

Scheduled Commercial Banks' Indicators *(₹ Crore)*

(As on 17 July)	Outstanding 2020	Variation: Over Month	Over Year	Financial Year So Far 2019–20	2020–21	Financial Year 2017–18	2018–19	2019–20
Aggregate deposits	14020487	153373 (1.1)	1369897 (10.8)	76819 (0.6)	452995 (3.3)	668390 (6.2)	1147721 (10.0)	993721 (7.9)
Demand	1491857	39434 (2.7)	166954 (12.6)	-186384 (-12.3)	-125146 (-7.7)	88843 (6.9)	141004 (10.3)	105716 (7.0)
Time	12528630	113939 (0.9)	1202942 (10.6)	263203 (2.4)	578141 (4.8)	579547 (6.1)	1006718 (10.0)	888004 (8.0)
Cash in hand	85191	-1991 (-2.3)	6163 (7.8)	4151 (5.5)	-2070 (-2.4)	-1295 (-2.1)	14812 (24.7)	12384 (16.5)
Balance with RBI	434563	-16800 (-3.7)	-98450 (-18.5)	-32694 (-5.8)	-101623 (-19.0)	16906 (3.3)	40021 (7.6)	-29521 (-5.2)
Investments	4187319	45320 (1.1)	694582 (19.9)	111681 (3.3)	439970 (11.7)	287494 (9.5)	62602 (1.9)	366293 (10.8)
of which: Government securities	4185871	44943 (1.1)	698452 (20.0)	108417 (3.2)	447174 (12.0)	287657 (9.5)	61595 (1.9)	359695 (10.6)
Bank credit	10219462	-25568 (-0.2)	561084 (5.8)	-113345 (-1.2)	-151399 (-1.5)	783965 (10.0)	1146298 (13.3)	599138 (6.1)
of which: Non-food credit	10133107	-22635 (-0.2)	540730 (5.6)	-137736 (-1.4)	-185990 (-1.8)	795906 (10.2)	1146677 (13.4)	588984 (6.1)

Capital Markets

	7 August 2020	Month Ago	Year Ago	Financial Year So Far Trough	Financial Year So Far Peak	2019–20 Trough	2019–20 Peak	End of Financial Year 2017–18	2018–19	2019–20
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 1978–79=100)	38041 (3.7)	36675	36691 (-2.6)	27591	38493	25981	41953	32969 (12.1)	39714.20 (12.4)	29816 (-21.8)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 1983–84=100)	11318 (3.2)	10879	10965 (-6.0)	8180	11324	7683	12456	10503 (11.5)	12044.07 (9.1)	8693 (-25.2)
S&P BSE-200 (1989–90=100)	4729 (4.2)	4547	4538 (-7.2)	3416	4729	3209	5185	4433 (12.0)	4986.55 (7.1)	3614 (-25.1)
CNX Nifty-50 (Base: 3 Nov 1995=1000)	11214 (3.3)	10800	10856 (-4.7)	8084	11301	7610	12362	10114 (11.1)	11922.80 (11.1)	8660 (-24.3)
CNX Nifty-500	9199 (3.9)	8850	8855 (-8.8)	6638	9199	6243	10119	8912 (12.6)	9805.05 (5.3)	7003 (-26.3)

Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates

■ Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities, Forex Market and Money Market—July 2020

1 Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions

Settlement Period	Outright Number of Trades	Outright Volume (₹ Cr)	Repo Number of Trades	Repo Volume (₹ Cr)	Daily Average (Outright) Number of Trades	Daily Average (Outright) Volume (₹ Cr)	Daily Average (Repo) Number of Trades	Daily Average (Repo) Volume (₹ Cr)
July 2020	73060	1146554	28620	4098668	3177	49850	1145	163947
July 2019	135958	1766292	22878	2562517	5911	76795	915	102501
2020–21^	220260	3864810	92998	13991720	2753	48310	1045	157210
2019–20^	391571	5098237	81951	9106085	4775	62174	921	102316

2 Netting Factor

a Securities Gross (₹ Cr)	a Securities Net (₹ Cr)	a Securities Netting Factor (%)	b Funds Gross (₹ Cr)	b Funds Net (₹ Cr)	b Funds Netting Factor (%)
5245222	1979142	62.27	5549866	654146	88.21
4328809	1428505	67.00	4521910	485639	89.26
17856530	6733573	62.29	18896245	2296118	87.85
14205817	5057581	64.40	14631880	1780682	87.83

3 Instrument-wise Break-up of Securities Transactions (₹ Cr)

a Outright Trades Central Govt Dated	a Outright Trades Treasury Bills	a Outright Trades State Govt	b Repo Central Govt Dated	b Repo Treasury Bills	b Repo State Govt
918434	163299	64820	1321928	277334	440185
1563782	123639	78872	832047	143000	293688
2936167	742917	185726	4693591	914566	1389763
4444055	386859	267322	2933491	690712	927495

4 Tenor-wise Settlement Volume of Central Government Dated Securities

Year	July 2020	2020–21^		2019–20^	
2020	4763	24441	(0.83)	100311	(2.27)
2021	22116	79429	(2.71)	44756	(1.01)
2022	24476	125820	(4.29)	91238	(2.06)
2023	23604	94910	(3.23)	153783	(3.48)
2024	71497	312927	(10.66)	443202	(10.02)
2025	54225	98589	(3.36)	23696	(0.54)
2026	43318	208745	(7.11)	137474	(3.11)
2027	24647	96309	(3.28)	43876	(0.99)
2028	24541	73198	(2.49)	1027051	(23.22)
2029	165198	916838	(31.23)	2096300	(47.39)
2030	267614	394912	(13.45)	21796	(0.49)
2031	9313	32662	(1.11)	47153	(1.07)
2032	4035	19382	(0.66)	63975	(1.45)
2033	25991	191028	(6.51)	40007	(0.90)
2034	130342	187141	(6.37)	14212	(0.32)
2035	2288	8590	(0.29)	15541	(0.35)
2036	397	3041	(0.10)	1095	(0.02)
2037	171	226	(0.01)	28	(0.00)
2038	171	226	(0.01)	28	(0.00)
2039	1745	8911	(0.30)	9744	(0.22)
2040	192	874	(0.03)	4078	(0.09)
2041	436	986	(0.03)	6095	(0.14)
2042	1106	4681	(0.16)	7197	(0.16)
2043	575	4497	(0.15)	3994	(0.09)
2044	561	1378	(0.05)	6404	(0.14)
2045	628	1548	(0.05)	3933	(0.09)
2046	516	2497	(0.09)	7749	(0.18)
2047	171	226	(0.01)	3	(0.00)
2048	171	226	(0.01)	3	(0.00)
2049	171	727	(0.02)	2561	(0.06)
2050	5238	18342	(0.62)	3	(0.00)
2051	1384	3817	(0.13)	2935	(0.07)
2052	135	190	(0.01)	3	(0.00)
2053	135	190	(0.01)	3	(0.00)
2054	135	190	(0.01)	3	(0.00)
2055	792	1265	(0.04)	1606	(0.04)
2056	135	190	(0.01)	0	(0.00)
2057	135	190	(0.01)	0	(0.00)
2058	135	190	(0.01)	0	(0.00)
2059	271	1488	(0.05)	1894	(0.04)
2060	4960	15150	(0.52)	0	(0.00)
Total	918434	2936167	(100)	4423730	(100)

5 Deal Size Analysis (%)

Settlement Period	< 5 Cr % to Total Trades	< 5 Cr % to Total Value	5 Cr % to Total Trades	5 Cr % to Total Value	> 5 Cr <=10 Cr % to Total Trades	> 5 Cr <=10 Cr % to Total Value	>10 Cr <=20 Cr % to Total Trades	>10 Cr <=20 Cr % to Total Value	> 20 Cr % to Total Trades	> 20 Cr % to Total Value
July 2020	4.89	0.53	48.03	15.30	21.60	13.67	7.83	8.54	17.64	61.96
July 2019	2.57	0.32	53.64	20.64	20.74	15.95	9.09	12.35	13.96	50.73
2020–21^	4.80	0.48	46.68	13.30	21.47	12.18	7.72	7.56	19.32	66.48
2019–20^	2.91	0.35	54.42	20.90	20.46	15.69	7.88	10.48	14.33	52.58

6 Market Share of Top 'n' Securities (%)

Period	July 2020	July 2019	2020–21^	2019–20^
Top 5	65.41	87.00	54.70	83.61
Top 10	78.54	91.79	72.11	88.08
Top 15	85.33	94.18	80.01	90.75
Top 20	88.87	95.62	84.59	92.65

7 Intercategory Member Turnover Activity for All Category

Category	Buy Outright	Buy Reverse Repo (Funds Lending)	Buy TREP Lending@	Buy Uncollateralised Money Market Lending*	Buy Forex	Sell Outright	Sell Repo	Sell TREP Borrowing@	Sell Uncollateralised Money Market Borrowing*	Sell Forex
Cooperative Banks	4.94	0.13	0.60	59.89**	0.11	4.60	0.23	0.50	2.06**	0.13
Financial Institutions	0.60	0.00	0.98	-	0.07	0.65	0.11	5.47	-	0.04
Foreign Banks	19.42	18.36	0.09	2.42	44.72	23.00	27.22	10.48	0.88	46.42
Insurance Companies	2.26	2.08	22.85	-	-	0.72	0.00	0.00	-	-
Mutual Funds	15.94	75.31	62.89	-	-	8.90	0.08	2.90	-	-
Others	4.53	0.00	12.32	-	-	3.27	2.13	4.71	-	-
Primary Dealers	9.52	1.74	0.01	0.00	-	15.28	47.74	7.38	45.28	-
Private Sector Banks	27.40	2.31	0.16	22.86	28.57	28.78	19.57	47.93	20.77	27.76
Public Sector Banks	15.38	0.08	0.10	14.82	26.52	14.79	2.91	20.63	31.01	25.65
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

8 Market Share of Top Five Members (Category-wise) (%)

Categories	July 2020	July 2019	2020–21^
Cooperative Banks	62.16	49.36	56.09
Foreign Banks	67.94	72.48	68.64
Public Sector Banks	66.80	54.91	65.73
Private Sector Banks	86.33	82.19	81.00
Mutual Funds	57.09	55.16	53.36
Primary Dealers	86.12	94.78	87.59

9 Market Share of Top 'n' Members (%)

Period	July 2020	July 2019	2020–21^	2019–20^
Top 5	29.91	29.57	30.21	29.39
Top 10	42.86	44.51	43.97	45.03
Top 15	53.45	55.97	54.45	56.49
Top 20	61.39	64.87	62.31	65.35

10 Trading Platform Analysis of Outright Trades

Period	OTC Trades	OTC % Share	OTC Value (₹ Cr)	OTC % Share	NDS-OM Trades	NDS-OM % Share	NDS-OM Value (₹ Cr)	NDS-OM % Share
July 2020	6507	8.98	254369	22.49	65968	91.02	876446	77.51
July 2019	7075	5.15	293731	16.42	130176	94.85	1494846	83.58
2020–21^	19325	8.75	999290	26.01	201466	91.25	2842140	73.99
2019–20^	24057	6.10	946815	18.42	370595	93.90	4194041	81.58

11 Type-wise Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions (₹ Crore)

Period	Outright Proprietary Trades	Outright Proprietary Volume	Outright Constituent Trades	Outright Constituent Volume	Repo Proprietary Trades	Repo Proprietary Volume	Repo Constituent Trades	Repo Constituent Volume
July 2020	54395	884223	18665	262331	13153	1666998	1144	372449
July 2019	114949	1485181	21009	281111	10953	1169991	446	98744
2020–21^	166328	3108041	53932	756769	41826	5545436	4733	1452484
2019–20^	331148	4289181	60423	809056	39399	4204976	1612	346723

12 Trep Trading @

Settlement Period	Total Trades	Total Value	Daily Average Trades	Daily Average Value
July 2020	20244	4162438	810	166498
July 2019	19088	3190152	764	127606
2020–21^	74371	15572115	836	174968
2019–20^	69953	11461795	786	128784

13 Top 5 Securities—Basket Repo

Security	Trades	Value	Rate
6.84% GS 2022	220	77962	3.17
6.79% GS 2029	141	55237	3.17
5.22% GS 2025	140	51643	3.18
7.32% GS 2024	172	46291	3.16
7.26% GS 2029	142	44974	3.20

14 Top 5 Securities—Special Repo

Security	Trades	Value	Rate
5.79% GS 2030	504	64063	2.58
6.45% GS 2029	474	63290	2.79
5.22% GS 2025	260	54396	3.04
8.83% GS 2023	75	32610	3.20
7.27% GS 2026	214	25808	3.01

15 Forex Settlement

Settlement Period	Cash Trades	Cash Value (₹ Cr)	Cash Value ($ Mn)	Tom Trades	Tom Value (₹ Cr)	Tom Value ($ Mn)	Spot Trades	Spot Value (₹ Cr)	Spot Value ($ Mn)	Forward Trades	Forward Value (₹ Cr)	Forward Value ($ Mn)	Total Trades	Total Value (₹ Cr)	Total Value ($ Mn)	Average Trades	Average Value (₹ Cr)	Average Value ($ Mn)	Netting Factor: Forex Gross ($ Mn)	Netting Factor: Forex Net ($ Mn)	Netting Factor: Forex Netting Factor (%)
July 2020	3314	862412	115024	4508	1093341	145763	113618	1853209	246991	6219	735331	98386	127659	4544294	606163	5550	197578	26355	606163	35459	94.15
2020–21^	10433	2467236	326739	13925	3063958	405667	330557	5386687	713204	30017	3250495	438795	384932	14168376	1884406	4812	177105	23555	1884406	107828	94.28

16 Category-wise Forex Activity—Deal Type

Category	Cash	Tom	Spot	Forward
Foreign Banks	38.02	43.63	46.56	54.79
Public Sector Banks	30.08	26.77	25.39	22.11
Private Sector Banks	31.68	29.45	27.86	22.93
Cooperative Banks	0.10	0.09	0.17	0.08
Financial Institutions	0.11	0.06	0.02	0.08

17 Forex Deal Size Analysis (%)

Settlement Period	< 1 mn % to Total Trades	< 1 mn % to Total Value	1 mn % to Total Trades	1 mn % to Total Value	> 1 mn <= 5 mn % to Total Trades	> 1 mn <= 5 mn % to Total Value	> 5 mn <= 10 mn % to Total Trades	> 5 mn <= 10 mn % to Total Value	> 10 mn <= 20 mn % to Total Trades	> 10 mn <= 20 mn % to Total Value	> 20 mn % to Total Trades	> 20 mn % to Total Value
July 2020	22.90	1.94	52.76	11.11	13.43	8.92	3.44	6.94	2.06	7.34	5.40	63.75
2020–21^	19.15	1.49	52.67	10.76	15.56	10.24	4.41	8.64	2.39	8.36	5.83	60.51

18 Market Share—Forex (%)

Period	July 2020	July 2019	2020–21^	2019–20^
Top 5	35.11	30.09	34.80	31.34
Top 10	59.00	51.08	58.82	51.80
Top 15	77.89	66.95	77.08	67.27
Top 20	86.45	78.83	86.17	78.66

19 Tenor-wise Forward Trade Analysis (%)

Settlement Period	< 30 Days % to Total Trades	< 30 Days % to Total Value	> 30 Days & <= 90 Days % to Total Trades	> 30 Days & <= 90 Days % to Total Value	> 90 Days & <= 180 Days % to Total Trades	> 90 Days & <= 180 Days % to Total Value	> 180 Days & <= 365 Days % to Total Trades	> 180 Days & <= 365 Days % to Total Value	> 1 Year % to Total Trades	> 1 Year % to Total Value
July 2020	14.33	32.25	14.81	20.12	14.81	12.45	50.47	31.47	5.58	3.71
July 2019	18.70	28.41	29.76	32.67	14.67	12.47	28.80	21.03	8.08	5.42
2020–21^	10.94	22.73	18.22	24.19	17.66	17.89	49.22	32.30	3.96	2.89

20 Forex Trading Platform: FX Clear (Amount in $)

Period	Spot Trades	Spot Value	Daily Average Trades	Daily Average Value
July 2020	19351	10852	841	472
July 2019	38900	24812	1691	1079
2020–21^	41836	24112	523	301
2019–20^	150311	96633	1833	1178

^ data pertains to April–July; * Call and Term Money Segment; ** Includes Small Finance and Payment Banks; @ 5 November 2018 onwards; (i) Figures in brackets are percentage to total; (ii) Tables 1 to 11 relate to Government Securities Market; (iii) Tables 12 to 14 relate to Money Market; and (iv) Tables 15 to 20 relate to Forex Market. Source: Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).

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